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

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

TIMOTHY W. CRAWFORD examines the failure of NATO's Kosovo policy in the months preceding the air war against Serbia in March 1999. He argues that the real challenge was not just to deter Belgrade from attacking Kosovar Albanians. It should also have been to deter the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) from guerrilla tactics aimed precisely to provoke Serb attacks on civilians in order to trigger a NATO intervention.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY summarizes the political and social dynamics that brought about the repeal of Aid to Families of Dependent Children (AFDC) and analyzes the effects of the new Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program over its first four years. He considers possibilities for further changes in cash assistance for poor families during the program's necessary reauthorization in 2002.

RACHEL GIBSON provides evidence for the main arguments made for and against Internet or I-voting. These range from normative criticism about the rise of "push-button" democracy to more optimistic expectations about increased participation and improved efficiency. The arguments are confronted with evidence from the 2000 Arizona Democratic primary election where I-voting was used as one method of ballot casting.

GARY KING and CHRISTOPHER J. L. MURRAY note that many attempts to ensure the territorial security of nation-states through military power have failed to improve their total human condition. In response, the international community has moved to combine economic development with military security and other basic human rights to form a new concept of "human security." Unfortunately, by common assent the concept lacks either a clear definition or any agreed upon measure of it.

TIMOTHY J. POWER analyzes the Cardoso experiment in Brazil through the lens of so-called Third Way politics. He demonstrates that while President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PDSB) has been the only major Latin American political party associated with the transnational Third Way debate, it has deviated in several important ways from recent European efforts to modernize social democracy.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

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Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War: Why the Holbrooke Agreement Failed

TIMOTHY W. CRAWFORD

Debate rages over whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) air war against Serbia was a success or failure.[1] But one thing is certain: that war resulted from a prior failure of NATO policy. The goal was to prevent the escalation of conflict and to achieve a political settlement that got "Serbia out of Kosovo, not Kosovo out of Serbia," without having to use force.[2] As intended, the Kosovo Liberation Army's (KLA) insurgency in Kosovo had provoked Belgrade's ham-fisted repression tactics. The Serb military police (MUP) and the Yugoslav National Army (VJ) killed innocent civilians and loosed a flood of refugees wherever they went: 42,000 by June 1998, 100,000 by August, and over 200,000 by October.[3] The Racak massacre in January 1999 captured public attention and triggered a vigorous international response. At the Rambouillet (6–23 February) and Paris (15–19 March) conferences, NATO threatened to bomb Serbia if it did not accept the Contact Group's (composed of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the United States) interim polit-

[1] See Michael Mandelbaum, "A Perfect Failure," *Foreign Affairs* 78 (September/October 1999): 2–8; Javier Solana, "NATO's Success in Kosovo," *Foreign Affairs* 78 (November/December 1999): 114–120; James B. Steinberg, "A Perfect Polemic," *Foreign Affairs* 78 (November/December 1999): 128–133; Christopher Layne, "Blunder in the Balkans: The Clinton Administration's Bungled War Against Serbia," *CATO Policy Analysis* 345 (20 May 1999); Barry R. Posen, "The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy," *International Security* 24 (Spring 2000): 39–84; Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); Ted Galen Carpenter, ed., *NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War* (Washington DC: CATO, 2000).

[2] Statement by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Situation in Kosovo, 8 October 1998 in Marc Weller, *The Crisis in Kosovo 1989–1999, International Documents and Analysis, vol. 1* [hereafter *IDA*] (Cambridge, UK: Documents and Analysis Publishing, 1999), 278.

[3] Phillip E. Auerswald and David P. Auerswald, eds., *The Kosovo Conflict: A Diplomatic History Through Documents* (Cambridge, UK: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 181, 224, 237, 333.

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ical settlement and NATO's plan to enforce it with armed peacekeepers. These threats did not compel Serbia to sign the agreements, and they did not deter it from launching Operation Horseshoe, a brutal offensive that displaced hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians (Kosovars).

Belgrade's decisions were the most visible failures of NATO's coercive diplomacy, but they were not the only ones. What made enforced negotiations at Rambouillet necessary was a breakdown of the cease-fire NATO imposed in October 1998. Under the threat of air strikes, Serbia agreed to withdraw or stand down most of its forces in Kosovo. Then, deterring the KLA from provocations became crucial to NATO's policy, a necessary condition for real progress in negotiations between Belgrade and Kosovar moderates. NATO failed to do this. That failure must be addressed if we are to understand why NATO did not prevent the war.

It is tempting to ignore it now that the war is won, refugees have returned, NATO controls Kosovo, and Slobodan Milosevic is out of power. The temptation is strongest for those who subscribe to the official Clinton administration view that "the responsibility for violence" in Kosovo lay "squarely with Belgrade" and that the KLA was "created" by the "extremist measures" of Serb forces.[4] Comparing this view with boilerplate KLA propaganda ("the source and cause of all evil is in Belgrade . . . the military actions of KLA are only of a defense nature") should at least give us pause.[5] If we want to understand why NATO's policy to prevent the war did not work, we must explain why NATO failed to deter the KLA from escalating. This is not to assert a "moral equivalency" between what the KLA did in Kosovo and what Serb forces did. But it is wrong to infer from Serb atrocities that the KLA was not aggressive and that it did not also need to be deterred. If we do that, we assume away NATO's strategic problem and do not understand it.

What sort of policy was it that failed? Was there any rhyme or reason to it? Or was it just a string of hasty decisions, bureaucratic turf battles, and the inevitable compromises of an unwieldy alliance? U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright thought that NATO's policy in 1998 had been "muddling" because it did not corner Belgrade sooner.[6] Michael Ignatieff saw it as "an evasive policy of procrastination."[7] And Marc Weller dubbed it "a perfect example of . . . ill-considered policy making on the hoof."[8] Phillip and David Auerswald suggest, more simply, that NATO was still "looking for a strategy" in the summer and fall of 1998.[9] From one direction, Christopher Layne condemns the

[4] Statement by Secretary of State Albright, 9 March 1998 in *Kosovo Conflict*, 103. See also Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 6.

[5] Statement by the KLA General Staff, 27 February 1999, *Kosovo Conflict*, 607.

[6] Barton Gelman, "The Path to Crisis: How the United States and Its Allies Went to War," *Washington Post*, 18 April 1999. In March 1998, Albright warned against a policy "paralyzed by the . . . artificial even-handedness that equates aggressors with their victims." *Kosovo Crisis*, 104.

[7] Michael Ignatieff, "The Dream of Albanians," *The New Yorker*, 11 January 1999, 37.

[8] Weller, *IDA*, 291.

[9] *Kosovo Conflict*, chap. 3.

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internal contradiction of NATO policy, which opposed "ethnic Albanian demands for independence" but also "Yugoslavia's efforts to suppress a guerrilla insurgency."[10] From the other, Chris Hedges suggests that NATO's policy was "blundering," because it "reminded the KLA not to rely too much on NATO."[11] Did NATO's policy make any sense?

Yes. It was an attempt to deal with a generic problem in international politics, a problem of pivotal deterrence. NATO tried to deter both the Serbs and the KLA from escalating, and to push them toward a compromise solution. From this perspective, there is a crucial, if often overlooked, reason why NATO's policy to prevent the war failed. Although options for deterring the KLA were limited by the strategic situation, NATO did not take feasible measures to restrain the KLA as it stepped up the pressure on Belgrade at the end of 1998. This failure is the key reason why the October cease-fire broke down in January 1999, a crucial turning point on the path to war two months later.

The Logic of Pivotal Deterrence

Pivotal deterrence is a form of statecraft used by third parties in a pivotal position between two committed adversaries. The aim is, first of all, to deter both sides and sometimes, in parallel, to drive them toward a compromise solution.[12] Not all third parties are pivots. A pivot is one who can determine the outcome of war by intervening or (what is much the same when one side dominates the other) standing aside. NATO was a pivot in the Kosovo War.[13]

Not all pivots are peacemakers. Some may use their position to incite or prolong rather than deter wars, to overthrow rather than preserve or reform the status quo. For example, Missouri Senator Harry Truman espoused a pivotal policy in 1941: "If we see that Germany is winning [the war] we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany and in that way let them kill as many as possible."[14] Truman's pivotal strategy would pro-

[10] Layne, "Blunder in the Balkans," 5.

[11] "Kosovo's Next Masters?" *Foreign Affairs* 78 (May/June 1999): 38.

[12] For a fuller theoretical treatment, see Timothy W. Crawford, *Pivotal Deterrence and Peacemaking: Bargaining, Leverage, and Third Party Statecraft* (Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation, 2001). See Robert Jervis, "What Do We Want To Deter and How Do We Deter It?" in L. Benjamin Edington and Michael J. Mazarr, eds., *Turning Point: The Gulf War and US Military Strategy* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994) 122–124; and Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), chaps. 5 and 6; Lowell Dittmer, "The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis," *World Politics* 33 (July 1981): 489–490; and Glenn Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 192–199, 332–334.

[13] This is partly an abstraction, since there was often disagreement within the alliance over Kosovo policy. But NATO did present itself to other key players as a unified actor, just as states do, despite their domestic divisions. On the problem of NATO's cohesion, see Posen, "The War for Kosovo"; and Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, "Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate," *International Security* 24 (Spring 2000): 34.

[14] Truman is quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1982), 4.

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long war. In contrast, pivotal deterrence tries to prevent war, to ensure that the status quo, if it is to be changed, is changed peacefully. This was what NATO aimed for in Kosovo until March 1999, when it turned decisively against Serbia.

Pivotal deterrers use threats, commitments, and what might be called non-commitments to deflect others from war. As with all types of deterrence, therefore, the point is to prevent war by making the potential belligerents fear the costs. Pivotal deterrence should not be confused with mediation. Although the two sometimes merge in what has been called muscular mediation, they are not the same thing, and they need not go together.[15] Mediation, according to William Zartman and Saadia Touval "must be acceptable to the adversaries . . . who cooperate diplomatically" with a mediator, who is "restricted to diplomatic involvement" and "may not employ violence."[16] Pivotal deterrence is often pursued against the wishes and without the cooperation of one or both sides, and it involves coercion—threats to use force or to refrain from using force and expose the weak side to the stronger.

Pivotal deterrence only makes sense when both sides are aggressive, when they both want to upset the status quo and will use force to do that if conditions permit.[17] Accordingly, a key to pivotal deterrence is that the pivot avoid firm commitments to one side. These will embolden the beneficiary; so the pivot maximizes its leverage over both adversaries by keeping its freedom of action. Moreover, if the goal is not just to deter war, but to drive both sides toward a settlement that neither prefers, one-sided pressure will only encourage intransigence from the other. The pivot must not become firmly committed or irreconcilably hostile to either side if it wants to impel compromise.

Flexibility makes pivotal deterrence possible. What makes it work are the adversaries' efforts to avoid being cornered or abandoned by the pivot. These efforts drive two peacemaking mechanisms. The first, deterrence in the most basic sense, instills caution. In trying to avoid actions that could alienate the pivot, the adversaries will act more cautiously than they otherwise would. The second, which operates at the level of diplomatic negotiations, encourages com-

[15] Alan Kuperman coined the phrase "muscular mediation" to describe the tactics of a third party who "simply proposes his own solution and threatens to use his considerable resources against whichever side rejects the agreement. While one or both sides may not like the deal, each is expected to prefer it to confronting the combined strength of its opponent and the mediator." See "Rambouillet Requiem: Why The Talks Failed," *Wall Street Journal*, 4 March 1999.

[16] Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, eds., *International Mediation in Theory and Practice* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985), 7; Saadia Touval, "Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical Considerations, *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1 (Fall 1975): 51–52. Also see Jacob Bercovitch, "Meditation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, A Review of Practice" in I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen, eds., *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1997), 127–128.

[17] This is why pivotal deterrence is different from extended deterrence. In the latter, the "defender" believes that one side is aggressive while the other side (the protégé) is not, and publicly commits to defending the protégé against the adversary. See Paul Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Crawford, *Pivotal Deterrence and Peacemaking*, chap. 1.

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promise. As they try to ingratiate themselves with the pivot, and put the other side "in the wrong," the adversaries may make concessions that they would not otherwise make. This is where the logic of pivotal deterrence and muscular mediation converge.

Pivotal deterrence makes sense in three basic situations. First is when both adversaries will escalate if they think the pivot will stand aside. Here the pivot will try to convince them that it will fight against whoever strikes first, which means that it cannot commit beforehand to fighting for either side. Second is when both adversaries will escalate if they have the pivot's allegiance, but not without it. Here the pivot will maintain good relations with both and threaten to abandon whoever starts a war. Third is when A will escalate if A thinks the pivot will stand aside, and B will escalate if B thinks the pivot will defend it. Here, the pivot will threaten to oppose A and abandon B.[18]

NATO confronted the last of these three scenarios in Kosovo. Milosevic, it seemed, would only refrain from a full-blown offensive in Kosovo and instead cut a deal with the Contact Group if he thought NATO would firmly oppose him. The KLA, on the other hand, would only refrain from provocative escalation if that would cause NATO to abandon and isolate it. Thus, to prevent the war from spiraling in 1998, NATO tried to make two credible yet contradictory threats—to intervene if Belgrade escalated the heavy-handed repression in Kosovo, and to abandon and isolate the KLA if it continued to provoke Serb retaliation and oppose a negotiated solution.

Was it foolish to pursue a policy that embraced this internal contradiction? Not necessarily. Steering away from Charybdis may bring you closer to Scylla, and vice versa, but you still would do well to sail between them. Pivotal deterrence policies, in any event, do sometimes work. In the 1870s, for example, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck pulled off a policy of "mutual frustration" toward Austria–Hungary and Russia that kept "them from tearing each other to pieces."[19] America's similar policy of "strategic ambiguity" toward Taiwan and China also has been successful.[20] And NATO's successful approach to the brewing dispute between Montenegro and Serbia in the Winter of 2000 was of the same species.[21]

[18] On this scenario, also see Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 332–334.

[19] Gordon A. Craig and Alexander George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 37–40; Bismarck quoted in Otto Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany*, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 491. This case is fully explained in Crawford, *Pivotal Deterrence*, chap. 3.

[20] The basic logic of the policy, as Nancy Bernkopt Tucker puts it, is "If you say you will protect Taiwan under any circumstances, you may encourage the independence forces on Taiwan. If, on the other hand, you say you won't defend Taiwan, you may invite China to act. . . . Ambiguity keeps each side from taking extreme action." Quoted in "US Policy: 'Ambiguity,'" *Los Angeles Times*, 22 February 2000. Also see Crawford, *Pivotal Deterrence*, chap. 8.

[21] As Ivo H. Daalder, an opponent of the policy, described it: "NATO . . . expressed concern about developments in Montenegro and warned Belgrade against using violence. But [it did not] provide Montenegro the security guarantee it wanted, fearing that to do so could prompt a Montenegrin decision to declare independence." "Another Balkan War?" *Washington Post*, 22 August 2000.

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Inevitably, those who oppose pivotal deterrence policies attack its basic premise and argue that only one side is really aggressive and must be opposed. Albright's brief against NATO's "muddling" policy of 1998 was no different. But the reality was that regardless of who started it, Belgrade and the KLA were both aggressive in Kosovo. That is why NATO's policy remained flexible before Rambouillet. Still, why did pivotal deterrence fail? To conceive of NATO's policy in this way does not explain why it failed. It does, however, suggest important answers to our basic puzzle.

Moral Hazard and the KLA

Moral hazard is a consequence of perverse incentives. It arises when you encourage others to do things against your interest, with the prospect that you will bear the costs of their behavior. Moral hazard is intrinsic to pivotal deterrence situations; it is the reason why pivots try to void or offset commitments that favor one side. If a measure that favors one side cannot be avoided, additional measures must also be taken to restrain it. When such off-setting pressures are not maintained, pivotal deterrence fails.

The lesson of Dayton for many Kosovars was that civilian carnage and refugees were more likely to lure Western support than nonviolent resistance to Serb rule. With good reason, many in the West worried about moral hazard. Namely, Kosovo extremists would escalate the civil war in order to drag NATO into their fight with Belgrade.[22] To say that moral hazard operated in this case, however, is not enough to explain why pivotal deterrence failed. We need to untangle the ways in which NATO policy emboldened the KLA and think carefully about how and whether they could have been managed in ways that would have restrained the KLA more without encouraging Belgrade.

Let us begin with the basics—the balance of power and interests. NATO was militarily preponderant in the region, but, rhetoric aside, its members did not have vital interests at stake in Kosovo. The ability to preserve their territorial integrity and determine political life within their borders was simply not at issue for NATO's members. It was for the Serbs. The combination of NATO's overwhelming power and underwhelming interest produced a predictable pattern of strategic interaction and moral hazard. NATO had to convince Serbia that it was as willing to fight as Serbs were, even though its motivation for doing so was much weaker. In order to do that, NATO had to issue public warnings that would be hard to renege on—in other words, use declaratory policy. As NATO took these costly steps, the KLA had less reason to fear abandonment and, therefore, more reason to provoke Serbia and obstruct negotiations.

[22] This problem was highlighted by Alan J. Kuperman, "False Hope Abroad: Promises to Intervene Often Bring Bloodshed," *Washington Post*, 14 June 1998; "Kosovo Option: Conditional Surrender," *Washington Post*, 25 September 1998. See also, Kuperman, "Transnational Causes of Genocide: Or How the West Inadvertently Exacerbates Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era" (presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 2 September 1999).

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Given the situation and NATO's goals, this moral hazard was structural, an unavoidable byproduct of NATO's declaratory policy.

There was another moral hazard problem. Throughout the late 1990s, there was a competition among Kosovar factions over whether to seek independence through violence or nonviolence. As the fighting worsened, NATO's increasing involvement rewarded the KLA's provacateur strategy and undercut the moderates, whose initial goals were more compatible with NATO's. Thus in 1998, the KLA emerged as the dominant political voice of Kosovo. In spite of Western efforts to strengthen them, the moderates in Ibrahim Rugova's Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) had to follow the KLA lead or risk being marginalized, branded traitors, and shot. This points up the moral hazard in NATO's policy that resulted from poor execution. NATO did not do things that it could have done to make the threat to isolate the KLA more credible. I will discuss these things in detail below, here it will suffice to make the basic point: If NATO had done these things, it would have been more likely to have prevented the war from escalating in early 1999, and to have impelled a negotiated solution that met its key objectives.

The Rise and Demise of NATO's Pivotal Deterrence Policy: 1992–1999

Before the air war, NATO policy toward Kosovo sought one thing above all else—regional stability. Keeping the peace or at least keeping the violence to low levels so that it would not spread to neighboring states was the main goal. NATO also had humanitarian aims in Kosovo, but stability was seen as an important condition for achieving them.[23] Restoring Kosovo's lost autonomy, which Belgrade revoked in 1989, was also a consideration, but it was lower on NATO's list of priorities than securing implementation of the Dayton Accords. Kosovo independence was and still is opposed by NATO. Belgrade wanted to maintain maximum political control over the province. Given Milosevic's record, there was reason to believe that he might try something drastic, like ethnic cleansing, if it would advance that goal. In contrast, the agenda of Ibrahim Rugova's shadow government of Kosovo was mostly benign. It called for the restoration of autonomy and eventual independence, but only through nonviolent resistance and negotiations.

Thus, from the early 1990s to late 1997, the only immediate threat to stability in Kosovo was Belgrade. So between 1992 and January 1998, NATO policy

[23] In January 1999, a classified strategy paper composed for the principals in the White House and the Departments of Defense and State stated that the "fundamental strategic objectives" of U.S. Balkans policy "remain unchanged: promote regional stability and protect our investment in Bosnia [i.e. the Dayton Agreement]; prevent resumption of hostilities in Kosovo and renewed humanitarian crisis; preserve US and NATO credibility." Gelman, "The Path to Crisis." For an almost identical public statement, see Excerpts from Remarks by Ambassadors Holbrooke and Hill, 15 December 1998, *Kosovo Conflict*, 379.

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toward Kosovo was simple one-way deterrence. In December 1992 the Bush administration leveled a stiff threat: "in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the US will be prepared to employ military force against Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper."[24] In February and July 1993, the Clinton administration repeated the threat. Then political meltdown in Albania in spring 1997 sent a flood of small arms into Kosovo, and the KLA began a bona fide insurgency, vowing to liberate ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia and unite them in a "Greater Albania."[25] So much for regional stability. One-way deterrence would now be, to paraphrase H.L. Mencken, "simple, neat, and wrong."

The first clear indication that NATO was shifting toward pivotal deterrence appeared on 23 February 1998. After meeting with Milosevic in Belgrade, U.S. Special Envoy to the Balkans Robert Gelbard stated in Pristina that the KLA was "without any question a terrorist group" and that the United States "very strongly" condemned terrorism in Kosovo.[26] Gelbard's statements have been sometimes recast as an unwitting "green light" to the Serbian crackdown that followed.[27] But Gelbard was speaking policy, not off the cuff.[28] The Clinton administration saw that the KLA threatened Balkan stability, and it was sending a warning.

The Escalation of Rebellion and Repression: March–June 1998

Within days, the situation exploded. Four Serb policemen were assassinated on 28 February, and Belgrade responded with heavy reprisals against KLA strongholds. On 5 March, Gelbard condemned the overreaction and restated the threat to use force against Serbia. The Serb attacks on the KLA aroused massive protests in Pristina, which Serb police in turn brutally suppressed. That month, the Kosovo shadow government held new elections, and Rugova's LDK took more than 90 percent of the vote. The KLA, however, boycotted the election and condemned Rugova's policy of nonviolence.

The Contact Group tried to "isolate the terrorists" and edge the LDK and Belgrade into negotiations "without preconditions." "What we are calling for," said British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, "is a political solution that enables

[24] Gelman, "The Path to Crisis."

[25] Patrick Moore, "Why the Kosovo Crisis Now," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline* [hereafter *RFE/RL*], Russia, 2 March 1998.

[26] "Washington Ready to Reward Belgrade for 'Good Will': Envoy," *Agence France Presse*, 23 February 1998. Gelbard said this in both Belgrade and Pristina.

[27] Tom Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 138.

[28] A State Department Press Statement of 2 March 1998 repeated the language "condemn[ing] terrorist action by the so-called Kosovo liberation army." *Kosovo Conflict*, 97. In an 8 March speech denouncing Serb repression, Albright said, "The authorities in Serbia will try to blur the picture by claiming their actions are a legitimate response to a terrorist threat. *We do not deny that they face such a threat.* We have no sympathy for a so called liberation movement that judges, tries and executes the ethnic Serbs and Albanians that it does not like." *Kosovo Conflict*, 104. (Emphasis added.)

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the moderate, peaceful, non-terrorist leadership of the [Kosovars] the opportunity to explore their legitimate political objectives."[29] The Contact Group vowed to use "all appropriate elements of pressure and influence with both sides to ensure that violence does not escalate and that . . . Kosovo's status . . . is resolved strictly through peaceful means."[30] Next came a UN Security Council Chapter VII resolution (1160), which condemned the violent excesses of Serbian forces and "all acts of terrorism" and imposed an embargo on arms to Serbia and "terrorists" in Kosovo. It demanded a political solution "based on the territorial integrity" of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) that gave "a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration" to Kosovo.[31]

As the LDK fragmented over the issue of nonviolence, Rugova recruited a Group of 15 to engage in the Contact Group's negotiations. NATO scrambled to shore him up, even though, as a European Union report noted, his "precondition" demand for Kosovo independence now directly conflicted with Security Council resolution 1160.[32] The North Atlantic Council's (NAC) statement of 30 April condemning "the excessive use of force by the Yugoslav army" thus also reiterated that NATO was "firmly opposed to independence for Kosovo" and to "all use of violence . . . by terrorist groups."[33]

Richard Holbrooke orchestrated a 15 May meeting in Belgrade between Rugova and Milosevic, which he and Gelbard mediated. It backfired. Nothing was accomplished, and just a few days later Serbia launched a new campaign against the KLA. Rugova's stock among Kosovars plummeted. On 29 May he went to Washington to meet Clinton and then to New York to meet UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.[34] Rugova's team informed Clinton that they were pulling out of negotiations with Belgrade and that after the recent offensive, nothing less than a quick transition to full independence was acceptable. Thus, the Kosovo moderates now set out an agenda deeply at odds with NATO's.

The Contact Group (Russia notwithstanding) had already frozen Serbia's international assets. Now in June it banned foreign investment and demanded an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo. At the same time, the KLA had, as Kofi Annan reported, "increased its attacks . . . [on] government security forces" and "Kosovo Albanians who allegedly cooperate with [them]."[35] In a step that rewarded the KLA's provocateur strategy,

[29] Press Conference by the foreign ministers of the Contact Group, 9 March 1998, *Kosovo Conflict*, 106.

[30] Statement by the Contact Group, 25 March 1998, ibid., 132.

[31] UNSC Resolution 1160 (1998), 31 March 1998, *IDA*, 188. On the arms embargo, see Lora Lumpe, "A New Approach to the Small Arms Trade," *Arms Control Today* 31 (January/February 2001): 13–14.

[32] European Union Report, 21 April 1998, *Kosovo Conflict*, 151.

[33] NAC Statement on the Situation in Kosovo, 30 April 1998, *IDA*, 275.

[34] Judah, *Kosovo*, 154–155.

[35] Report by United Nations Secretary-General Annan to the Security Council, 4 June 1998, *Kosovo Conflict*, 180.

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NATO began military exercises over Macedonia and Albania on 13 June.[36] The subtle distinctions in NATO's call for a settlement providing "enhanced status" for Kosovo but "preserving the territorial integrity" of the FRY was lost in the din.[37]

The KLA Isolated and Almost Beaten: June–September 1998

On 16 June, Moscow delivered what appeared to be important concessions from Milosevic. He agreed to restart negotiations with Rugova on "forms of autonomy," to stop repressing civilians, to guarantee free access to Kosovo for diplomats, international organizations, and humanitarian NGOs, and to return Serb forces to their barracks "to the extent that terrorist activities are halted."[38] On 23 June, Richard Holbrooke, acting as President Bill Clinton's special envoy, met with Milosevic to follow up. Between 4 and 6 July, Holbrooke and the Russian deputy foreign minister shuttled between Milosevic and the LDK, pushing for an agreement. They failed, according to Holbrooke, because the Kosovars did not "get their act together."[39] Rugova's spokesman blamed their disunity on the lack of a coherent Contact Group strategy, saying that the "biggest problem for us is that there's no international agenda."[40] There was, however, a clear international agenda. As Christopher Hill, the Contact Group's chief negotiator, put it, Kosovo could not "shoot its way out of Serbia."[41] Disunity among Kosovar factions clearly was a factor impeding progress in negotiations, but not one that should be made too much of.[42] There was, after all, a reason why the Kosovars could not agree to a negotiating position. The most powerful among them totally opposed negotiations, and Kosovar disunity in the face of international pressures to negotiate expressed their political will. By midsummer 1998, the KLA controlled much of Kosovo. And with so much talk about NATO intervening, which could seal the KLA victory and pave the way to independence, why would they want to negotiate with Belgrade for something less?

[36] Micah Zenko, "Coercive Diplomacy Before the War in Kosovo: America's Approach in 1998," Pew Case Study (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, forthcoming).

[37] Statement by NATO Secretary General on Exercise "Determined Falcon," 13 June 1998, *IDA*, 276.

[38] Joint Statement by the president of the Russian Federation and president of FRY, Moscow, 16 June 1998, *IDA*, 292.

[39] "Shuttle Diplomacy Without Results" *RFE/RL*, Southeastern Europe (SE), 7 July 1998.

[40] "Rugova Aide Blames Foreigners for Kosovar Disunity," *RFE/RL*, SE, 8 July 1998. Similarly, two months earlier, Rugova's spokesman blamed Kosovar disunity on the "Serbian game—divide and rule." Judah, *Kosovo*, 155.

[41] "Hill Sets Deadline for Kosova," *RFE/RL*, SE, 7 July 1998. Similarly, in a 23 July hearing before the House Committee on International Relations, Ambassador Gelbard said "the UCK [KLA] will not be able to shoot its way out of Yugoslavia." *Kosovo Conflict*, 220.

[42] See, for example, Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 39–40; Judah, *Kosovo*, 147, 200.

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On 8 July, four NATO warships docked in the Albanian port of Durres. Wesley Clark, NATO's SACEUR (supreme allied commander), called it a "demonstration of NATO's determination to help resolve the Kosovo conflict." More important, he adopted a menacing tone toward the KLA. "All those who are participating in this conflict," he warned, "have to recognize and take account of NATO's considerable capabilities." He hinted darkly at some type of anti-KLA operations that NATO could undertake with "very, very close" Albanian cooperation.[43] Perhaps the alliance would actually use its "considerable capabilities" to enforce the UN embargo of arms to Kosovo, to disrupt the KLA's logistics and supply routes. At the same time the Contact Group announced new efforts to cut off funding to the KLA from abroad: in Gelbard's words, "to interrupt their ability to sustain themselves through the full chain of supply."[44] But NATO really punished the KLA by doing nothing to stop the Serb's summer offensive. This encouraged and enabled the Kosovo moderates to move closer to a compromise political settlement.

By late July, the Serb offensive was taking a real toll: KLA fighters and thousands of civilians were forced into the hills. Serbia was back in control of most of Kosovo, and the KLA was chastened (or so it seemed). It was a good time, in other words, to push for a settlement that kept Serbia intact. In that spirit, Hill for the first time made official contact with the KLA leadership on 29 July, and showed them an early draft of the Contact Group's initial settlement proposal.[45] Hill's efforts were, as Gelbard reported to Congress, designed to promote "an authoritative" Kosovar negotiating team representing "the full spectrum of political opinion . . . including extremist elements. . . . The [KLA] is a reality on the ground, and . . . they will have to be a party to any cessation of hostilities or any settlement."[46] More to the point, the KLA's organizational structure, as is usually the case with underground insurgencies, was diffuse and opaque. Bringing the KLA into negotiations would force their leadership into the open and increase their vulnerability to coercion. Not surprisingly, Hill's attempt to draw out and coopt them failed.

On 9 August, the Contact Group floated the plan calling for an autonomous Kosovo that remained a "special part" of Serbia. The KLA condemned it, insisting that they would settle for nothing less than independence. So when Rugova fielded another negotiating team to take up the Contact Group proposal, the KLA was not on the roster. Milosevic, of course, refused to negotiate with the KLA. But NATO also "warmly welcomed" the new team *sans* KLA.[47] This made sense: if NATO wanted a compromise, and the KLA refused, then the KLA was better sidelined. It is true that international efforts to broker a deal

[43] "NATO Warships Dock at Durres," *RFE/RL*, SE, 8 July 1998.

[44] "Sanctions Are Threatened for Kosovo," *Associated Press*, 9 July 1998.

[45] Judah, *Kosovo*, 170.

[46] Excerpts from the Hearing on Kosovo by the House Committee on International Relations, 23 July 1998, *Kosovo Conflict*, 218.

[47] Statement by NATO Secretary General Solana, 13 August 1998, *Kosovo Conflict*, 230.

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and impose a cease-fire failed in 1998 because the KLA was not party to them.[48] But that was the result of the KLA's political program and their refusal to engage not of a failure to reach out to them.

In mid-August NATO staged a new round of Partnership for Peace exercises in Albania to pressure Milosevic, and on 24 August, the Security Council called again for a cease-fire. Belgrade still did not relent. As the KLA crumbled in the field, the LDK became more flexible at the negotiating table. First, they set aside their demand for immediate independence, and agreed to work toward a cease-fire based on a three year interim political solution. Then, on 20 September, as Serb forces routed KLA strongholds around Prizren and Pec, they endorsed an interim plan to make Kosovo "temporarily part of Yugoslavia as an independent entity, equal to the other two republics in the federation."[49] Milosevic was sure to oppose any scheme that gave Kosovo status in the FRY equal to Serbia and Montenegro, for such a scheme would guarantee his ouster by constitutional means. So with the KLA in tatters, the LDK were working hard to ingratiate themselves with NATO. They were maneuvering for a negotiating position that showed a renewed willingness to compromise and put Belgrade in the wrong.

UN Security Council Resolution 1199 and the Holbrooke Agreement

Now NATO bore down on Belgrade. On 23 September, the Security Council passed Resolution 1199 (UNSCR), which condemned "all acts" of violence in Kosovo, especially the "indiscriminate use of force by Serb security forces" and commanded the two sides to cease fire and seek a political solution.[50] Significantly, Russia did not veto this Chapter VII resolution. NAC then issued an "ACTWARN" authorizing General Wesley Clark, the SACEUR, to seek forces from NATO members for use in Kosovo.[51] On 30 September, the British foreign secretary warned Belgrade to comply quickly with UNSCR 1199, and the next day Hill pitched a revised settlement plan. On 1 October, Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced that the United States was ready to begin air strikes in two weeks. Three days later, Milosevic cracked and announced that Serb forces would be pulled back. On 5 October, Holbrooke went back to Belgrade to pin him down.

Russia expressed "deep disquiet" over NATO's threats, and squabbling within NATO also broke out.[52] Most worrying was Italy with its key air bases at Aviano, Vicenza, and Villafranca. On 8 October, the Italian prime minister said that his government did "not see grounds for military action, which would

[48] See Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 57; Judah, *Kosovo*, 189.

[49] 20 September 1998, *IDA*, 22.

[50] UNSC Resolution 1199 (1998), 23 September 1998, *IDA*, 190.

[51] Statement by NATO Secretary General Following ACTWARN Decision, 24 September 1998, *IDA*, 277.

[52] Statement by the Government of the Russian Federation, 4 October 1998, *IDA*, 277.

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have to be legitimized by the United Nations."[53] Should NATO use force without an explicit Security Council mandate? How would Russia respond if it did? These were answered that day in a critical meeting of the Contact Group at London Heathrow Airport. According to Holbrooke, Igor Ivanov, the Russian foreign minister, sent a signal of tacit assent to independent NATO action: "If you take it to the UN we'll veto it. If you don't we'll just denounce you . . . we'll just make a lot of noise."[54] The same day he said in public that Russia opposed NATO air strikes, because they would "strengthen Milosevic" and emphasized that "the strategic aims" of Russia and NATO in Kosovo "are the same, and the differences, which also exist between [NATO] allies, are tactical."[55] The next day, Ivanov was also reportedly predicting that "Milosevic ultimately will knuckle under" to NATO demand for a withdrawal.[56] Whether or not Milosevic got wind of what Ivanov said in private to the Contact Group, he would have found no solace in Ivanov's public remarks.

On 13 October, the NAC ordered air-strikes in ninety-six hours if Belgrade did not comply with UNSCR 1199.[57] That day Milosevic and Holbrooke announced what is known as the Holbrooke Agreement. It affirmed that any Kosovo settlement must respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the FRY and unilaterally committed Serbia to completing by 2 November an agreement on the "core elements" of a settlement based on Hill's 2 October proposal.[58] Most importantly, Milosevic agreed to withdraw Serb forces deployed in Kosovo after February 1998. The VJ elements that remained would return to their barracks, except for limited numbers that were to defend the Serb-Albanian border. The activities of the police forces would also be scaled back, their chief task to maintain twenty-seven "observation points" along critical lines of communication. Milosevic also agreed to NATO overflights to verify the withdrawal of Serb forces and to the deployment of 2,000 unarmed Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) verifiers, who would then monitor both sides' compliance with UNSCR 1199.[59]

Holbrooke, acting as Clinton's special envoy, had negotiated the general contours. Now it was up to NATO officials—namely SACEUR Clark and Klaus Naumann, chairman of NATO's military committee—to meet with Milosevic and turn the broad language of UNSCR 1199 into fine print with specific

[53] "Ministers Meet In London Amid Kosovo Divisions," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* [hereafter *FBIS*], *FBIS-WEU*-98-281, 8 October 1998.

[54] Judah, *Kosovo*, 183.

[55] "Ivanov: NATO Kosovo Attack Will Strengthen Milosevic," *FBIS-SOV*-98-281, 8 October 1998.

[56] Norman Kempster and David Holley, "West Backs Last-Ditch Effort for Peaceful End to Kosovo Crisis," *Los Angeles Times*, 9 October 1998.

[57] Statement by NATO Secretary General Following Decision on the Activation Order (ACTORD), 13 October 1998, *IDA*, 278.

[58] See "Serbian Government Endorses Accord Reached by President Milosevic, Belgrade, 13 October 1998," *IDA*, 279.

[59] See *IDA*, 272–274, and the documents referenced therein.

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benchmarks.[60] Belgrade began haltingly to meet NATO's demands on 16 October, prompting a new ten-day window for compliance. Clark and Naumann kept pressuring Milosevic to commit to real numbers and then comply with them. They hammered on two themes: if he did not comply, NATO would bomb; if he did comply, he could "turn the table so that the KLA [were] seen as the bad guys."[61] By the 27 October deadline, Belgrade had complied. As Naumann put it, Milosevic "really did what we asked him to do, he withdrew within 48 hours some 6,000 police officers and the military back into the barracks."[62] In return, Naumann and Clark had assured him that NATO would "try to control" the KLA.[63]

The KLA lambasted the Holbrooke Agreement. "All solutions but independence," they insisted, were "not acceptable."[64] But unwilling to be put in the wrong by Milosevic, they declared a "unilateral" cease-fire, and agreed informally to comply with 1199. NATO hoped that the LDK would seize this opening to make real progress in negotiations with Belgrade, so it turned its menacing rhetoric back on the KLA. Said Albright: "We have . . . delivered a clear message to the leadership of the Kosovo Liberation Army: there should be no attempt to take military advantage of the Serb pull-back. Neither side can achieve military victory in Kosovo."[65] Or, as another western diplomat put it on 29 October, the KLA were told "not to start trouble because we are not going to bail them out."[66]

The Holbrooke Agreement did not preclude Serb security operations. Indeed, roughly 20,000 Serb VJ and MUP forces were allowed to remain in Kosovo.[67] Even OSCE observers "deemed this presence necessary given the likelihood that KLA, emboldened by the circumstances, could take advantage of the depleted security arrangements."[68] This point is crucial: NATO did not expect or intend for its agreement with Belgrade to stop all Serb security operations in Kosovo. When KLA activities and Serb retaliations spiraled up in the following months, what failed most of all were NATO's promises and threats to restrain

[60] Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 50–52; Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 146–152.

[61] Transcripts of General Klaus Naumann, Interview, PBS Frontline (www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/naumann.html), 13 February 2001.

[62] Transcripts of Naumann, Interview, BBC2 Special, "Moral Combat: NATO at War" (http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/events/panorama/transcripts/transcript_12_03_00.txt.), 12 February 2001, 7.

[63] Naumann interview with Daalder and O'Hanlon cited in *Winning Ugly*, 58, fn. 135. Clark's memoirs, *Waging Modern War*, do not mention this assurance. Clark did not reply to author's correspondence on 9 February 2001 seeking confirmation on this point.

[64] Roger Cohen, "In Balkans Again, Promises," *New York Times*, 14 October 1998.

[65] Albright, Remarks on Kosovo, Washington, DC, 27 October 1998, *IDA*, 284.

[66] Mike O'Connor, "Despite a Truce, Kosovo Albanians Dig New Graves and Vow Revenge," *New York Times*, 29 October 1998.

[67] Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 52.

[68] Information on the Situation in Kosovo & Measures taken by OSCE, September/October 1998, *IDA*, 306.

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the KLA. Belgrade could not be expected to give up recourse to self-defense if NATO could not deter and control the KLA.[69]

The KLA Rides Again

As the VJ pulled back, the KLA came down from the hills and resumed the campaign of provocations—ambushing Serb police patrols, even firing upon diplomatic observers who accompanied, and occupying and fortifying key positions vacated by Serb forces. Because NATO did not squeeze the KLA's external lifelines, the cease-fire allowed it to reconstitute quickly as a political and fighting force. Soon the OSCE reported that "central control and unified political and military strategy are increasingly visible aspects of KLA activity."[70] In the words of a KLA general, "the cease-fire was very useful for us, it helped us to get organized, to consolidate and grow."[71]

It is clear from the language of NATO, UN, and OSCE public documents that the KLA was seen by all responsible decision makers as partly to blame for the escalation after the Holbrooke Agreement.[72] In their public statements, Western leaders tied themselves in knots trying to put the "primary" blame on Belgrade without denying the obvious. On 8 January, William Walker, chief of the OSCE verification mission, stated: "There have been instances of noncompliance on both sides. In our view, the majority of the instances . . . have emanated from the [Serbian] government side. But that is also perhaps a function of the fact that we have asked more of them. When I say that they're not cooperating in terms of landing rights for planes that might be bringing in supplies or quibbles at the border over customs, this sort of thing, those are things you ask of a government; you don't ask that from the KLA."[73]

Beneath the official equivocation there was a simple truth. The KLA were the drivers of the post-cease-fire escalation. According to Gelman, "US intelligence reported almost immediately [after the Holbrooke Agreement] that the KLA intended to draw NATO into its fight for independence by provoking Serb forces into further atrocities."[74] Confidential minutes from NAC meetings at the time called the KLA "the main initiator of the violence" and stated, "it has launched what appears to be a deliberate campaign of provocation." Gen-

[69] Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 151.

[70] Information on the Situation in Kosovo and Measures taken by OSCE, November/December 1998, *IDA*, 317.

[71] *Moral Combat: NATO at War*, 7.

[72] On 12 November, Kofi Annan reported that "recent attacks by Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units have indicated their readiness, capability and intention to actively pursue the advantage gained by the partial withdrawal of the police and military formations." Report of the UN Secretary General, 12 November 1998, *IDA*, 302. See also Press Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Kosovo, 19 November 1998, *IDA*, 286; Letter from the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE to the Secretary General, 20 February 1999, Monthly Report on the situation in Kosovo, January/February 1999, *IDA*, 330.

[73] Remarks by Ambassador Walker, 8 January 1999, *Kosovo Conflict*, 406.

[74] Gelman, "The Path to Crisis."

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eral Naumann said that William Walker reported to the NAC in private that "the majority of violations was caused by the KLA."[75]

In the run-up to war, NATO leaders suppressed this version of events and cast Belgrade as the chief villain in the collapse of the cease-fire. But one need merely ask "cui bono?" to understand why the KLA would want to disrupt the cease-fire more than Belgrade. Stability harmed the KLA's goals more than Serbia's, and stability is what NATO tried to create in October. The Hill process depended on it. On 8 December, NATO demanded that "armed Kosovar elements . . . cease and desist from provocative actions."[76] No one contends that the KLA met NATO demands. Not even Albright, who on 26 January admitted that KLA "provocations have contributed significantly to the renewed deep tensions in Kosovo."[77]

Abandonment Issues

Without putting troops on the ground in Kosovo, the only way to deter the KLA that winter was to create a real danger that NATO would isolate them if they escalated.[78] NATO leaders did try to convey this threat. On 17 November, the U.S. State Department announced that it had warned the KLA that if it "doesn't hold to the cease-fire and conducts provocations, that will negatively affect international support for their cause."[79] Similarly, when asked in Pristina about the danger of KLA provocations, Holbrooke warned, "there was no guarantee" that NATO would intervene. Kosovars "would then be on their own, face to face with Milosevic's tanks and helicopter gunships."[80] Madeleine Albright put it succinctly: NATO demanded that the KLA behave "reasonably" or "they would lose completely the backing of the United States and the Contact Group."[81] Yet it is surprising how little was done before Rambouillet to pressure the KLA.[82] For NATO's policy could not have worked unless the threats to isolate the KLA were made real. How could that have been done? The most important thing was to begin enforcing the measures against the KLA that NATO members had already subscribed to. As long as those threats did not materialize, additional ones would not carry weight.

[75] *Moral Combat: NATO at War*, 8.

[76] NATO Statement on Kosovo, 8 December 1998, *IDA*, 286.

[77] Joint Statement by Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov and Secretary of State Albright, 26 January 1999, *Kosovo Conflict*, 428.

[78] Daalder and O'Hanlon argue that the October cease-fire failed because there was no deployment of robust peacekeepers to deter the KLA. *Winning Ugly*, 52–57. While ground deployment would have been the ideal way to check the KLA, the were other less costly options available.

[79] "US Warns UCK Against 'Aggression'" *RFE/RL*, SE, 18 November 1998.

[80] Ignatieff, "The Dream of Albanians," 39.

[81] *Moral Combat: NATO at War*, 8.

[82] See Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, "Was it a Mistake? We Were Suckers for the KLA," *Washington Post*, 26 March 2000.

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These measures would have involved shutting down the KLA's "windpipe" by imposing a naval screen around Albania's ports to enforce the UN arms embargo, by insisting that Tirana end the KLA's de facto control over what the UN called "the vital [Koman] ferry link on the main supply route to the border area" next to Kosovo, and by putting military pressure on the border area itself so that the KLA could not use it with impunity.[83] NATO did not do these things. Weller gives one reason: "Albania . . . remained hostile to the idea of introducing an international force which would monitor its border region with Kosovo. This . . . was designed to forestall the application of the strategy of containment. . . . The prospect of a widening of the conflict had to be maintained. . . . An altogether too intrusive international presence along the border with Kosovo would have [prevented this and] fostered an international view that it might be possible . . . to manage the developing Kosovo crisis through containment."[84]

The international view that Tirana tried to dispel needed to be reinforced if NATO's policy were to succeed. Although it did much to boost the Albanian government during the crisis—including Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercises in August 1998—NATO got little in return. NATO leaders were afraid to pressure the weak government in Tirana lest it fall to pieces. So, weak or not, the Albanian government undercut NATO strategy. This was most evident in Tirana's flat refusal to exert any authority over affairs in the north, where the major hubs of KLA support operated. By pressuring Albania, NATO could not have shut down the KLA fighters entirely, although it could have made supplying them a much more costly endeavor. If nothing else, this would have signaled a more credible threat of abandonment; and that might have caused the KLA to lie low in the winter of 1998. NATO could also have acted or threatened to act unilaterally to eliminate the KLA staging areas in Albania, just as it did against Serbia. The Security Council Resolutions enjoined the powers to stop KLA terrorists and the flow of arms and material to them, just as strongly as it enjoined them to stop Serb repression. There was, in other words, a Chapter VII basis for using force against KLA strongholds and supply lines in Albania, if Tirana would not. Russia, maybe even China, would have been likely to support NATO in this, though that was perhaps in itself a reason why no such action was taken.

One can think of other more realistic things that could have been done to restrain the KLA. For example, the U.S. State Department released its 1998 annual report on terrorism, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, in April 1999. It noted that "Albania's poor internal security provides an environment conducive to terrorist activity," but the KLA was conspicuously not mentioned in the

[83] Report of UN Secretary General Annan to the Security Council, 5 August 1998, *Kosovo Conflict*, 227; Judah, *Kosovo*, 174.

[84] Weller, *IDA*, 287–288.

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report.[85] Naming them in the report, and letting it be known before hand that they would be named (a political decision within State's discretion) would have created an incentive for KLA restraint in the winter of 1998. It would have signaled that the KLA was in danger of being designated an official "Foreign Terrorist Organization" in the State Department's mandatory biannual report to Congress, due in October 1999.

Actually, the statute permits additional groups to "be added at any time . . . by the Secretary [of State] in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury . . . [and they] can be revoked if the Secretary determines that there are grounds for doing so."[86] Thus the State Department could have placed the KLA on the existing 1997 list at any time in 1998. This should have been the consequence of U.S. support for Security Council Resolutions 1160 in June and 1199 in September 1998. Designating the KLA as a terrorist organization would have made it illegal to raise funds for it in the United States, and would have channeled actual resources toward enforcing the prohibition, making it more likely that Western partners would have followed suit. This would have put a real dent in the KLA's external sources of material support and legitimacy. And the carrot of revoking the designation in return for restraint could have been used to pressure the KLA after October 1998. The State Department did not take this obvious and otherwise warranted step, probably because it did not want to credit Serb propaganda, which used KLA terrorism to justify excessive violence against Kosovar civilians.[87]

In early February, just before the Rambouillet talks, NATO officials began to speak more forcefully about using "credible threats directed toward both sides" to impose a settlement. Yet even at this late stage, the credible threats against the KLA were less than fearsome: "sophisticated surveillance techniques" would be used along the Albanian border, there would be intensive international scrutiny in the "Tirana airport and the Albanian ports of Vlor and Durres," and, of course, there was more talk of closing KLA bank accounts.[88]

[85] *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, U.S. Department of State Publication 10610 (http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998Report/europe.html#albania), 24 July 2001.

[86] See Foreign Terrorist Organizations Designations, (www.state.gov/www/glbal/terrorism/annual_reports.html), 12 February 2001.

[87] This dilemma drove the State Department into an absurd position, one that not only contradicted February and March 1998 statements that the KLA was a terrorist organization, but that also suggested that what made a group terrorist was a tight organizational form and undesirable political goals, not its method of using violence against civilians and local authorities to achieve them. Thus, State Department spokesman James Rubin asserted, "our view is very straightforward. We condemn acts that people associated with the KLA have taken. [If] they are classic terrorist acts, we condemn them as terrorist acts. That does not mean, however, we regard the KLA—this loosely knit group—as a terrorist organization; we do not. We regard it as an insurgency that is using force to respond to the stripped autonomy." U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, 9 July 1998. In light of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S., the dangerous nonsense of this declared policy is painfully evident.

[88] Steven Erlanger, "Kosovo Negotiators Will Look to Impose a Quick Settlement," *New York Times*, 4 February 1999.

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Even if these were now taken seriously by the KLA, they came too late, for by February 1999 the cease-fire was dead and gone, and a key plank in NATO's policy had been foiled.

The (Down) Hill Process

Between the Holbrooke Agreement and the Rambouillet talks, Kosovar intransigence blocked progress toward a political settlement consistent with NATO's goals. This is easy to show, because the Contact Group's goals came closer to what Belgrade wanted than what the LDK wanted. Quite simply, NATO and the Contact Group sought a political autonomy solution that would obviate the need for NATO peace enforcers and keep the FRY intact. Rugova, on the other hand, continued to demand independence and that "NATO ground troops deploy in Kosovo."[89] As the KLA recovered, the LDK became obdurate. On 1 November, Ambassador Hill presented a revised proposal that envisioned a democratically self-governed Kosovo, which remained, however, part of the Yugoslav federation. Two days later, the LDK rejected it as "fundamentally incompatible with the democratic mandate bestowed upon the Government of Kosova. . . . It cannot furnish a basis for discussion."[90] Belgrade disavowed the new proposal a week later, saying that it still endorsed Hill's 1 October plan, on which it had agreed to negotiate in the Holbrooke Agreement.[91]

Belgrade renewed its offer to hold direct talks with Rugova's team on 15 November. But for Kosovars to hold them with local Serb officials and without international mediators would concede that Kosovo was not independent. The LDK boycotted the talks, while Belgrade went ahead with a picked cast of Kosovo minority representatives. The resulting Joint Agreement on self-government in Kosovo looked rather like Hill's most recent version. The LDK quickly denounced it. There was no doubt about why. On 17 November, Adem Demaci, the political spokesman of the KLA, stated that "Rugova can sign anything, but there can be no deal without [KLA] consent." And they would not consent to any solution that left Kosovo part of Serbia.[92]

The LDK did not want to appear more intransigent than Belgrade, so they softened their rhetoric about Hill's 1 November proposal. It at least had the virtue of being rejected by Serbs. In early December, Rugova's lead negotiator, Fehmi Agani, announced that the 1 November plan had been changed for the better by "an entire body of written complaints/objections" given by the LDK team. Although the LDK still had "serious objections," it "subscribed to the

[89] "Kosovo: Rugova Urges Deployment of NATO Ground Troops in Kosovo," *FBIS-EEU*-98-296, 23 October 1998.

[90] Kosova Statement on Fundamental Principles, 3 November 1998, *IDA*, 369.

[91] Press Release by FRY Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 November 1998, *IDA*, 370.

[92] "UCK Wants Last Word," *RFE/RL*, SE, 18 November 1998.

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idea of an interim settlement for Kosova."[93] This concession—one they had already given—came with the demand that at the end of the interim period a referendum on independence must be held within, and only within, Kosovo, which they were sure to win. Thus, even the LDK's most niggardly support for Hill's plan was conditioned upon a demand that was prima facie unacceptable to NATO, the Contact Group, the UN Security Council, and of course Belgrade.

On 2 December, Hill put forward yet another proposal that retained limited Serbian powers in Kosovo. The next day, without mentioning it directly, the Federal Assembly of the FRY condemned the "new American pressures" to "dislocate" Serbia from Kosovo.[94] It was also greeted by a Kosovar chorus of derision. On 5 December, the KLA announced that it would not "settle for anything less than full independence" and "called on the international community, first and foremost the United States of America, to support Kosovar independence."[95] On 8 December, Demaci said the new Hill plan was "utterly unacceptable" and he recommended that the U.S. government fire Holbrooke and Hill![96]

That day NATO issued a statement urging both sides to embrace Hill's "negotiating process" and insisting upon a solution that "enhanced" Kosovo's political status but "preserve[d] the territorial integrity of the FRY."[97] The fundamental disagreement between NATO and the LDK could not be finessed. Agani went before the Kosovo shadow parliament and denounced the new Hill plan as "a return to the old and unacceptable proposals." The shadow parliament, for its part, affirmed that the Kosovar negotiators should uphold "the independence bid" and insist on a settlement "based on the principle of the right of self-determination" and the immediate formation of "an international protectorate in Kosova."[98] While NATO and the Contact Group were pushing an interim solution that did not give Kosovo independence and that would not establish an international occupation there, the LDK and the KLA converged in demanding both.

The VJ now began the "Christmas Offensive," an attack on the KLA in northern Kosovo that lasted from 24–27 December. Preceding it, the KLA had taken positions around Podujevo that threatened the main access roads from Serbia proper, murdered six Serbs in a bar in Pristina, and abducted the deputy

[93] Kosova Press Release, 1 December 1998, *IDA*, 375. Kosovars refer to their would-be independent state as "Kosova." Except when quoting them, I shall use Kosovo.

[94] Declaration by the Federal Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 3 December 1999, *Kosovo Conflict*, 349.

[95] Kosova Press Release, 5 December 1998, *IDA*, 382.

[96] Specifically, he said that the U.S. government should replace them with "people who do not have the prejudices of Dayton, who do not have some deficiencies which we see as the cause of such oscillations." Kosova Press Release, 8 December 1998, *IDA*, 382.

[97] NATO Statement on Kosovo, 8 December 1998, *IDA*, 286.

[98] Kosova Press Release, 11 December 1998, *IDA*, 382.

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mayor of Kosovo Polje, killing him and then dumping his body by the side of a road.[99] In four days of fighting, the VJ expelled the KLA from Podujevo. In early January, tensions mounted in southern Kosovo. The KLA initiated a string of ambushes and kidnappings, including the killing of three MUP officers. The KLA also increased aggressive patrolling of major roads in the area. On 8 January, the OSCE reported that "the irresponsible actions by the KLA since yesterday morning are the main reasons for a considerable increase of tension in Kosovo. . . . These actions are in direct contradiction of solemn promises from the KLA of showing restraint and of maintaining the cease-fire agreement."[100] As men and material poured in from Albania, Serb forces laid ambush to infiltrating KLA columns and retaliated in a number of surrounding communities, most notoriously in Racak. There, on 15 January, they murdered forty-five ethnic Albanians civilians, twenty-two of them in execution style. The media and OSCE monitors got to the scene at Racak almost immediately. With international attention focused on the atrocity, NATO, the UN secretary general, and William Walker of the OSCE condemned Belgrade.

The Racak massacre prompted justifiable outrage against Belgrade and diverted attention from the LDK's intransigence and the KLA's provocations. On 17 January, Javier Solana announced that Milosevic would be held personally responsible. Wesley Clark went to Belgrade to confront Milosevic in person. The Contact Group met throughout the rest of January, and at the end of the month called for a settlement conference at Rambouillet, France. Threatening to hold "both sides accountable," the Contact Group demanded that they attend and seal a political deal. NATO was now "ready to act and rule[d] out no option to insure full respect by both sides of the demands of the international community."[101]

Rambouillet End Game

Rambouillet was an offer the KLA could not refuse, a negotiation they could not sit out. If they did, they would hand NATO and especially the United States such a smashing embarrassment that the West would wash its hands of Kosovo. For the KLA, Rambouillet carried with it for once a powerful threat of abandonment. Moreover, while the Contact Group was demanding that the two sides reach a political settlement, NATO was demanding on a separate track that the implementation of the settlement include the deployment of NATO peacekeepers. This then was the political bargain: if the Kosovars would agree

[99] Mike O'Connor, "Kosovo's Rival Forces Are Moving Closer to a New War," *New York Times*, 22 December 1998.

[100] The statement continues: "the reaction by Yugoslavian authorities to these KLA provocations has been up to this point very restrained. [They] have shown a willingness to co-operate in the present situation." "OSCE Press Release," 9 January 1999, *Kosovo Conflict*, 408.

[101] Craig R. Whitney, "NATO Says It's Ready to Act To Stop Violence In Kosovo," *New York Times*, 29 January 1999.

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to the Contact Group's plan, they would get their international protectorate for the length of the interim period. By the same token, this gave the Contact Group an awful lot of leverage over the Kosovars, for it meant that any interim political settlement the Contact Group could extract from Serbia the Kosovars would have to accept—or else Milosevic would put them in the wrong and they would be isolated.

There were few surprises during the first two weeks. The Serbian delegation had no leash from Belgrade to make a deal, so it temporized. The Kosovo delegates, on the other hand, worked hard to ingratiate themselves with the Contact Group through serious negotiations. Three days before the deadline, Ambassador Hill broke the conference protocol and went to Belgrade to engage Milosevic directly. He returned with a new proposal, one that still held that Kosovo would remain part of the sovereign territory of the FRY.[102]

The Kosovo delegation then rejected Hill's new proposal. They objected because there was no referendum for independence at the end of the interim period and no mechanism to facilitate the KLA's transition to a peacetime existence. Three days followed of cajoling and courting the Kosovars by Albright, her staff, military representatives of NATO, and other members of the Contact Group. On 23 February, the plan still referred to FRY sovereignty and territorial integrity. But without clearing the change with the Contact Group, Albright's team had tried to insert an oblique reference to a referendum ("the *expressed* will of the people") at the end of the interim period, and had privately assured the Kosovars that the United States would assist the KLA's transition to a civil political force. The Contact Group refused to endorse the wording change and neither Kosovars or Serbs would agree to sign. So matters stood when the deadline expired on 23 February.[103]

Hashim Thaci, the political spokesman for the KLA and the head of the Kosovo delegation at Rambouillet, had blocked immediate endorsement of the plan on 23 February. Consequently, U.S. private assurances, which were contingent on immediate acceptance, lapsed.[104] Thaci was apparently forced to do this by KLA hard-liners. But the Kosovars could not flat-out refuse, or Milosevic would accept the plan, and they would be cornered. So shrewder minds in the Kosovo delegation prevailed, and after the deadline expired, it tentatively accepted the agreement on the condition that it would sign in two weeks, after "consultations" back at home.[105] The US government launched a public relations blitz in Kosovo in favor of the plan. Former U.S. Senator Bob Dole, a long time supporter of Kosovo, toured the region warning Kosovars, "We'll abandon you if you don't sign."[106] Shortly thereafter Demaci, the leader of the

[102] *IDA*, 402.

[103] Judah, *Kosovo*, 215–216; IDA, 405.

[104] *IDA*, 452.

[105] Statement by the Kosovo Albanian Delegation to the Rambouillet Conference, 23 February 1999, *Kosovo Conflict*, 592; *IDA*, 405.

[106] Dole paraphrased in Judah, *Kosovo*, 220. See also, Remarks by Senator Dole and Ambassador Hill, 6 March 1999, *Kosovo Conflict*, 611.

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KLA hard-line faction, stepped down. Thaci now had the leeway to sign the deal. On the next day, the eight parties of the Kosovo shadow government endorsed the Rambouillet agreement.

On 23 February, Milosevic was waiting for the Kosovars to reject the plan first, so that he could take a more conciliatory tack. But when it became clear that Kosovars would tentatively endorse the plan, Belgrade mimicked the position. Serbia would not sign just yet; there were elements in it that still needed to be clarified about "the scope and character" of the "international presence" that would implement the agreement.[107] The Contact Group then announced that a "signing" conference would be held in Paris on 15 March. There, it seemed likely that NATO's "nonnegotiable" implementation plan would be put on the table. But at Paris, Belgrade would sign nothing but a drastically revised draft of the Rambouillet plan, which gutted everything important from the 23 February document. When NATO denounced it, Milosevic seized on the wording of the Status of Forces (SOF) agreement in the implementation annex of the Rambouillet plan as a pretext for rejecting in toto.[108] The game—at least this round of it—was now up for Belgrade. It had been put in the wrong by the Kosovo delegation, and now it was cornered by NATO. The air war began four days later.

Why a pragmatist like Milosevic felt enough liberty to brave NATO's bombs is a crucial question that cannot be adequately addressed here. Some argue that Milosevic believed that the NATO campaign would be a short series of pin-prick air strikes like the ephemeral Desert Fox campaign against Iraq four months earlier.[109] Others think that Milosevic planned to hunker down and ride out an extended air campaign, betting that a defensive operational strategy in Kosovo could deter a NATO ground invasion, while political tensions within NATO would lead it to cave in before he did.[110] These are an important part of the story, but the main driver behind them was Belgrade's expectations about Russian support. These are what probably led Milosevic to bet that NATO would strike weakly and that the alliance would then fold from internal tensions catalyzed by Russian pressure.

As I have argued elsewhere, Belgrade was almost certainly encouraged in the gambit by the prospect that Russia would "hold the ring," deflecting or minimizing NATO air-strikes by threatening to sever many important aspects of

[107] Letter from the FRY/Serb Delegation to the Negotiators, Rambouillet, 23 February 1999, 16.00 hrs., *IDA*, 470.

[108] There is much speculation about the origins and purpose of the provocatively phrased SOF agreement in Appendix B, Paragraph 8 of the Rambouillet plan. See "Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, 23 February 1999," *IDA*, 469. For balanced discussion of it, see Timothy Garton Ash, "Kosovo: Was It Worth It?" *New York Review of Books*, 21 September 2000; Posen, "The War for Kosovo," 44, fn. 10 and 80. A plausible explanation that I have not seen raised elsewhere is that the offending clause was inserted—or not deleted by diplomats—not in order to provoke war and not to give NATO carte blanche in Yugoslavia, but rather, as a bargaining chip.

[109] Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 94–96.

[110] Posen, "The War for Kosovo," 51–52, 66–67.

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Russian relations with the United States and NATO.[111] In this view, more than NATO cohesion, what Belgrade misperceived in March 1999 was Russia's influence with the United States and in the end Russia's ability to cushion Belgrade from NATO's wrath. The crucial difference between October 1998 and March 1999 was that by March Russia stridently opposed NATO threats and the deployment of NATO peacekeepers in Kosovo without Belgrade's consent. In October 1998, Moscow did not present itself to Belgrade as a viable alternative to coming to terms with NATO. In March 1999 it did. When Belgrade quit negotiating after Rambouillet and went full steam ahead with a new assault on Kosovo, it gambled—with some justification—that Russia would derail NATO's military response, or at least significantly blunt it.[112]

What is certain is that Milosevic's decisions after Rambouillet were taken with the knowledge that NATO had not restrained the KLA as it said it would in October 1998—something that he had to consider among the pros and cons of accepting the Rambouillet plan and NATO implementation of it. More important, if NATO had restrained the KLA in October, the enforced negotiations at Rambouillet might never have been needed. In this scenario, with the KLA undermined rather than enhanced by NATO policy, the LDK and Belgrade may have both become more flexible, and could therefore have been moved through the Hill process to bridgeable negotiating positions that achieved NATO's main aims without the magnitude of threats—and ultimately the use—of force entailed in the Rambouillet strategy.

Conclusion

I have argued that the KLA would not have been as aggressive as they were in the closing months of 1998 if NATO had done more to isolate them, and that consequently, the LDK would have been less intransigent in negotiations, making a deal within the Hill process far more likely. The strongest counterargument is that Serb excesses are what radicalized Kosovars and caused them to grasp for immediate maximal gains, not the expectation of NATO support. After the crackdowns of 1998, so the argument goes, all Kosovars were set upon independence; and in the short term, they would never settle for less than an international protectorate, with a virtual guarantee of independence after three years. In this view, even if Belgrade could have been nudged toward a political settlement that restored a measure of autonomy to Kosovo, a negotiated settlement was impossible, because the Kosovars would never accept such a deal.

The problem with this notion that a negotiated settlement was not possible after October 1998 is that it assumes that the Kosovars' "minimum demands" were fixed. The deep and widespread preference of Kosovars may indeed have been for independence, but what they were willing to settle for in the present

[111] Crawford, *Pivotal Deterrence and Peacemaking*, chap. 8.

[112] Posen, "The War for Kosovo," also makes the case along these lines, 51–52, 66–67.

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was shaped in great part by the ascendancy of the KLA and optimism that NATO would intervene and de facto support its more ambitious goals. The evidence shows that the LDK became more flexible when the KLA was on the ropes in August and September 1998 and ethnic cleansing was still in full swing, and became more intransigent after the KLA was given a new lease on life in October. The rise and decline of the KLA, therefore, had more influence over the LDK's willingness to bargain than the Serb's escalating crackdown. The reason for the rise of the KLA in the winter of 1998 is that they were rescued, and then not restrained, by NATO. With the KLA's supply-lines from Albania under pressure, their financial sources of support squeezed, their international legitimacy tarnished, most of all, with the diminishing prospect of NATO rescue that such isolation would have signaled, is it really plausible that the LDK, whose viability depended on international support, would have stuck to extreme demands that went far beyond what NATO, the UN, the EU, much less Belgrade, would tolerate?*

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

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Ending Welfare As We Know It: A Reform Still in Progress

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

In August 1996, President William Jefferson Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) (H.R. 3734) into law. This law ended the entitlement status of cash assistance to poor families with children, called Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which began in 1935 with the passage of the original Social Security Act. Between 1996 and 1999, there occurred a massive drop of over five million or 40 percent from some twelve-and-a-half million in the average monthly number of cash assistance recipients.[1] Based on such statistics, most political leaders on the federal and state levels of government including both the Democratic and Republican candidates for president in 2000 called the 1996 changes or "welfare reforms," a success.

Yet just looking at the macronumbers of the millions who dropped from the cash assistance rolls doesn't tell the whole story. We do not know how many of these recipients would have left the rolls anyway during four years of unprecedented economic boom, even if PRWORA and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) hadn't been enacted, and how many will return in a recessionary economy. The gross numbers also do not reveal how many of these "welfare leavers"[2] have new jobs and have been able to reach financial

[1] In exact numbers, the total fell by 5,441,000, from 12,644,000 to 7,203,000; the number of adults fell by 1,884,000, from 3,973,000 to 2,089,000, while the number of children receiving cash assistance fell by 3,557,000 from 8,671,000 to 5,114,000. Committee on Ways and Means, *2000 Green Book* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [hereafter GPO], 2000), Table 7.4, Historical Trends in AFDC/TANF Enrollments, Fiscal Years 1970–1999, 376.

[2] The term was coined by Pamela Loprest, "Families Who Left Welfare: Who Are They and How Are They Doing?" (working paper prepared for The Urban Institute's Conference, Assessing New Federalism, February 1999).

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FIGURE 1
Female Householders with Dependent Children Under 18 Drop in Welfare Caseloads vs. Drop in Poverty, 1996 and 1999.



Source: The Census Bureau, Current Population Reports-Poverty in the United States 1996 and 1999, Table 2.

independence including supporting their children; nor do they reveal how many of them are in jobs that are low paying, lack health care, and are extremely vulnerable to economic downturns. Further, the macrofigures do not tell how many hundreds of thousands or perhaps even millions of mothers and children who left the public assistance rolls are without jobs and have simply dropped out from government statistics as they cope with lack of cash, lack of permanent housing, little food, and no medical care. Finally, the Census Bureau reported that in 1999, even after unprecedented boom times, there were still 10,133,000 individuals in female-headed households with children eighteen or younger living in poverty,[3] only a small decrease of 1,957,000 or 15 percent from the 12,644,000 reported for 1996.[4] (See Figure 1.)

This article reflects on the social and political changes that surrounded the repeal of AFDC, analyzes the effects of the new Act for the four years for which we have official data, and considers possibilities for further change of federal social safety net policy, particularly in the process of PRWORA's necessary reauthorization in 2002.

[3] The U.S. Census Bureau uses a set of money income thresholds that vary by family size and composition to determine who is poor. The 2000 Poverty Threshold, as calculated by the Census Bureau, was $11,869 for a family with a single householder and one dependent child and $13,861 for a single householder and two dependent children.

[4] U.S. Census Bureau, *Poverty in the United States 1996 and 1999*, vol. 60 of *Current Population Reports no. 175 and 210* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1991).

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Background and Setting

Clinton Proposals

President Clinton took office in 1993 following a campaign that had emphasized his commitment to "end welfare as we know it."[5] He did not seriously address the issue again, however, until June 1994, having initially focused his administration's attention on deficit reduction and health care. The central tenet of his reform proposal was an emphasis on work. "We propose to offer people on welfare a simple contract," he stated. "We will help you get the skills you need, but after two years, anyone who can go to work must go to work—in the private sector if possible, in a subsidized job if necessary. But work is preferable to welfare. And it must be enforced."[6]

The Clinton plan proposed a two-year lifetime limit on receiving cash assistance for those who could work, to be followed by mandatory community service jobs if private sector employment could not be obtained. He allowed exemptions for individuals who were either seriously ill or caring for a seriously ill or disabled child or infant. Also, states would have been able to extend the time limits for recipients who were enrolled in education or training programs, or if they faced serious obstacles to employment such as learning disabilities or illiteracy. These extensions, however, could not be applied to more than 10 percent of a state's caseload.

Another important part of Clinton's plan was that it required a commitment on the part of the government to provide child care, transportation, and other services to help those making the transition to work, as well as job training and paid work assignments to those who could not find or qualify for a private sector job. This plan did not propose ending AFDC status as an entitlement, although it did apply time limits for the receipt of benefits. In addition, the plan allowed states to limit benefit increases when recipients had more children. It also denied AFDC and Food Stamp benefits to legal immigrants in their first five years of American residence and limited their access thereafter.[7] Although Clinton did not propose a fundamental devolution of responsibility for welfare to the states, he was certainly willing to allow states more flexibility in tailoring their own program requirements and limitations. This was demonstrated by the fact that prior to PRWORA, his administration had granted waivers to many states to allow them to experiment with different aspects of AFDC.

[5] Richard L. Berke, "Clinton: Getting People off Welfare," *New York Times*, 10 September 1992; a campaign ad initially broadcast on 9 September 1992, in which Clinton stated, "I have a plan to end welfare as we know it—to break the cycle of welfare dependency. We'll provide education, job training and child care, but then those that are able must go to work, either in the private sector or in public service."

[6] "Welfare Reform Takes a Back Seat," *Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1994* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995), 364.

[7] Ibid. Clinton proposed to require an immigrant's sponsor to be financially responsible for the immigrant for five years. After the five years, if the sponsor's income was above the national median family income, the immigrant would have to become a citizen to be eligible for benefits.

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But with little congressional support, Clinton's proposal for welfare reform failed to move forward. By attempting to appear centrist and moderate with his reform proposal, Clinton alienated major parts of both parties. Liberal Democrats found the plan's work requirements and time limits too harsh, while Republicans complained that it did not go far enough to dismantle the federal entitlement system and that it would perpetuate a system under which welfare recipients purportedly would be treated more generously than working families.[8] Also, because Clinton wanted to guarantee that poor mothers would receive meaningful assistance during their transition to work, the plan would have actually increased welfare-related spending in the short run.

The 104th Congress Republican Proposals

The November 1994 elections resulted in Republican majorities in both chambers of Congress for the first time since 1954, and they elected a particularly conservative group of Republicans as their leaders: Speaker Newt Gingrich, Majority Leader Dick Armey, and Majority Whip Tom DeLay. They introduced a welfare reform proposal as part of the 1996 Budget Reconciliation Act (HR 2491) that shifted responsibility for generating income to individuals and away from the government by placing five-year lifetime limits on cash assistance, requiring work after two years and denying benefits to unwed teenage mothers and children born to welfare recipients. The bill, which passed in the House and the Senate on party-line votes[9] but was vetoed by President Clinton, would also have block-granted funds for cash assistance to states and cut federal spending on welfare by $81.5 billion over seven years.

Following Clinton's veto, the Republicans in the House proposed the Welfare Overhaul Bill (HR 4), which was similar to the previous bill in that it provided block grants to states, placed lifetime limits on cash assistance, and denied assistance to unwed teenage mothers and children born to parents already receiving welfare. The Welfare Overhaul Bill, which too passed by strict party-line votes,[10] would have also decreased spending on Food Stamps and Medicaid. An Office of Management and Budget report assessing the bill's impact concluded that, if enacted, it would push over one million children into poverty. President Clinton, under pressure from congressional Democrats and advocates for the poor, vetoed the bill, declaring that it did "too little to move people from welfare to work."[11]

[8] "Welfare Reform Takes a Back Seat," 364.

[9] HR 2491 passed in the Senate 52–47 (D 0–46, R 52–1) and in the House 235–192 (D 5–191, R 230–1).

[10] HR 4 passed in the Senate 52-47 (D 1–45, R 51–2) and in the House 245–178 (D 17–174, R 228–4).

[11] "Welfare Bill Clears under Veto Threat," *Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1995* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1996), chap. 7, 52.

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PRWORA: The Final Compromise

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (HR 3734) resulted as a compromise between the wishes of President Clinton and the congressional Republicans.[12] Against Clinton's and the liberal Democrats' preferences, it dismantled AFDC, and in its place created TANF. The Act authorized six years of TANF block grants of $16.5 billion annually to the states, instead of the matching funds for AFDC that could increase or decrease without limit according to the state benefit level, the state's percentage match, and the number of welfare recipients receiving cash assistance that had defined that program as an entitlement.[13] The Republicans were able to achieve the death of unlimited matching funds for cash assistance from the federal entitlement, to decrease the federal allotments for Food Stamps by 13 percent through the creation of stricter eligibility standards, to cut benefits to individuals, and to take away most aid from legal immigrants.[14]

This bill did not, unlike prior Republican versions, include the dismantling of either Medicaid or Food Stamps as federal entitlements by turning them into block grants to states. Despite Clinton's dislike of many of the bill's provisions, but not wanting to drop the accomplishment of "ending welfare as we know it" for his 1996 reelection campaign, the President signed the act.

The difference between PRWORA and a bill that the President said he could have wholeheartedly supported lay in the level of commitment on the part of the federal government to genuinely assist poor mothers in their transi-

[12] PRWORA, or HR 3734, Final passage: House 256–170 [D 30–165 (ND 16–122, SD 14–43) R 230–2], Senate 74–24, [D 23–23 (ND 16–20, SD 7–3) R 51–1]; Conference Report PRWORA: House 328–101 [D 98–98 (ND 62–76, SD 36–2 2), R 230–2, I 0–1], Senate 78–21 [D 25–21 (ND 17–20, SD 8–1), R 53–0].

[13] See the *2000 Green Book*, 352. Strictly speaking the entitlement was for states that had chosen to participate in AFDC to receive matching dollars for a proportion of what they spent. The proportion of the match varied according to the per capita income of the state, with "rich" states like New York, Connecticut, or California getting back 50 cents for every dollar they spent and poor states like Mississippi, Louisiana, and New Mexico getting back 80 cents for every dollar they spent.

[14] The first action the bill took with regard to legal immigrants was to divide them into two groups: those who were in the country as of 22 August 1996 and those who came after preenactment and postenactment. Although most legal immigrants were originally barred from Food Stamps and SSI regardless of their date of entry into the United States, the date of entry distinction did matter for other programs. Most postenactment immigrants were barred from federal means-tested benefits, including SSI, Food Stamps, TANF, nonemergency Medicaid, and the state Child Health Insurance Program (CHIP) for their first five years in the United States. States were given the option to bar preenactment immigrants from TANF and nonemergency Medicaid programs. Since 1996, eligibility for SSI and Food Stamps has been restored to many preenactment children, elderly, and disabled persons, deepening the divide between the support available to the pre and postenactment groups. See Wendy Zimmerman and Karen C. Tumlin, "Patchwork Policies: State Assistance to Immigrants under Welfare Reform," The Urban Institute, May 1999. According to the *2000 Green Book*, "The basic policy laid out by the 1996 welfare law remains essentially unchanged for noncitizens entering after its enactment." *2000 Green Book*, 1372.

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tion to work.[15] But for the most part, this bill did just what the new breed of Gingrich-led House Republicans had in mind: end cash assistance to poor families as a federal entitlement, force poor women to work without providing much costly assistance or a safety net, cut some spending out of the federal budget by decreasing individual food stamp allotments, cut out benefits to legal immigrants, and increase the power of the states. The following sections will address what has happened nationally and on a state level to individuals, and what the political consequences and justifications have been with regard to the move toward block granting and time limits.

Postdevolution Realities

Impact on AFDC/TANF recipients

Between 1995 and 1999, the average monthly number of TANF recipients dropped by 47 percent, the number of children receiving cash assistance fell by 45 percent, while the number of adults fell by 52 percent.[16] (See Table 1 in the Appendix.) Whether or not PRWORA has been a success five years out depends on whether this sharp decrease in welfare recipients represents actual gains in financial independence through the acquisition of good jobs. Evaluating the effectiveness of PRWORA has been difficult because of the sheer numbers of persons who were involved and a limited public record of what happened to the welfare leavers. Also, the scholarly analyses available are based on the experience of at most a few thousand individuals. In addition, no one knows how many of the millions of welfare leavers would have left the cash assistance rolls anyway because of the large economic boom experienced by the American economy in the years after PRWORA was passed. The boom contributed to the creation of hundreds of thousands of new jobs and a May 2000 unemployment rate of only 3.9 percent—the lowest since January 1970.[17]

The successful welfare leavers. The best-case scenario for poor Americans who left the cash assistance rolls after 1996 is that some have been successful in finding jobs and attaining a greater level of financial independence. As a consequence of the two-year limit at any one time and five-year lifetime limit on cash assistance mandated by PRWORA, many welfare recipients who could find a job voluntarily left public assistance, at least temporarily, following the passage of the act. A study on early welfare leavers found that the majority (69 percent) reported having done so because of work related reasons—increased

[15] Peter Kilborn and Sam Howe Verhovek, "Clinton's Welfare Shift Ends Tortuous Journey," *New York Times*, 2 August 1996.

[16] Calculated from the *2000 Green Book*, tab. 7.4, 376.

[17] U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (stats.bls.gov/blshome.htm), 6 June 2001.

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hours or earnings, or a new job.[18] These early welfare leavers were among the most able and employable welfare recipients and entered the job market during the economic boom. Even so, 10 percent of early welfare leavers reported having left the cash assistance rolls because of administrative problems rather than the gaining of a job. Within a year, nearly a third of the leavers had returned to cash assistance, and about 25 percent were not working and had no partner working.[19]

According to another study of people who left the New Jersey welfare system after 1997, only a third were able to find work and support themselves a year after their public assistance ended. Two-thirds remained below the federal poverty level and fully half lost their homes, forcing them to move in with friends or family or to seek emergency housing in homeless shelters.[20] As many as 27 percent of New Jersey's recipients left welfare without finding work and were barely subsisting on what little they could get from other government subsidy programs such as Food Stamps and unemployment compensation.[21]

Looking at the national picture, Cornell University economist John Bishop notes that between 1994 and 1998, single parents increased their labor force participation by about 1.3 million, while the AFDC/TANF single parent caseloads fell by 1.7 million. These data suggest that a majority of those leaving welfare were able to find some kind of job but that there were some 400,000 who had not. In addition, Bishop concluded that even though the majority of single parents who had left welfare as of 1998 seems to have been able to move into the labor force, "further reductions in the unemployment rate of single parents are probably not feasible." In his view, for some poor families, the need for cash assistance will never disappear.[22]

One central issue interfering with single parent movement from welfare to work is lack of available quality child care. Single mothers leaving welfare for work have created a need for an additional one million spots for toddlers and preschoolers in child care. Inexpensive care of these children often means they are receiving low quality care, which leads to lags in language and social development. Other families are inhibited in their use of child care because it is located at great distances from a parent's home and work, compounded when siblings have to be placed in separate facilities. Furthermore, often there is no care for sick children or children of people who work at night.[23] The reality that only

[18] Pamela Loprest, "How Are Families That Left Welfare Doing? A Comparison of Early and Recent Welfare Leavers," *New Federalism: National Survey of America's Families* 36 (April 2001).

[19] Loprest, "Families Who Left Welfare: Who Are They and How Are They Doing?"

[20] Describing people or families as having incomes above the official poverty line does not necessarily mean that they have the means for adequate self-support. The federal poverty line is not adjusted for regional cost-of-living differences and therefore often falls dramatically short of what a family actually needs for self-sufficiency.

[21] David Kocieniewski. "Study Finds Mixed Results in Reducing Welfare Rolls," *New York Times*, 22 October 1999.

[22] John H. Bishop, "Is Welfare Reform Succeeding?" Working Paper Draft, 12 August 1998.

[23] Tamar Lewin, "Study Finds Welfare Changes Lead a Million Into Child Care," *New York Times*, 4 February 2000.

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one in ten families who qualifies for child care assistance actually receives it is particularly ironic given that one of PRWORA's stated goals was "to provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives."[24] In addition to the one million children placed in poor quality care, other children are being sent to their grandparents as their parents' benefits disappear or are taken from their mothers and placed in foster homes. The *New York Times* reported: "As Wisconsin drives its welfare rolls to record lows, the number of grandmothers pressed into action is reaching unexpected heights. Unwilling or unable to work for public aid, many of the state's most troubled mothers have lost their benefits, often en route to drug clinics, shelters or the streets. And grandmothers . . .—angry, worried, or plain exhausted—are being left to care for the children abandoned along the way."[25]

Compounding the problem for welfare leavers, the strong technology-driven economy caused housing and health care prices to rise dramatically, while failing to substantially increase the wages of low-skilled workers. Homelessness has increased as a result of recipients being dropped from the welfare rolls because of time limits; but even if dropped after taking a job, in most cases they have been earning such low wages as to make it impossible to pay increasing rents. The decreasing supply of affordable housing has had a particularly negative and dramatic effect on the daily lives and opportunities of those with limited means. For the most vulnerable of the poor, loss or reduction of cash aid along with rising rents and stagnant low-skilled wages have caused homelessness among families with children.[26]

The bottom line is that there have been three outcomes for welfare leavers: first, there have been some functional individuals who were jolted out of their complacency or laziness and got normal employment; second, there is another larger slice who have been able to obtain low-paying, low-skill jobs and temporarily leave welfare, often at great cost to their children's development; and third, there is a group that has not been able to find and maintain jobs, and with time limits on cash assistance having come into play, they now are deeper in poverty than ever. Ron Haskins, staff director for the welfare panel of the Republican-controlled House Ways and Means Committee's welfare panel, has acknowledged, "There are people at the bottom who are worse off."[27] While between 1993 and 1995 the economic situation of families headed by single women generally improved, by 1997 the poorest 20 percent of these families experienced decreases in income, by an average of $577 a year, leaving them with an average annual income of $8,047.[28] For the most part, these were families who had left welfare but could not earn a living wage.

[24] H.R. 3734 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, part A, sec. 410, (a) (1).

[25] Jason DeParle, "As Welfare Rolls Shrink, Burden on Relatives Grows," *New York Times*, 21 February 1999.

[26] For more information on family homelessness, see Ralph da Costa Nunez, *The New Poverty: Homeless Families in America* (New York: Insight Books, 1996).

[27] "Study Says Welfare Changes Made the Poorest Worse Off," *New York Times*, 23 August 1999.

[28] Ibid. The average yearly income in this group fell to $8,047. The situation was worse for the poorest 10 percent, who lost an average of $814 a year.

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With respect to the most fragile and dysfunctional families, the new welfare system—which cuts off benefits to their entire family unit if parents will not or cannot work and limits cash assistance to a maximum of five years and as little as two years in some states—has caused homelessness, extreme deprivation, and in some cases child abandonment or the forced placement of children in foster homes.

Current TANF recipients. A worse case scenario awaits poor Americans who still receive welfare, but are facing impending time limits and the severe obstacles many recipients face in trying to work, especially if the economy is weak. One effect of the impending deadline has been to spur welfare agencies and caseworkers to focus intently on problem cases, often realizing the enormity of the roadblocks standing between their clients and work. It is those who are least capable of work who, with their children, remain on the cash assistance rolls. Many suffer physical or mental health disabilities, or substance addiction, or may be caring for an ill or disabled relative. At the very least, most welfare recipients lack adequate educational training, and many are not fluent in English.

An Urban Institute study provides some data that illustrate the differences between current cash assistance recipients and those who have already left the rolls. This study identified six potential obstacles to labor market success: poor physical condition, a child under one year of age, a child receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI), limited English, low level of education, and infrequent employment. The researchers found that 42 percent of those who left welfare in 1997 faced none of the identified obstacles. Of those still receiving benefits, only 22 percent had no obstacles, and 44 percent faced two or more. Importantly, current recipients have significantly lower levels of educational attainment than those who have left.[29]

New York City had just such a group of remaining welfare recipients who were having trouble moving into self-sufficiency. The city's Independent Budget Office (IBO) reports: "A growing portion of the city's welfare caseload is exempt from work or training activities because of health and other reasons that limit their ability to participate. This suggests that a significant number of public assistance recipients may remain in need of aid when their federal welfare benefits expire."[30] The IBO estimates that at the end of 2001, almost 100,000 people will be cut from the TANF program due to time limits and will be moved into the state-funded safety net program. PRWORA allows any state to ignore TANF time limits if they do not use federal dollars but only their own. Also, New York is very unusual because its state constitution mandates aid to the needy, even if it comes exclusively from state dollars. Of course, New York City's problems were greatly compounded by the terrorist destruction of the World Trade Center and the businesses servicing it.

[29] Pamela Loprest, "Current and Former Welfare Recipients: How Do They Differ?" Discussion Paper 99-17, Urban Institute, November 1999.

[30] City of New York Independent Budget Office, *Inside the Budget*, no. 82, 4 May 2001.

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FIGURE 2
Female Householders with Dependent Children in Poverty in 1999 Disproportionally Concentrated in Central Cities



Source: The Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, Poverty in the United States 1999, Table 2.

Complicating the situation is a lack of available jobs for which cash assistance recipients are qualified. A 1999 Brookings Institution study finds that welfare caseloads are not declining at the same rate in all kinds of locations. Older cities in the South, Northeast, and Midwest tend to have increasing shares of state welfare rolls.[31] Urban areas with spatially concentrated poverty have higher levels of welfare caseloads, and they have higher unemployment rates and homelessness than other areas,[32] making the chances of welfare recipients in poor urban areas to find jobs seem even slimmer than in other areas. As Figure 2 shows, single mothers and their children in poverty in central cities are almost as great as in the suburbs and rural areas combined. In percentage, rural areas too have high levels of poverty, as many rural areas also lack accessible employment opportunities because of unaffordable transportation over long

[31] Following the *Congressional Quarterly*'s categorization, the Midwest includes Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Wisconsin; the Northeast includes Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia; the South includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia; and the West includes Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming.

[32] "The State of Welfare Caseloads in America's Cities" (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution—Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy, 1999).

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distances.[33] The lack of local jobs and necessary job skills is often compounded by confusing and unhelpful interactions with welfare agencies that often fail to provide entitled support. "Even when city governments provide jobs, these jobs often do not lead to future work. Under the Work Experience Program (WEP), many New Yorkers have been earning their welfare checks by working for the City cleaning streets and parks or performing low-level clerical jobs in a few other agencies. The conditions they work in are often dangerous and demeaning."[34] Often this form of initial and inadequate employment is inhibited by lack of access to quality child care. For the more fragile and otherwise dysfunctional cash assistance recipients, the time limits and work rules of PRWORA are not a nudge toward work but toward an impending crisis. What lies ahead for poor Americans depends on their state's policies affecting the poor and the generosity of their state of residence rather than on any federally defined safety net.

State Variation in Dealing with TANF Population

The new TANF system is characterized by nothing if not variations because of the almost free rein that states have been given with their federal block-grant money. The single uniformity is the focus on work as opposed to poverty reduction that drives the policies of the states. Alan Weil, director of the Urban Institute's "Assessing the New Federalism" project, points out that there are three main strategies for moving people from welfare to work being pursued in different combinations and with different emphases by the states:[35] supporting the work effort of parents through subsidizing child care, health insurance, and transportation; improving the skills of those trying to get a job; an approach that many states have emphasized—simply erecting barriers to obtaining cash assistance.

In implementation, the job-first approach of the PRWORA, which is clear in the name of the act, caused in many cases the redefinition of the front line workers' approach to clients, as the case workers became more focused on driving their applicants to employment rather than guiding them through eligibility rules and paperwork for other benefits. Symbolic of this shift, states changed the titles of their frontline workers to better reflect the goals of self-sufficiency and work emphasis of the new law. In Michigan, the former "Assistance Payment Worker" became the "Family Independence Specialist," and in Georgia the same position was named "Family Independence Case Manager."[36] Fur-

[33] See Somini Sengupta, "In Rural Counties, the Squeeze of Poverty Can Be Stronger," *New York Times*, 29 April 2001.

[34] Testimony of Sylvia Ruff in "Welfare as They Know It," *Harper's Magazine*, November 1997, 24–29.

[35] Alan Weil, "Assessing the New Federalism" (Urban Institute's Conference, February 1999). These strategies are also discussed by the Department of Health and Human Services in their "Third Annual Report to Congress," August 2000 (www.acf.dhhs.gov), 24 August 2001.

[36] Thomas L. Gais et al., "The Implementation of the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996: Commonalities, Variations, and the Challenge of Complexity" (conference paper prepared for The New World of Welfare: An Agenda for Reauthorization and Beyond, Washington, DC, 1–2 February 2001), 13.

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thermore, rhetoric used by caseworkers in welfare offices focused on the work and independence goals of the PRWORA. Texas's welfare commissioner coined the slogan, "Get a job, get a better job, get a career."[37] Welfare offices across the nation display signs that proclaim "Welcome job seekers" and "You have a choice, choose a job!"[38]

The shift to block grants has been central to the increase in disparities in the amount of funding provided to each state and to the level of cash assistance given to individuals within a state. Previously, under AFDC, states were reimbursed for a percentage of their welfare expenditures with matching federal funds, according to a formula that returned 50 percent to the highest per capita income states and up to 80 percent to those with the lowest. The size of TANF block grants were made equal to the largest yearly amount paid by the federal government to a state for AFDC, Emergency Assistance to Needy Families (EA), and the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program (JOBS) programs in the fiscal years 1992–1995. Some of these years had a weak economy and therefore large caseloads. PRWORA also provided some supplemental grants for states with above-average population growth and below-average welfare spending per poor person in fiscal year 1994.[39]

There has always been wide variation—even under AFDC—in the level of cash assistance that states have chosen to extend to their eligible poor. Since the AFDC's origin in 1935, poorer states, especially in the South, have provided less cash assistance to their citizens, and they continue to spend very little. (See Figure 1 in the Appendix.) Accordingly, they also received the smallest reimbursements in numbers of dollars. The poorest three states—New Mexico, Mississippi, and Louisiana, which also had the lowest benefit levels under AFDC—had all spent less than 70 percent of the federal TANF money awarded to them by the end of 1998. This windfall of federal dollars to states was possible because states are not required to return unspent TANF dollars to the federal government. In the 2002 reauthorization of the law, the block grants may reflect how much the states actually spent on the poor during the time TANF was in effect rather than being tied to AFDC spending that would have become out of date.

Even when states spent all the money allotted to them, as nineteen states did,[40] they varied widely in the programs on which they chose to spend their federal dollars. Some states have chosen to spend generously on programs to support welfare recipients in their mandated transition to work. For example, Wisconsin expanded job-placement services, increased the number of counselors, guaranteed child care, created thousands of community service jobs, and raised monthly benefits almost to the highest level in the contiguous forty-eight

[37] Ibid., 12.

[38] Ibid., 12.

[39] See *2000 Green Book*, 353.

[40] Ed Lazere and Lana Kim, "Welfare Balances in the States: Unspent TANF Funds in the Middle of Federal Fiscal Year 1999" (Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 12 January 2000).

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states. Other states have used federal money to pay for programs formerly funded from state budgets, thereby freeing state money for tax cuts. *City Limits Weekly* reports that New York planned to use its TANF surplus to substitute federal for state dollars to support existing services for the poor, thereby freeing money for tax cuts and spending on other budget items.[41]

Minnesota is an example of a state that was relatively generous to its poor. The experimental Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) was deemed a success by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC), one of the earliest organizations that designed pilot projects to help poor people get to work.[42] The pilot program was initiated pre-TANF, beginning in April 1994 and ending in June 1998. Since 2001, a less generous version of MFIP is in effect, and its outcomes have not yet been evaluated.

Like other reformed welfare programs, pilot MFIP mandated participation in employment and training activities. In order to reach the goal of making work pay, however, recipients were eligible for welfare until their income reached 140 percent of the poverty line. In order to support family stability, penalties were removed for making two-parent families ineligible for welfare if the primary earner worked more than 100 hours a month or if he or she did not have a recent work history. In addition, MFIP paid child care subsidies directly to providers if the recipient worked while receiving welfare. Finally, the program consolidated AFDC, Food Stamps, and Family General Assistance into one program with common rules.

The outcomes of the MFIP pilot program were extremely positive. Single-parent long-term welfare recipients experienced significant increases in employment and earnings, and were able to sustain employment into the third year of research follow-up. In terms of family life, single-parent families experienced a large decline in domestic abuse, some increase in marriage rates, fewer behavioral problems in children, and improved school performance. Two-parent families benefited from reduced pressure for both parents to work and saw reduced divorce rates, higher incomes than those on AFDC, and increased home ownership. MDRC's analysis found that MFIP's positive impact on children was due primarily to the additional money available to working families and not to its participation mandates.

Naturally, because MFIP increased support for working families through financial incentives and increased eligibility, it cost more than the previous welfare program—between $1,900 and $3,800 more per family per year. Since the enactment of TANF and program expansion to the entire state, Minnesota has reduced the generosity of its program. Jeff Thompson of the Oregon Center for Public Policy writes: "Compared with the original Minnesota Family Invest-

[41] Annia Ciezaldo, "Inside the New State Budget: A Welfare Slush Fund," *City Limits Weekly*, no. 224, 17 April 2000.

[42] Virginia Know, Cynthia Miller, and Lisa Gennetian. "Reforming Welfare and Rewarding Work: A Summary of the Final Report on the Minnesota Family Investment Program," *MDRC*, 2000. All data on MFIP and its outcomes were obtained from this MDRC report.

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ment Program, the new version requires a lower income for eligibility, provides less training, decreases incentives, stiffens sanctions, and includes time limits. In taking credit for the original program's success, while carrying out an inferior alternative, Minnesota's welfare agency is trying to get away with a classic bait and switch."[43] Though the pilot form of MFIP is no longer in existence, it is interesting to note that a welfare program that mandated work, but that also guaranteed real support and rethought the impact of its incentive structure on families, achieved a significant level of success in terms of poverty reduction and increased employment. One way for more states to fund this type of intensive support would be to use their TANF surpluses to provide assistance to families beyond their time limit if it is still needed.

California's TANF program, California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids (CALWORKS), requires welfare recipients to work after being on cash aid for eighteen to twenty-four months. If the welfare recipient is unable to find a regular employment, CALWORKS provides subsidized employment or community service activity. The report of the California Budget Program suggests that it helps to move recipients toward financial independence while taking into account their different needs. This is the most interesting aspect of this program and probably the reason for its success. The transitional jobs in a public or private setting were chosen to provide participants with valuable job skills and sometimes with educational and training activities. Depending on the particular needs, counseling time can also be considered as part of the job. The working recipients may be paid through regular grants directly from the welfare offices or given wages through the employer. If given wages, the simulation of a real-world job has various benefits, both psychological and practical: the recipients do not feel different from other employees or discriminated against, are eligible for Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), have access to job-related references, and contribute to Social Security and to Medicare. Furthermore, another incentive for participating in the program is that wage-based services were not counting toward the federal five-year limit on cash aid.[44]

There has always been wide variation among the states in the size of welfare payments given, but now this wide variation extends to the kind of job training and child support services to help them leave the cash assistance rolls. Variation among the states provides an example of the potential dangers of the devolution of federal funds into block grants to states and the end of the federal guarantee to support and aid America's poor. Those least employable and lacking in skills need support the most. But it seems that this is the exact group of people most forgotten by PRWORA, which lacks legal mandates to each state to provide job training, job placement, and, perhaps most important, public service jobs or government subsidized private jobs when adequate employment would not otherwise be available.

[43] Jeff Thompson, letter to *New York Times*, 20 June 2000.

[44] California Budget Program, *Welfare Reform Update, Calworks Community Service: How Can Counties Make it Work?* (www.calib.com/peerta/policies/employ.htm), November 2000.

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FIGURE 3
Change in Federal Outlays for Poor People, 1996 to 2000.



Source: Calculated from Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2001, Historical Tables, Table 11.3.
* Medicaid figures exclude money spent on elderly and disabled recipients. Changes are between 1996 and 2000.

Impacts on Federal Government Outlays

Cash assistance. Ironically and contrary to the goals of the Act, PRWORA has actually resulted in increased federal outlays for cash assistance for the former AFDC population than what would have been the case under the old system. (See Figure 3.) Because PRWORA tied funding levels of the block grants to the highest of the three pre-1996 years of spending, federal outlays stayed at those levels, despite the nation's economic boom and the sharp drop of persons on cash assistance. The sharp drop of cash assistance recipients under the old, matching-funds system would have reduced federal outlays as state outlays declined.

Medicaid. Before the passage of the 1996 welfare reform, recipients of AFDC were automatically eligible for Medicaid and able to receive that benefit through the same application process. PRWORA separated the application requirements for TANF cash assistance and Medicaid for parents and children, causing confusion that initially led to a drop in the number of uninsured and eligible families receiving Medicaid. While the federal eligibility requirements for Medicaid did not change with the enactment of the PRWORA,[45] Families

[45] In order to qualify for Medicaid, persons must be either elderly and low-income, disabled and low-income, medically needy (with a moderate income but extremely high medical bills), a member of a low-income family with dependent children, or a pregnant woman and have countable assets (determined by the states) that are valued below federal limits.

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USA found that the number of low-income parents who received Medicaid fell by 945,900 in the fifteen states they studied, from 3,503,553 in January 1996 to 2,557,653 in December 1999.[46] Even so, outlays for Medicaid for the nonelderly and nondisabled—meaning then primarily for poor single mothers and their dependant children—did increase from FY 1996 to FY 2000. (See Figure 3.)

Getting approved for Medicaid coverage has, however, not been easy. Unless severely disabled, adults with no children are completely ineligible for Medicaid in forty states;[47] low-income parents are in principle eligible for coverage, but states set their own standards for income requirements and thus control enrollment. In twenty-six states, a parent working full time, earning $5.15 per hour (minimum wage) for a yearly total of $9,373 for a 35-hour week and $10,712 for a 40-hour one while supporting a family of three is deemed to have "too much income" to qualify for Medicaid coverage, even if his or her job does not provide health insurance.[48] In three of these states—Louisiana, Virginia, and Texas—parents working more than 12, 17, and 18 hours per week, respectively, at this wage would not qualify for Medicaid.[49] The problem of insuring low-income parents is two-fold: the transition to separate the application for Medicaid and cash assistance can be confusing, leaving many temporarily uninsured; the state variation resulting from states being allowed to create their own eligibility requirements leaves many low-income parents permanently uninsured.

As a partial remedy, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 created the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), which guarantees free or low-cost health insurance to all children in families earning less than 200 percent of the federal poverty level and gives states the option to increase coverage.[50] SCHIP, however, is not an entitlement program and does not get implemented automatically. States have to choose to set it up and then fix eligibility requirements for coverage based on geography, age, income, resources, residency, disability status, access to other health insurance, and duration of eligibility for coverage.[51] As of the end of FY 1999, twenty-five states had not yet established a SCHIP Program. Furthermore, as states must determine how to disseminate information about SCHIP to needy families, the program has been slow to catch on. As of early 2001, there remained 7 million low-income children who were not covered by SCHIP, Medicaid, or private insurance.[52]

Food Stamps. The number of people who receive Food Stamps has fallen in recent years, from 27.5 million recipients in 1994 to 18.6 million in 1999, and

[46] Robert Pear, "A Million Parents Lost Medicaid, Study Says," *New York Times*, 20 June 2000.

[47] Families USA, "The Heath Care Safety Net: Millions of Low-Income People Left Uninsured," July 2001 (www.familiesusa.org), 3 August 2001.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Pear, "A Million Parents Lost Medicaid."

[50] *2000 Green Book*, 931.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Families USA, "The Health Care Safety Net."

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thus reduced federal outlays by $6.436 billion (or $8.265 billion in 1996 constant dollars).[53] (See Figure 3.) A study by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) attributes 55 percent of the decline to a decrease in the rate at which eligible poor people were actually receiving needed assistance,[54] and only 28 percent of the decline to a decrease in the number of people with low incomes. In 1998, only 70 percent of poor children received Food Stamps—down from 88 percent three years earlier.[55]

In sum, federal outlays on Food Stamps and the number of participants in Food Stamps have dropped, but not because of a commensurate decrease in need. One factor is that a large number of welfare leavers are confused by the separation of Medicaid and Food Stamps from cash assistance, and they are both discouraged and confused by new bureaucratic obstacles. Because Medicaid and Food Stamp eligibility were automatically granted under AFDC through welfare eligibility, the separation of these two programs and changing eligibility standards from those for cash assistance has resulted in confusion, even though the federal eligibility standards for Medicaid and Food Stamps have not changed from what they were before PRWORA. Administrative policies created by states in the aftermath of welfare reform impede, sometimes deliberately, many needy people from receiving the support to which they are still entitled. Food Stamps application forms in many states are so long, difficult, and confusing that they deter eligible people from applying.[56] Thus, many welfare leavers are not simply living without cash assistance, but many are also struggling without the health and nutritional subsidies that they received while on welfare and to which they are still legally entitled.

Political Impacts

Now that the federal government has passed the resources and authority to run cash assistance safety-net programs to the states, federal officials can claim that their hands are largely tied and that advocates for the poor must look to the

[53] The federal government requires that food stamp recipients have an income and assets below a set level and that they register for work or job training; the PRWORA requires that adults without dependent children work at least half-time or enroll in a job training program to receive Food Stamps for longer than 3–6 months. Many TANF, SSI, and General Assistance recipients automatically qualify for Food Stamps, while most strikers, noncitizens, post-secondary students, and institutionalized persons do not. Families without a permanent address may not qualify for Food Stamps.

[54] Parke Wilde, et al., "Food Assistance and Nutrition Report No. 7: The Decline in Food Stamp Participation in the 1990's" (Washington, DC: USDA, Economic Research Service, Food and Rural Economics Division [www.ers.usda.gov/publications/fanrr7/], 21 June 2001). Another 12 percent was attributed to "program reform and political variables," and only 28 percent of the decline was accounted for by a decrease in the number of people with low incomes.

[55] "Study Says Welfare Changes Made the Poorest Worse Off," *New York Times*, 23 August 1999.

[56] Nina Bernstein, "Bingo, Blood and Burial Plots in the Quest for Food Stamps." *New York Times*, 12 August 2000. See also, Food Resource and Action Center at www.farc.org and Mathematical Policy Research at www.fns.usda.gov, August 2000.

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fifty governors to do the right thing for their poor citizens. President Clinton made this clear in a 1997 speech to the National Governors Association. "You asked to be cut loose from the federal government's bureaucratic strings," he reminded the assembled governors, "and we did that. But now you have continuing responsibility that is greater."[57] This meant that if any "anti-welfare ideologues" were left, there would be no point in directing their venom to the federal government or, more specifically, to the president.

Thomas L. Gais of the Rockefeller Institute's Federalism Research Group has found that welfare reform in the 1990s gave power not just to state governments overall, but also to state executives in particular, limiting the role of state legislatures.[58] These reforms have strengthened governors—and so it is no surprise that they heavily supported PRWORA. Gais writes:

> A striking feature of devolution has been the salient and often dominant role played by governors and top state executives and the contrasting political weakness of state legislatures. The recent history of devolution has largely been a history of executive action. Governors pushed for increasingly ambitious waivers from Medicaid and AFDC in the early 1990s. . . . Governors in the Midwest—as in most states within our research sample—were very active in fashioning the new welfare policies, while state legislatures usually made only marginal changes before the legislation was finalized. If anything, the role of state legislatures has declined even further since the [welfare] reforms were enacted.[59]

It is the many complex and varied possible responses to any given family's situation that preclude legislative codification and leave safety-net decisions up to individual executives and administrators.[60] The danger of this is the difficulty it creates in evaluating states' welfare programs—now a patchwork of programs with different rules and benefits depending on the state, administered according to the views of sometimes idiosyncratic individuals who happen to be serving in key political roles.

TANF Surpluses. Another benefit to governors is that as welfare rolls shrank and the size of federal block grants remained the same, surplus TANF dollars amounted to a windfall—a kind of general revenue sharing, allowing top state executives, especially governors, to enact politically popular tax cuts and increase spending on other programs. At the end of fiscal year 1999, the

[57] Remarks made by President Clinton to the National Governors Association, 28 July 1997, Las Vegas, Nevada.

[58] State legislatures have missed out on this new power, partially because state legislative bodies have nowhere near the amount of influence vis à vis a governor as Congress has toward the president.

[59] Thomas L. Gais, "Concluding Comments: Welfare Reform and Governance" in Carol S. Weissert ed., *Learning from Leaders: Welfare Reform Politics and Policy in Five Midwestern States* (Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute Press, 2000), 173–189.

[60] See Demetrios Caraley, "Dismantling the Federal Safety Net: Fictions Versus Realities," *Political Science Quarterly* 111 (Summer 1996): 250–51. As could easily have been predicted, governors have in fact gained power as a result of the block granting of cash assistance, as well as the devolution of much of the policy-making authority around welfare.

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states were in possession of approximately $7 billion of unspent TANF funds out of $40 billion available.[61]

The surpluses have caused some members of Congress to argue that federal TANF funding should be cut back, as states appear not to need a significant portion of their funds. In March 1999, Representative Nancy Johnson (R-CT), chairman of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Human Resources, sent a strongly worded letter to all fifty governors, pointing out that much of the TANF money had yet to be spent. "The time is rapidly approaching," she wrote, "when it will not be possible to protect these funds unless states begin to demonstrate that all the funds can be productively employed. Spend the money."[62]

A year later she again wrote to the governors. Although she praised them for bringing 2002 TANF surplus projections down from $22.8 billion to $14.2 billion, she also strongly cautioned them to avoid just replacing state dollars with TANF dollars in their budgets for other than programs benefiting the poor. "Supplantation, of course, is perfectly legal under the TANF statute," she warned, but "if the savings from supplanted federal funds are used for purposes other than those specified in the TANF legislation, Congress will react by assuming that we have provided states with too much money."[63]

Winners and Losers from Welfare Reform

The Winners. The 1996 welfare reforms were a boon to some and a disaster to others. The big winners include former President Clinton and all the governors. President Clinton was able to claim a bipartisan policy success and to take credit for the widely popular reform of an almost universally unpopular program. In addition, by passing both the authority and the responsibility for cash assistance to the states, he and probably all future presidents would also be able to pass any criticisms of the program along to the states. In addition and paradoxically, Democratic candidates and Democratic elected officeholders in Congress no longer have "welfare" as an albatross that they must defend.

The governors benefited from the reforms in that they gained a huge amount of federal money that they have been able to spend largely at their discretion. Although the practice is frowned upon by Congress, in reality many governors through creative accounting have used TANF money to pay for existing state programs, thereby freeing parts of the state budget for tax cuts and other uses popular with the voting public. In addition, states now have much greater leeway than before to increase or decrease benefits and to manipulate eligibility standards, time limits, and work requirements—within the federally

[61] See *the 2000 Green Book*, tabs. 7–14.

[62] Letter from Nancy Johnson to governors, 16 March 1999 (www.fiscalpolicy.org/johnson99.htm), 26 July 2001.

[63] Letter from Nancy Johnson to governors, 15 March 2000 (*www.mncn.org/bp/johnson.htm*), 26 July 2001.

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mandated maximum time limits—to their liking. This boon to governors may prove to be short-lived. As the business cycle turned down in 2001 and TANF time limits run out, it is state budgets that will likely have to pick up the tab for the continued provision of basic necessities to America's poorest citizens if Congress decides to reduce the size of TANF block grants in order to have money to spend elsewhere.

The final category of winners from the 1996 welfare reforms are those former welfare recipients who have, through necessity and better support systems, been able to get and hold jobs that provide them with greater financial and family stability than life on welfare did. Unfortunately, no data are currently available as to what percentage of 1996 welfare recipients this group might be. It is probably more than one million but fewer than the 2.3 million adult recipients who left the cash assistance rolls and fell into this category of putative winners. But even if a welfare leaver with one child could find a job at the minimum wage and work 40 hours a week for 52 weeks, his/her total earnings would be $10,712 and, therefore, below the poverty level of $11,869 for a household unit of an under 65 adult with one child.

The Losers. Those who have clearly lost ground are former and current cash assistance recipients who have not been able to get jobs, so that on net they are not as well off as they were under AFDC. This category includes those who have not received the vital services of job training and child care, those for whom the loss of cash assistance has brought homelessness due to an inability to pay the rent, those who are working at wages too low to provide basic necessities, those who have improperly lost access to Food Stamps and Medicaid, and those with multiple and severe barriers to employment and self-sufficiency who realistically will never make it on their own. Some of the mothers whose families were rendered homeless have also had their young children taken from them against their will and had them put in foster care.

In a way, it may turn out helpful that the debate over TANF reauthorization in the year 2002 will take place during a downward turn in the economy, when the number of needy poor people will be increasing. Perhaps now that the concepts of PRWORA and TANF have been generally accepted, congressional debate will include ways to increase PRWORA's ability to function not just as reducer of cash assistance rolls but as a meaningful safety net for those who are honestly seeking better than low-wage jobs so that they can eventually make it on their own.

Reauthorization Politics

Five years after the passage of the PRWORA, almost everyone including both the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates in their 2000 campaigns has been touting it as a success. This is so even though it has gone some way—not only with respect to cash payments but also with respect to Medicaid

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and Food Stamps—toward dismantling the federal safety net for the poor. While there has always been wide variation among the states in the size of welfare payments given, now this wide variation extends also to the kind of job training and child support services to help cash assistance recipients leave the rolls. This variation among the states provides an example of the potential dangers of the devolution of federal funds into block grants to states and the end of the federal guarantee to support and aid America's poor. But the poor are least employable, lacking in skills, and in need of support the most. Yet this is the exact group of people most forgotten by PRWORA, which lacks legal mandates to each state to provide job training, job placement, and, perhaps most important, public service jobs or government subsidized private jobs when adequate employment is not otherwise available.

So the question during reauthorization in 2002 will be to what extent will Congress be willing to fix shortcomings that have been noted in the 1996 versions. More specifically, can the programs be redesigned so that in addition to reducing the cash assistance rolls, they also provide the supports needed to raise both welfare leavers and those still receiving cash assistance out of poverty? Part of the answer to these questions lies in three political trends: the decline in the number of Democrats in the House and Senate; the shift to the center of many remaining Democrats (exemplified most notably by Bill Clinton running under the banner of a "New Democrat"); and the increased cohesiveness of the Republican party.

Decline in the number of Democrats in Congress. The decline in the number of Democrats (see Figure 4) in Congress is important because historically it has been the Democrats (minus some deviant southern Democrats[64]) who have supported the federal government's programs designed to aid poor individuals and local governments; the Republicans (with deviance sometimes by the northeasterners) have not.[65] Between 1935 and 1976, with programs such as the Social Security Act of 1935, the Public Housing Act of 1937, the Food Stamps Act and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, the Economic Opportunity Act Amendments of 1966, the Comprehensive Training Act of 1973, the Legal Services Corporation and the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, the New York Seasonal Financing Act of 1975 and the

[64] Following *Congressional Quarterly's* categorization, Southern Democrats are those elected in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. For this comparison, Northern Democrats are those representing the other thirty-seven states.

[65] See Demetrios Caraley, "Congressional Politics and Urban Aid," *Political Science Quarterly* 91 (Spring 1976): 19–45; Caraley, "Congressional Politics and Urban Aid: A 1978 Postscript," *Political Science Quarterly* 93 (Fall 1978): 411–18; and Caraley, "Congress and Reagan's New Federalism," (with Yvette Schlussel), *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 16 (Winter 1986): 49–79.

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FIGURE 4
Long-Term Decline of Democratic Representation in the House of Representatives, and in Electoral Votes, 1961–2001.



Source: Congressional Quarterly Yearbooks and Statistical Abstract of the United States.

Public Works Jobs of 1976, a majority of House Republicans voted to recommit or voted against final passage in each case. In the Senate the uniformity was not that completely solid: a majority of the Senate Republicans voted in favor of final passage on about half the programs including the Social Security Act of 1935. (See Figures 5 and 6.)

The enactment of major new programs for the poor almost always took place when there was a Democratic president in the White House and large Democratic majorities in the House and Senate. The Democratic majorities had to be large so that even with the deviance of many southern and some mountain state Democrats, the Democratic leadership could still muster majorities for votes on the floor.

Some of this decline in Democratic representation in Congress can be attributed to the dynamics of particular candidacies, but a larger part comes from the changing demographics of the nation. In 1999, only 27 percent of all Americans lived in central cities of fifty-thousand people or larger. A full 50 percent of Americans lived in the outside central city or suburban portions of metropolitan areas; and 18 percent lived outside metropolitan areas entirely. Furthermore, the percentage of the politically and economically dominant white population that lived in central cities in 1999 was even lower—21 percent—meaning that 79 percent lived in suburbs and rural areas.[66]

[66] U.S. Census Bureau, "Poverty in the United States," 1999.

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FIGURE 5
Percentage of Representatives Voting in Favor of Selected Safety-Net Programs by Party, 1935–1976.



Source: Calculated from the *Congressional Record* and *Congressional Roll Call Yearbooks* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.).

The decline in the proportion of the population living in large cities has resulted in a steadily decreasing number of Democratic members in the House of Representatives who represent central city districts and therefore would have constituency interests, ideology, and party tradition all motivating them to support federal aid programs. As recently as 1982, 105 (24 percent) districts were predominantly central city, while 125 (29 percent) were predominantly suburban, 132 (30 percent) rural, and 73 (17 percent) mixed.[67] As a result of the 1990 census and the required decennial reapportionment, the Clinton Con-

[67] Demetrios Caraley, "Carter, Congress, and the Cities" in Dale Rogers Marshall, ed., *Urban Policy Making* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979).

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FIGURE 6
Percentage of Senators Voting for Safety-Net Programs by Party, 1935–1976.



Source: Calculated from the *Congressional Record* and *Congressional Roll Call Yearbooks* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.).

gresses had a still smaller number of members from central cities (82), not much more than rural representation (76), and a larger number of representatives from the suburbs (212), with the rest mixed.

Residents of the suburbs as a general rule care less about a number of urban programs than city dwellers do. A 1996 CNN exit poll indicated that the economy, medical care, and crime reduction were priorities for residents of cities of 500,000 and above, while education, tax decreases, and deficit reduction were priorities for suburbanites.[68] It is around this latter set of issues that many bat-

[68] 1996 CNN exit poll (www.cnn.com), 28 May 2001.

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FIGURE 7
Decline in Snowbelt House Seats and Electoral Votes, 1962–2002.



Source: Congressional Quarterly Yearbooks. As defined by the Congressional Quarterly, the Snowbelt includes the Midwest and the East, the Sunbelt includes the South and the West.

tles during the 1996 and 2000 presidential and congressional elections were fought.

Beyond this exodus to the suburbs, there has also been a nationwide movement from the traditionally less conservative—in terms of supporting federal aid to the poor and to local governments—snowbelt of the East and Midwest to the more conservative West (with the exception of the Pacific coastal states) and Southern sunbelt. Between 1962 and 2002, this has resulted in a decrease in the number of representatives (and therefore also a decrease of electoral votes) from the East and Midwest by 27 and 25 seats and an increase for the South and West of 23 and 29 respectively.[69] (See Figure 7.) Because the Senate is never reapportioned, it is more difficult to nail down the impact of present population trends. However, senators in general, and even Democratic senators, inevitably recognize the increasingly suburban character of their overall constituencies.

The New Democrats' Shift to the Center

In response to the desertion of white, middle-class voters from the Democratic party's candidates during the presidential campaigns of the 1980s, many Demo-

[69] Calculated from the U.S. Census Bureau, Congressional Apportionment Homepage (www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/apportionment.html), 23 May 2001.

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cratic party leaders by 1992 had come to embrace both the more moderate political ideology and the rising stars of the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC). Bill Clinton was chair of the group when he ran for president in 1992, and Al Gore was a member as was 2000 vice presidential candidate Joe Lieberman. The DLC was an unofficial party organization formed in 1985 with the goal of influencing the national party, specifically to make it more appealing to mainstream voters. The DLC argued that the Democratic party as a whole had gained a reputation for extreme liberalism and therefore could not win the presidency.

While many Democrats and even some members of the DLC were still in fact voting like liberals, political scientist John F. Hale argues that, "as elected officials, most [liberal DLC members] saw the wisdom in discussing ways to make party positions more palatable to mainstream voters and in making themselves look more moderate in the eyes of their constituents."[70] He believes that the DLC's achievement, crowned by chair Bill Clinton wresting the presidency back from twelve years of Republican domination in the 1992 election, was the creation of "a liberal-leaning platform couched in soothing centrist rhetoric for a party that has been unable to do so and one that [had] considerable potential appeal to much of the party's political base."[71] More recently, victories in the November 2000 congressional elections by self-described moderates helped the Democrats to pick up four seats in the Senate, which increased their membership to fifty, as well as three in the House.[72] The New Democratic coalition sees these results as a validation of its centrist platform that includes targeted tax cuts and entitlement overhaul.

Not the whole Democratic party is a part of this centrist trend. A large group of Democrats was not pleased with Clinton's welfare reform plan, and only a minority of Democrats outside the South voted for final passage of PRWORA or for the conference report in either chamber. The senators who voted against PRWORA are shown in Table 1. But after Clinton signed the bill into law, Americans started to view the two major parties equally qualified to reform the welfare system. In keeping with the idea that welfare is a different thing from helping the poor, surveys also indicate that Americans believe that the Democrats care significantly more about the disadvantaged and can be better trusted to help the poor.[73]

The centerward shift of much of the Democratic party has been in large part an attempt to please voter opinion as measured in polls and past election

[70] Jon F. Hale, "The Making of the New Democrats," *Political Science Quarterly* 110 (Summer 1995): 216.

[71] Ibid., 224.

[72] 106th Congress, SENATE: 45 Democrats, 55 Republicans; HOUSE: 211 Democrats, 223 Republicans, and 1 independent. 107th Congress: SENATE 50 Democrats, 49 Republicans, 1 Independent; HOUSE: 212 Democrats, 221 Republicans, 2 Independents.

[73] See Robert Y. Shapiro and John T. Young, "Public Opinion and the Welfare State: The United States in Comparative Perspective," *Political Science Quarterly* 104 (Spring 1989).

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TABLE 1

*Senators Voting Against the Final Passage of PRWORA**

Akaka, Daniel K., D-HI	Glenn, John, D-OH	Moynihan, D. Patrick, D-NY
Bingaman, Jesse, D-NM	Graham, Daniel, D-FL	Murray, Patty, D-WA
Boxer, Barbara, D-CA	Kennedy, Edward, D-MA	Pell, Clairbone, D-RI
Bradley, William, D-NJ	Kerrey, J. Robert, D-NE	Pryor, David, D-AR
Bumpers, Dale, D-AR	Lautenberg, Frank, D-NJ	Sarbanes, Paul, D-MD
Daschle, Thomas, D-SD	Leahy, Patrick, D-VT	Simon, Paul, D-IL
Dodd, Christopher, D-CT	Mikulski, Barbara, D-MD	Wellstone, Paul, D-MN
Feinstein, Dianne, D-CA	Moseley-Braun, Carol, D-IL	

* In addition, there were 165 Democrats in the House who voted against final passage of the PRWORA. These roll call votes are available on-line at www.clerkweb.house.gov.

results. In polls, Americans have historically supported federal spending on health and education, especially with regard to poor children, but cash assistance programs for the poor have been the least supported form of social welfare.[74] Even before 1995, the word "welfare" suggested dependence, fraud, "playing" the system, laziness, and overblown bureaucracy; to many it brought to mind the conservative image of the perpetual welfare mom, continually having more children to increase her benefits. For these reasons, Clinton clearly felt compelled to enact "welfare reform" despite his party's historic interest in protecting the poor in general and AFDC in particular and despite the fact that much of the nonsouthern, more liberal wing of the congressional Democrats voted against the final compromise.

Increased Conservative Solidarity

The Republican party has historically been reluctant to support federal aid to poor central cities or to poor individuals. Indeed, even during the depths of the Depression, in a procedural vote a large majority of Republicans tried to kill the original Social Security Act of 1935, which set up the system of benefits for retirees and AFDC.[75] Also, in the time stretch of 1935 to 1976, majorities of Republicans in the House of Representatives opposed these programs to help the poor in every single case. The Republican senators were less single-minded and opposed somewhat more than half of the programs. Nevertheless, before the 104th (1995–1996) Congress, the Republican party was more heterogeneous in its voting, as some northeastern Republicans were likely to take a more liberal stance on aid to cities and the poor and to vote with a majority of Democrats. This was especially true for the Senate. In President Jimmy Carter's first

[74] Kent Weaver, *Ending Welfare As We Know It* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 24–25. See also Shapiro and Young. "Public Opinion and the Welfare State."

[75] See 1935 Social Security Act: HR 7620. House: recommit—failed 149–253: D 46–252 (N 39–151, S 7–101), R 94–1; bill—passed 372–33, D 289–13 (N 187–6, S 102–107), R 76–18. Senate: bill—passed 75–7, D 60–1 (N 39–1, S 21–0), R 15–5. For a detailed discussion of this topic, see Demetrios Caraley, "Congressional Politics and Urban Aid," *Political Science Quarterly* 91 (Spring 1976).

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Congress (1977–1978), for example, Republican senators from the northeast voted for safety net items and other aids to poor people and poor city governments more reliably than even the average for all Democratic senators. This group of Republicans included Lowell P. Weicker (CT), Henry J. Heinz III (PA), Edward W. Brooke (MA), Clifford P. Case (NJ), and Jacob K. Javits (NY), all of whom voted to support safety net programs 90 to 98 percent of the time.[76]

The 104th Congress saw, however, a marked solidification of the Republican party around antisafety-net ideology, and party line voting became the norm. Congressional Republicans generally took an antisafety-net stance between 1995 and 1996, with both the House and Senate Republicans demonstrating an extremely high degree of party solidarity in opposition to federal safety net programs.[77]

Any Hope for America's Poor?

Unlike AFDC, which was authorized on a continuing basis, PRWORA and TANF were authorized for six years and will expire at the end of fiscal year 2002. This means that before 30 September 2002, another debate will take place in Congress about how, if at all, to change the law in its next authorization.

Political Environment for Further Reform

Since there will be no intervening elections between the end of the year 2001 and the end of fiscal 2002, the distribution of party control in Washington will be unchanged from 2001 when TANF cash assistance is undergoing reauthorization: a conservative Republican president in the White House, Republican

[76] Unpublished data collected by the author.

[77] With the exception of Senators James M. Jeffords (VT, now Independent) and Lincoln Chafee (RI), and less often Olympia Snowe (ME) who sometimes vote with the Democrats. They, however, are offset by several Democrats like John Breaux (LA) and Robert Byrd (WV) who also cross party lines and vote with the Republicans. For data that this solidarity on safety net items continued, see relevant votes in Congressional Roll Call, 1997–1999. For example, amendments to allow states to continue noncash/voucher benefits to children whose parents had reached lifetime limits were brought to the floor many times in both the House and Senate and were rejected each time, largely along party lines.

SENATE: 1996 roll call vote 205 on S1956, an amendment to provide vouchers to children whose parents had reached lifetime limits, rejected 51–47 [R 6–47; D 45–0]. Roll call vote 223 on S1956, an amendment to provide noncash assistance to children whose parents had reached lifetime limits, rejected 48–51 [R 2–50, D 46–1 (ND 37–0, SD 9–1)].

HOUSE: 1996 roll call vote 329 on HR 3734, amendment to require states to provide vouchers to children whose parents had reached lifetime limits, rejected 168–258 [R 9–221, D 159–36 (ND 110–28, SD 49–8)]. Roll call vote 330 on HR 3734, amendment to recommit the bill to committee with instructions to allow states to provide noncash vouchers to children whose parents had reached lifetime limits, rejected 203–220 [R 7–220, D 195–0].

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control of the House by a very slim majority, and a one-vote Democratic control of the Senate.

What we know of President Bush's position on safety net policy is vague, but his central or organizing ideology is clear: he is interested in increasing the role of religious and nonprofit groups in providing services, and he has a generally conservative stance against government, especially the federal government, providing for the poor. In one of his first statements on poverty policy since taking office, he praised former President Clinton for signing PRWORA and argued that the American people, not the government, needed to take the principal responsibility for helping the poor.[78] The Bush administration also put through a large, regressive tax cut in 2001, which—like the Reagan tax cut in 1981—started to starve the federal government.[79] This cut, together with the weakening economy in 2001, produced decreased revenues that threatened the Clinton administration's twin accomplishments of balancing the budget and then running annual surpluses. But it also insures that the Bush administration and congressional Republicans would probably fight against new spending for almost all domestic programs, including those for the poor, and would probably propose spending cuts in order to meet congressional budget caps so that the budget could still be balanced or the projected deficits made as small as possible.

In addition to Bush's ideological stance on the role of the federal government in fighting poverty, the political reality is that he was brought to power and can presumably stay in power without any support from voters in central cities, whose residents are most likely to benefit from safety net programs. Bush lost to Gore in many big cities by very large margins, yet Bush still carried many of those states. Bush won Ohio's twenty-one electoral votes, despite Gore having won the large cities of Cleveland and Columbus, with 79 and 55 percent of the vote, respectively; Gore won 73 percent in Kansas City, Missouri, but lost the state; Gore also won 68 percent of the vote in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, but carried the state by fewer than 6,000 votes; finally, in Denver Gore won 62 percent of the vote, but Bush easily won the state. This evidence of the declining political influence of voters in large cities shows that Bush does not have to do anything positive for the urban poor or their allies in order to stay in office.

Much of the 2002 debate over reauthorization will take place in a Congress where neither Republicans nor Democrats have overwhelming power to significantly change the law, because they are so evenly divided in numbers. Republicans have an upper hand, because even if Congress were to pass some liberalizing version of PRWORA, they now have a conservative Republican president who almost certainly would veto such changes. But Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson, whose department has responsibil-

[78] See Frank Bruni, "Bush Pushes Private Sector Role in Aiding Poor," *New York Times*, 21 May 2001.

[79] For a prediction that such a tax cut would occur and the safety net not be strengthened if budget surpluses materialized, see Caraley "Dismantling the Federal Safety Net," 256–8.

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ity for the federal role in TANF, will also have strongly felt views of his own to present to President Bush and to Congress. As governor of Wisconsin, Thompson was a leader in changing welfare provisions through waivers from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) even before TANF became law, concentrating on helping the poor get away from welfare by spending large sums for job training and child care. He was fond of saying that to succeed in weaning families from welfare, there was need for more, not less, spending in the near term in order to save money over the long run; and he might continue to express what by now has proved to be a truism.

Furthermore, state governors are content with their increased political power, and the general public seems happy with the status quo, as welfare and poverty as problems seem to have slipped from the public discourse.[80] For all of the above reasons, there may not be much pressure for significant change, except perhaps to decrease overall funding, since the cash assistance population is currently much smaller than it was at the first authorization in 1996. The weakening of the economy in 2001 is a double-edged sword: it can be used by the Democrats to argue that more people are going to need help, but it can also be used by the Republicans to argue that with a decrease in revenues caused by the sluggish economy and the 2001 tax cut, the federal government cannot afford it.

Proposals for Further Reform

Working within these political constraints, there are still some ways by which TANF and PRWORA could be reauthorized to provide fairer and more consistent coverage to poor individuals and a greater incentive and ability to find quality jobs:

Congress should not decrease funding levels because of the experience of the first five years of TANF and PRWORA. Those five years had a booming economy and very few TANF recipients who had hit their five-year time limits. Members of the Congress may want to lower the funding levels because the number of people receiving cash assistance dropped significantly after 1996. Governors, especially Republicans, are likely to oppose funding cuts. Some Democratic governors will want more funding to be mandated for child care and job training.

Time limits. Receiving limited cash assistance while working during a month should not count as equal to receiving a full monthly cash assistance payment while not working at all. As the law is now, even though some states

[80] CNN's November 2000 exit polls failed to include questions on poverty or welfare. When participants were asked what they thought should be done with the federal surplus, they were provided with only three conservative responses: social security (35 percent); tax cut (28 percent); and debt reduction (24 percent).

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allow TANF recipients to supplement employment earnings with partial cash assistance, the number of months they receive such partial assistance counts against the lifetime time limit. Moreover, in Connecticut starting in 2001, the state counted even a single day on cash assistance as one month toward the time limits.

Work requirements/programs. There should be public service jobs or subsidized private-sector jobs available so that every recipient who wants to leave cash assistance should be able to work. The current law mandates that 40 percent of all TANF recipient families and 90 percent of two-parent TANF recipient families in each state work, and by 2002 these requirements will rise to 50 percent and 100 percent, respectively.[81] The original 1994 Clinton plan for welfare reform was in some aspects like time limits, more stringent than what was later enacted in 1996. But it did promise that if there were no private jobs for the welfare leavers, some level of government would create them.

Education and training. Job training and job retention training should be made mandatory for all states, and the time spent in job training should not count fully toward time limits. Career mentoring programs are also needed to help mothers retain jobs, as current retention rates are not good. This may require better child care support, because jobs often are lost when mothers have to leave work to care for children.

Child care. The Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) created in 1996 with $4.5 billion available during the period 1997–2001 should be reauthorized and its funding increased. States spent all of this CCDBG money and an additional $3 billion from TANF funds on child care. A Department of Health and Human Services study finds that at this level of CCDBG funding, only 12 percent of eligible children can be served.[82] PRWORA left great discretion for child care to the states. But the experience of the past five years shows that there should be federal mandates and regulations about the availability and quality of child care.

Medicaid and Food Stamps. States should be mandated to have applications for TANF also include provisions for applying at the same time for Medicaid and Food Stamps. Also, cash recipients leaving the rolls should be fully informed of their possible continued eligibility for Food Stamps and Medicaid.

Earned income tax credit. The earned income tax credit should be increased so that workers working full time and earning minimum wage do not

[81] *2000 Green Book*, 356.

[82] Ron Haskins, Isabel Sawhill, and Kent Weaver, "Welfare Reform Reauthorization: An Overview of Problems and Issues" (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, Welfare Reform and Beyond Brief #1, January 2001).

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FIGURE 8
Earned Income Tax Credit, 2000.



Source: Urban Institute calculations from data from the Joint Committee on Taxation, as reported in "The Earned Income Tax Credit: Knowledge is Money" by Katherin Ross Phillips in *Political Science Quarterly* 116 (Fall 2001).

have to stay below the poverty level. The EITC was enacted in 1975 during the Republican Ford administration and with a heavily Democratic Congress as a way to give back to the working poor a part of the payroll taxes they had been paying for Social Security and Medicare.[83] The reasoning was that whereas their income was too low for regular income taxes, the working poor were paying Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes from the first dollar they earned. By essentially giving back those payroll taxes, EITC was seen as removing a disincentive to leave AFDC and go to work. Since its creation, EITC has been significantly increased on a regular basis in every presidential administration since its establishment, leading to more of the working poor being eligible (see Figure 8) and outlays increased more than any safety-net program except Medicare. Given the historic bipartisan support for this program, Democrats with moderate Republicans could once again raise the maximum credit as a politically defensible means of helping both the welfare leavers and the working poor to get out of poverty. And there is a great psychological advantage in having a subsidy come not from a welfare office but from IRS.

[83] *2000 Green Book*, 808–812 .

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Housing. Reauthorization of PRWORA and TANF should deal with homelessness and provide for low-income housing. The housing issue did not become part of the 1996 welfare debates, but outlays for housing assistance actually decreased between 1996 and 2000. (See Figure 3.) But because many poor families no longer receive cash assistance and do not have jobs at sufficient salaries, they do not have enough money with which to pay rent. Some become homeless, and some homeless single mothers also have their small children taken away and placed in foster care. Moreover, the education of these children is seriously compromised. In many states, children who don't have a fixed residence are not allowed to register for school, and moving from one homeless locale to another also prevents children from getting a normal education. Because adequate shelter is absolutely necessary to hold jobs, housing vouchers and other forms of subsidized housing should come up as part of the 2002 reauthorization.[84]

Recession planning. A countercyclical formula should be built into PRWORA and TANF funding so that in times of recession, funding levels automatically increase and in boom times, decrease. There should be a baseline for the size of the block grant authorized and, in addition, a formula that would increase or decrease it according to a state's unemployment rate so as to provide a countercyclical effect.

To sum up, "welfare reform" has cut the cash assistance rolls by millions and driven many welfare recipients who had good job skills and job prospects to use them. Given the nature of its funding as block grants, it has not saved the federal government any cash assistance money. But in any event, federal outlays for cash assistance for the twenty years before 1996 were rising slowly, at about 2 percent a year in constant dollars.[85] The only substantial drop in outlays since 1996 has been for Food Stamps, and the weight of opinion is that the drop has been less the result of a contraction of need and more of greater difficulties in applying, including ignorance that noncash assistance recipients are still eligible. The job training and job retaining supports for mainly single mothers with children have varied greatly state by state. As the economy softened, as TANF surpluses have been used up, and as the "true," meaning the very high, costs of providing effective support services for untrained single mothers with small children have become clear, even progressive states like Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Connecticut have ratcheted down their spending on such services.

The Poor and James Madison's Tyranny of the Majority

The problem of "welfare as we know it" was never primarily that of large numbers of undeserving poor adults who could easily have gotten jobs and sup-

[84] See *Homeless in America: A Children's Story, Part One* (New York: The Institute for Children and Poverty, 1999).

[85] See Caraley, "Dismantling the Federal Safety Net," fig. 6.

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ported themselves but who refused to do so and were siphoning off huge amounts of budgetary resources. One piece of hard evidence is that a majority of recipients has always been children. The welfare problem was and is that of single mothers who have limited job skills. Thus however hard they try, they cannot provide food, medical care, and shelter for themselves and their families with the low wages they earn. While it would be greatly preferable if no one had children without having the means to support them, once such children are born in the richest society in the world, there is no moral reason for the children being forced to live a life of destitution.

This article does not supply an optimistic outlook for the poor, but it does reflect the political reality they face. That the poor should be only a minority—though a sizable minority of some 32 million people or 11.8 percent of the population—would be a surprise to James Madison, who was worrying in *The Federalist*, No. 10, about tyranny by a majority faction of the poor forming against a minority of the wealthy and, therefore, about the wealthy being exploited by the poor. Madison could not have conceived of the present situation where any "tyranny" is one of an insensitive majority that ignores the problems of the poor or finds them undeserving or just practices optimistic denial that there is any need for having a government safety net.

If a democracy is to remain stable in the long run, the majority must be humane and foresighted enough to see that it is in its own interest to take care of minorities who have severe problems and who, because of those problems and lack of numbers, will never have the political strength to impose their own policy solutions. The majority also needs to recognize that when the problems specifically concern poor single mothers with children, the lack of a safety net with good quality job training, child care, medical care, education, and jobs, then the problems of these mothers and children will be transmitted from generation to generation indefinitely.*

* This article was finished just before the catastrophic events of 11 September 2001. Obviously, the political and budgetary dynamics discussed earlier will surely change in ways that cannot yet be known.

I thank Genevieve Melford, Dana Hepper and Elena Rigacci Hay for their excellent research assistance. I also thank Vilma M. Caraley, Ralph Nunez, Richard Pious, Robert Y. Shapiro, and John J. Smee for reading and commenting on various drafts of this article, although as is usual, I did not accept all of their suggestions.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 1

Total TANF Recipients by State

State	August 1996	June 2000	Total Difference	# Families Working, 1998	Percent Difference 96-00
Alabama	100,662	55,168	−45,494	3,674	−45%
Alaska	35,544	24,389	−11,155	3,465	−31%
Arizona	169,442	82,851	−86,591	7,278	−51%
Arkansas	56,343	28,113	−28,230	1,384	−50%
California	2,581,948	1,272,468	−1,309,480	179,953	−51%
Colorado	95,788	27,699	−68,089	3,608	−71%
Connecticut	159,246	63,589	−95,657	15,439	−60%
Delaware	23,654	17,262	−6,392	924	−27%
Dist. of Columbia	69,292	44,487	−24,805	3,685	−36%
Florida	533,801	135,903	−397,898	19,854	−75%
Georgia	330,302	135,381	−194,921	13,271	−59%
Hawaii	66,482	42,824	−23,658	3,449	−36%
Idaho	21,780	1,382	−20,398	284	−94%
Illinois	642,644	259,242	−383,402	45,747	−60%
Indiana	142,604	96,854	−45,750	9,262	−32%
Iowa	86,146	52,293	−33,853	10,585	−39%
Kansas	63,783	36,557	−27,226	3,222	−43%
Kentucky	172,193	85,696	−86,497	12,931	−50%
Louisiana	228,115	79,745	−148,370	8,754	−65%
Maine	53,873	14,813	−39,060	5,068	−73%
Maryland	194,127	70,910	−123,217	3,947	−63%
Massachusetts	226,030	93,890	−132,140	12,479	−58%
Michigan	502,354	195,101	−307,253	43,470	−61%
Minnesota	169,744	116,589	−53,155	11,296	−31%
Mississippi	123,828	33,781	−90,047	3,018	−73%
Missouri	222,820	122,930	−99,890	6,521	−45%
Montana	29,130	14,001	−15,129	3,417	−52%
Nebraska	38,592	26,841	−11,751	3,218	−30%
Nevada	34,261	16,478	−17,783	1,810	−52%
New Hampshire	22,937	13,862	−9,075	1,188	−40%
New Jersey	275,637	125,258	−150,379	1,426	−55%
New Mexico	99,661	67,950	−31,711	2,801	−32%
New York	1,143,962	693,012	−450,950	83,781	−39%
North Carolina	267,326	97,171	−170,155	5,297	−64%
North Dakota	13,146	7,734	−5,412	550	−41%
Ohio	549,312	238,351	−310,961	42,023	−57%
Oklahoma	96,301	13,606	−82,595	5,425	−86%
Oregon	78,419	42,374	−36,045	1,479	−46%
Pennsylvania	531,059	232,976	−298,083	17,735	−56%
Rhode Island	56,560	44,826	−11,734	3,996	−21%
South Carolina	114,273	35,721	−78,552	5,067	−69%
South Dakota	15,896	6,702	−9,194	890	−58%
Tennessee	254,818	143,823	−110,995	11,698	−44%
Texas	649,018	343,464	−305,554	7,484	−47%
Utah	39,073	24,101	−14,972	3,654	−38%
Vermont	24,331	15,528	−8,803	1,702	−36%
Virginia	152,845	67,388	−85,457	8,218	−56%
Washington	268,927	146,375	−122,552	28,444	−46%
West Virginia	89,039	31,500	−57,539	4,756	−65%
Wisconsin	148,888	37,381	−111,507	7,473	−75%
Wyoming	11,398	1,103	−10,295	242	−90%
U.S. Total (excluding territories)	12,077,254	5,677,443	−6,399,811	686,342	−53%

Source: U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Administration for Children and Families.

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FIGURE 1
Maximum Benefits and Percent of Federal TANF Money Spent.



* Committee of Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, *2000 Green Book*, Table 7-7. They are based on January 2000 benefit levels.
** U.S. Department of HHS, ACF table "Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) Program Total Federal Awards, Transfers and Expenditures. All FY's (97–99)." "Outlays to TANF Recipients" is the sum of state expenditures on cash and work based assistance, work activities, child care, transitional services, and "other" expenditures.

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Elections Online: Assessing Internet Voting in Light of the Arizona Democratic Primary

RACHEL GIBSON

The public furor surrounding the Florida vote count in the recent presidential election has focused attention on election administration and the need for reform. Mistakes by voters due to confusing butterfly ballots, along with difficulties in counting punch card ballots due to stubborn chads, led to legal challenges by both presidential candidates that made their way to the Supreme Court. The Court's opinion in *Bush v. Gore* condemns "arbitrary and disparate treatment" of voters and mandates "specific standards" and "uniform rules" for the exercise of the vote to ensure "that the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied."[1] While the Court itself was not specific on what those specific standards should be, one potential response to the Court's mandate is a move to electronic voting. As a commentator in *Wired* remarked: "The 2000 election highlights the fact that American democracy hinges for the most part, on 1960s technology. . . . So is electronic voting at precincts, if not Internet voting from remote locations the way to prevent further crises in our democracies?"[2] Proponents claimed that, among other benefits, a move to electronic voting would have prevented ballot spoiling, allowed for immediate vote counts, and prevented the early guesswork by television networks that led to the misreporting of state results.[3]

[1] *Bush v Gore* 531 S.Ct. Slip Opinion, 6–7 (2000).

[2] Farhad Manjoo, "Ballots Need an Upgrade–Duh!" (www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,40078,00.html), 10 November 2000.

[3] See Gary Chapman, "Online Voting, Even If Secure, Won't Solve Election Troubles" (http://www.latimes.com/cgi-bin/print.cgi), 13 November 2000.

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In the light of this controversy, this article examines the arguments for and against Internet voting as a fair and safe method of casting ballots and considers the broader implications it presents for the democratic system. Next, the theoretical arguments made by the proponents and detractors are assessed in light of a recent example of electronic voting—the Democratic party's primary election in Arizona on 11 March 2000. This primary was the first instance in which Internet voting was used in a statewide, legally binding election for political office.

The Internet and Democracy

The link between democracy and the modern mass communications system has been the subject of considerable research since the introduction of television broadcasting in the early 1960s.[4] More recently, the rise of computer-mediated communication in the 1990s in the shape of the Internet has reawakened the debate about the impact of the media on society and the possibilities for a more deliberative or participatory style of democracy. For many observers, the emergence of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) such as the World Wide Web (WWW) and email has revived hopes for so-called electronic or "e-democracy"—a polity whereby interactive media promotes a wider base of citizen participation. Although there was a brief flurry of enthusiasm that interactive television or "teledemocracy" could fulfil these ambitions in 1980s, this interest proved short-lived.[5]

Speculation about the Internet's democratic potential is based on the understanding of its inherent and unique properties as a medium of communication. While much has been made of its greater information storage space and faster speed of transmission, e-democracy promoters view the Internet's interactivity and decentralized control structure as offering the greatest potential to reinvigorate civic life. Building on the momentum toward theories of more deliberative or discursive democracy that arose in the 1990s,[6] proponents of e-democracy have argued that it offers a new and highly effective way to expand the circle of voices being heard in the policy-making process. If what is

[4] For contemporary overviews, see Pippa Norris, *A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Postindustrial Societies* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan, eds., *Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); David Swanson and Paolo Mancini, *Politics, Media and Modern Democracy* (New York: Praeger, 1996).

[5] Christopher F. Arterton, *Teledemocracy: Can Technology Protect Democracy?* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1987); Benjamin Barber, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics For A New Age* (Berkeley: University Of California Press, 1984); Jean Bethke Elshtain "Democracy and the Qube Tube," *The Nation*, August 1982, 108–109.

[6] Amy Guttman and Dennis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement* (London: Bellknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996); Jurgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Jon Elster, ed., *Deliberative Democracy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); John Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000).

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required to improve democratic life is the injection of more mass deliberation, then surely this new medium with its opportunities for two-way or multidirectional debate offers a potential solution. From radical models of direct democracy to leaner and more transparent representative systems, the interactive properties of the Internet could open up a new level of governing accountability and public dialogue.[7]

Similarly, in the wider civic sphere, Internet communities are seen as offering a basis for rebuilding the frayed bonds of social capital. As Robert Putnam has commented, "Social capital is about networks, and the Net is the network to end all networks."[8] Based in shared interests rather than forced or involuntary communities of place, online socializing provides an ideal way to reconcile modern demands for social linkage and individual autonomy.[9] Through community bulletin boards, email, newsgroups, and websites, people now have the concrete means to build new networks, engage in meaningful deliberation, and enhance their social capital. In this way, the Internet holds out the prospect of breaking a depressing spiral of declining participation.[10]

Yet harnessing the new media for citizen participation has not excited optimism in all quarters. Problems have been highlighted in two main areas. First, commentators have expressed fears of a widening gap between participators and nonparticipators in society. The financial and cognitive skills necessary to use the new modes of participation mean that existing patterns of political involvement will simply be reproduced and further entrenched.[11] Second, critics have argued that electronic participation is a poor substitute for real-world or face-to-face participation. While it is hard to argue that greater public deliberation would impoverish the quality of democracy in society, critics question whether it constitutes authentic deliberation. Citizens must be able to debate in a free and considered manner the important public policy issues that face the nation and on which they will have to vote. Deliberation in cyberspace is a more spontaneous affair and is pursued in a largely solitary and anonymous manner. Such conditions may often introduce a more inflamed and abusive

[7] Ian Budge, *The New Challenge of Direct Democracy* (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1996).

[8] Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 171.

[9] William Galston, "Does the Internet Strengthen Community?" Report from the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, 19 (Fall 1999): 1–8.

[10] Steven G. Jones, ed., *Cybersociety: Computer Mediated Communication and Community* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc., 1995); Guiseppe Mantovani, *New Communication Environments: From Everyday To Virtual* (Bristol, PA: Taylor and Francis, 1996); Howard Rheingold, *The Virtual Community: Homesteading On The Electronic* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1994); Lewis A. Friedland, "Electronic Democracy and the New Citizenship," *Media, Culture & Society* 18 (April 1996): 185–212.

[11] Benjamin Barber, Ken Mattson, and John Peterson, "The State of Electronically Enhanced Democracy: A Survey of the Internet," A Report for the Markle Foundation (New Brunswick, NJ: Walt Whitman Center for Culture and Politics of Democracy, 1997); Stephen Coleman, "Can the New Media Invigorate Democracy?" *Political Quarterly* 70 (April 1999): 16–22; Langdon Winner, "Technology Today: Utopia or Dystopia?" *Social Research* 64 (Fall 1997): 989–1017.

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quality to the debate.[12] Thus, while Putnam notes the potential benefits of the Internet for increasing social connectedness, he also warns that "building trust and goodwill is not easy in cyberspace," since there is a "poverty of social cues" that "inhibits interpersonal collaboration."[13] Far from engineering a new, brighter world of reasoned debate and informed decision making, the Internet may actually diminish civic trust and political engagement. Looking for a silver lining in this rather black scenario, perhaps the most effective democratic uses of the new technology reside in its capacity to enhance offline and traditional forms of participation, as recently witnessed in Seattle and Melbourne.

This article examines the revitalization versus decline of democracy debate by investigating one particular application of this new technology in politics—Internet or "I-voting"—the use of the Internet to cast a legally binding vote in an election to political office. It does so by outlining the process by which I-voting works and uses recent examples from the United States to profile the main arguments for and against I-voting. These claims are then assessed with evidence from the first full scale implementation of I-voting—the Arizona Democratic Primary election, held in March 2000.

Defining I-voting

For the purposes of this article, I-voting is defined as the casting of a secure and secret electronic ballot that is transmitted to officials over the Internet. This is the definition adopted by the California Internet Voting Task Force, established in January 1999 by Secretary of State Bill Jones to examine the feasibility of Internet voting. The task force was comprised of election professionals, security experts, political scientists, and representatives of nonpartisan voter organizations.[14] According to this definition, I-voting is a form or subtype of electronic voting or "E-voting," which refers to casting a ballot via a broader range of electronic telecommunications technology including telephones, cable and satellite television, and computers without Internet connections.

E-voting, in this broader sense, has become increasingly widespread during the past decade. Voters in Belgium and the Netherlands have been using a system of touch screen computers at the polling station and smart cards or tokens for a number of years. The votes are recorded and transferred to an electronic database where they are cumulated and counted. Brazilians have used computers to vote at polling stations since 1990, and the numbers using this technology have risen in each election. Building on their success, the Brazilian government

[12] Nolan Bowie, "Comments Regarding William A. Galston's Essay" (http://www.siyaset.bilkent.edu.tr/Harvard/bowie.htm), 3 January 2001; David Resnick, "The Normalization of Cyberspace" in Chris Toulouse and Tim Luke, eds., *The Politics of Cyberspace* (London: Routledge, 1999), 48–68.

[13] Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, 176.

[14] California Internet Voting Task Force, *A Report on the Feasibility of Internet Voting* (Sacramento, CA: Office of the Secretary of State for California January 2000). The full report is available at www.ss.ca.gov/executive/ivote.

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contracted with an American Internet election company, Safevote Inc., to run absentee balloting on the Internet for the federal election in 2000. South Africa saw its second democratic election in June 1999 administered in part through a network of computers linking polling stations in remote villages and townships to a central headquarters in Pretoria. In addition, some councils in the United Kingdom opted for touchscreen computers at the polling stations in their May 2000 local government elections as a response to the disappointing turnout in European Union elections in June 1999.[15]

Models of I-voting

Although certain forms of E-voting have been successfully used in a number of countries for national and local elections, I-voting had not been used in a legally binding political election until March 2000 when the Arizona Democratic party held its primary election online. Their decision to use I-voting was possible since parties in Arizona enjoy a special status whereby they do not need legislative approval for changes in their election practice. The Arizona primary was technically a private election, contracted by the state's Democratic party; thus, it did not have to meet stringent state election certification and adoption by legislative vote.

There are two basic variants of I-voting:[16] Internet Voting at the Polling Place (IV@PP) whereby votes are cast at official polling stations and transmitted via the Internet to election officials, and Remote Internet Voting (RIV) whereby votes are cast in any location with an internet connection and transmitted via the Internet to election officials. The crucial difference between the systems from an administrative perspective is that voter authentication in the IV@PP model is done at the polling place by election officials, whereas for RIV it is done through a prearranged personal identification number (PIN) or digital signature. In addition, for RIV at any outlet, another major difference is that the infrastructure of the election (machine and environment) is not controlled by officials. These distinctions are highlighted below in diagrammatic form. (See Figure 1.)[17]

These technical distinctions give rise to wider differences between the two options in terms of the security risks and level of citizen inclusiveness associated with each. These issues are discussed in greater depth below; however, it is evident from this brief description that RIV at any outlet represents the most radical departure from existing practice. The Arizona Democrats' decision to try this electoral option generated much of the public controversy that surrounded

[15] Simon Goodley, "Government considers online voting" (http://www.telegraph.co.uk...rrrrrrrq&pg=/et/00/11/16/ecnvote16.html), 16 November 2000.

[16] See Derek Dictson and Dan Ray, "The Modern Democratic Revolution: An Objective Survey of Internet-Based Elections" (SecurePoll.com, The Internet Voting Portal: Bryan, Texas, 2000). For further information see the authors' website www.securepoll.com.

[17] Models adapted from the California Internet Voting Task Force, *Report*, 14.

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FIGURE 1
Internet Voting



the event and led to a legal challenge against the party's use of I-voting. The controversy was further increased by the issuance of the California Internet Voting Task Force Report just two months before the primary. This report had concluded that a move straight to RIV was unwise on security grounds. Instead, the task force recommended that a "phased-in approach" to the technology be adopted starting with IV@PP at home voting stations. In addition, other potential test cases had been shelved due to security concerns. Florida had planned to use online voting in local elections in 1999 but decided against it after cases of fraud in Miami raised security fears. The Louisiana Republicans also investigated the possibilities for an online primary in Spring 2000 but called a halt.[18]

Previous Use of I-voting

In using RIV, the Arizona Democrats were not taking a complete leap in the dark. A number of private organizations such as unions, nonprofit organizations, corporations, and trade associations have begun to allow the use of Internet technology as a method of casting legally binding votes. Boeing, for instance, ended a strike in early 2000 with I-voting by its workers. More significant in political terms, a number of states and counties in the United States had run experimental nonbinding versions of I-voting during the year prior to the Arizona primary. In November 1999, two Iowa counties ran a mock Internet election. After casting regular votes, two precincts offered voters the chance to cast an I-vote. In January 2000, the Alaska Republican party allowed I-voting via remote access in a straw poll for presidential candidates. In April 2000, a county in Washington ran a mock Internet primary for voters. Prior to the presidential general election, the U.S. Department of Defense, through the Federal Voting

[18] Rebecca Fairley Raney, "Plan for Internet Voting in Louisiana Falls Apart" (http:www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/06/cyber/articles/22vote.html), 22 June 1999.

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Assistance Program, was commissioned to set up a pilot I-voting scheme for military personnel from five states (Missouri, Florida, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah) who were stationed overseas. An estimated 250 people were included in the group. In addition, over the course of 1999–2000, bills have been passed in a number of states to initiate studies on I-voting, including Washington and Minnesota.

The Debate About I-Voting

The issue of I-voting has generated rather heated and passionate debate. The following section highlights the main arguments made against the procedure. Next, it summarizes the counter-arguments of I-voting proponents.

The Opponents' Critique

Critics of I-voting have three main lines of argument. First, the procedure will have negative consequences for the equality of voter influence. Second, the potential for violations of security and voter privacy will be increased. Third, the quality of participation will be reduced.

Equality of voter influence. One of the central criticisms of I-voting is that it discriminates against the poor and minorities because of the so-called digital divide that exists between affluent whites and the rest of the population in terms of ownership and use of personal computers (PCs) either at home or at work. According to a Department of Commerce report based on 48,000 in-person interviews, the divide is closing, but ethnic minority and lower-income families and individuals still have lower levels of access to the Internet compared with the U.S. average, and particularly to wealthier white Americans. Figures released in October 2000 show that 41.5 percent of U.S. households report Internet access; however, only 12.7 percent of those households earning less than $15,000 report having access compared with 77.7 percent of households earning over $75,000. Black and Hispanic households also reported lower than average levels of Internet access with 23.5 percent and 23.6 percent respectively.[19]

If we expand the analysis from the United States to Europe—the continent with the second highest rates of Internet penetration—Eurobarometer data reveal a similar story. (See Table 1.)

Although these data do not include race, they indicate that a similar digital divide exists in Europe that has proven relatively persistent over time. Given these differential rates of access, critics contend it is inevitable that any move to I-voting, particularly in its remote form, will grant certain groups of voters

[19] "Falling Through the Net: Defining the Digital Divide," U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications & Information Administration (http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/digitaldivide/), 17 October 2000.

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TABLE 1

Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Western European Internet Users, Spring 1996 and 1999 (in percentages)

Social Variables	*Online, 1996*	*Online, 1999*	*Change*
Age			
15–25	9	32	+23
26–44	7	24	+17
45–64	5	16	+11
65+	1	3	+2
Income*			
(1)– –	4	14	+10
(2)–	3	14	+11
(3)+	5	22	+17
(4)++	10	37	+27
Education			
Up to 15 years	1	5	+4
16–19	4	15	+11
20+	9	33	+24
Gender			
Male	6	22	+16
Female	4	17	+13
Occupation			
Manager	14	44	+30
White collar	8	29	+21
Manual	3	15	+12
Home worker	2	8	+6
Unemployed	3	10	+7
Student	13	44	+31
Read Newspaper			
Never	2	12	+10
Sometimes	5	21	+16
Every day	6	23	+17
Watch TV News			
Never	5	20	+12
Sometimes	6	22	+14
Every day	5	19	+16
Overall EU	5	20	+15

* Income by quartiles, where 1 = lowest income quartile and 4 = highest income quartile.

Source: P. Norris, *Who Surfs Café Europa? Virtual Democracy in the U.S. and Europe* (paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, 1–5 September 1999).

greater influence over the outcome of an election, even if other methods of voting were available. By allowing people to vote from their PCs at home or work at any time of the day or night over an extended period of time, the costs of voting are lowered and the likelihood of participation is enhanced, but only for those with Internet access. Thus, while there is no systematic denial of the right to exercise the franchise, the barriers to voting are lowered for a particular subset of voters, creating a fundamentally unequal situation. The inequity of the situation was neatly summarized by Deborah Phillips, a strong opponent of I-voting in the Arizona election and president of the nonprofit organization,

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the Voting Integrity Project (VIP): "Think of it as a subway train pulling into the station and the whites get to run through an open gate to the train and the minorities have to go through a turnstile, one-by-one. When that train leaves the station, there are going to be disproportionately more white voters on that train. That is the reality of this situation—its saying some voters are more equal than others."[20]

Security concerns. The second major argument raised against I-voting centers on its insecurity and potential for violation of voter privacy. One of the chief complaints raised about the Arizona race (although not part of VIP's legal challenge) was that the Democrats and Election.com rushed into the election for publicity purposes and did not enact adequate security provisions. The types of complaints raised against I-voting in this regard range from minor glitches, such as instances of service denial, to full blown malicious attacks that disable the site or secretly change votes.[21]

In general, security concerns are divided into three broad categories. The first, authentication, is ensuring that the voters are who they claim to be. A major concern in any election is ensuring that voters are properly identified. Without the use of a digital roll call and digital signatures, Internet voting can at best only be as secure as absentee or mail-in votes. Simply using a PIN and personal information is not enough to prevent unauthorized use of another person's ballot. Some critics contend that even if more rigorous identification procedures were in place, the remote voting environment permits a greater degree of voter coercion and bribery than can occur at the traditional polling place.[22]

The second category, privacy/secrecy, is ensuring that the voter's ballot is anonymous. Another key concern in an election is that a voter's vote remain secret. Concerns were raised in Arizona that those voting from PCs that were part of a local area network (LAN) could have their vote checked by the system administrator. The California task force was so concerned about this that it advocated enactment of new laws, with strong penalties for any employer or personnel caught checking employees' ballots in this manner.

Aside from the problems of the unofficial checking of votes by interested parties, the use of PINs and digital signatures offer election officials an electronic trail linking voters to their vote. This is a problem for e-voting in general, but it is a particular problem for RIV, given its need for stronger authentication checks. The tighter the identification measures in place, the less the anonymity of voters can be maintained. David Jefferson, one of the members of the California Internet Voting Task Force, highlights the conundrum when comparing

[20] "Arizona's Online Voting Experiment," An interview with the Freedom Channel (http://www.freedomchannel.com/todays/0303000phillipscfm), 3 March 2000.

[21] For an extensive report on the security aspects of RIV, see Avi Rubin, "Security Considerations for Removal of Electronic Voting over the Internet" (http://www.avirubin.com).

[22] Kim Alexander and David Jefferson, "Internet voting: Proceed cautiously" (http://www.sjmercury.com/premium/opinion/columns/e-voting.htm), 16 May 2000.

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online financial transactions and online elections. In e-commerce, receipts to link the consumers to their purchases are entirely appropriate. "In voting, it's completely different. . . . The county knows who you are, but they must not know how you vote. That's a much harder thing—and you the voter cannot prove how you voted. We don't allow you to have that proof."[23]

The third category, integrity, is ensuring the voter's ballot is not subject to interference. In addition to concerns about ensuring the identity of voters and their privacy, the integrity of the vote is also a major cause for concern in I-voting. Votes should not be tampered with or changed from the time they are cast to the point when they are counted. The danger of fraud exists in any election, but RIV increases the risks to a much greater extent, since storage and transport of votes are more vulnerable to attack. Possible methods of interference include:

- distribution of so-called "Trojan horse" viruses to users' PCs via web or email downloads that change an individuals' vote prior to transmission, without detection;
- unauthorized access to the election company's central servers where votes are tampered with en masse; and
- "site-jacking," whereby a copy of the election site is created, and voters are directed there by search engines and log on with their PIN and personal details. They vote and leave unaware that the site is a fake. The site owner then takes information collected from the fake site logs onto the real site, and votes multiple times. While less systematic than the two previous types of fraud, such interference could change an election outcome in a very close race.

Quality of participation. A third major criticism of I-voting is that it erodes the significance of voting and will hasten the current decline in levels of political engagement. This claim is centered on the understanding that voting is an important act that cements civic life and requires a public ritual to instill and perpetuate it. Remote internet voting is regarded as particularly pernicious in this regard because it makes voting the equivalent of checking one's email or buying a book online. In a worse case scenario, critics fear I-voting would extend to online referenda in which legions of couch potatoes, television console in one hand, bag of chips in the other, heed the call to "press those buttons now." Democracy under such conditions would acquire game show status.

Rather than revitalizing an important democratic ritual, the Internet might become ". . . one more way people are disconnecting from the body politic."[24] In addition, by privatizing the act of voting, people are encouraged to weigh

[23] Quoted in Lynn Burke, "The Tangled Web of E-Voting" (http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,37050-2,00.html), 26 June 2000.

[24] Ted Anthony, "A Vote for Old Fashioned Ballots" (http://www.dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/200000311/el/one_voter_s_view_1.html), 11 March 2000.

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their own individual interests above those of the body politic. A recent article in *Slate*, the online magazine published by Microsoft, quotes American political scientist Rick Valelly, who makes a distinction between I-voting and "real voting [that] is a vital public ritual that increases social solidarity and binds people together."[25] The Internet, he argues, turns a public act into a private one, which is dangerous for democracy. The traditional method of voting breeds a sense of egaliatarianism and a recognition, if only fleetingly, of the importance of the public good. Everyone, regardless of social status, needs to make their way to the polling booth to vote, and in doing so they enter the public sphere. Coming together at an officially designated spot serves to remind one of the importance of looking after broader civic interests as well as our narrow self-interests. Ted Anthony, an Associated Press journalist wrote: "Something stands to be lost. That pause in our daily routine, perhaps even the opportunity to reflect on democracy. Should voting be so routine, so easy that it's utterly forgettable and not worthy of our most serious consideration?"[26]

The Proponents' Case for I-voting

Given these extensive critiques, the question of why anyone would choose I-voting inevitably arises. The proponents of I-voting marshal three basic claims in support of the method. First, I-voting will increase participation. Second, it will increase administrative efficiency; and third, it represents a natural or logical progression in voting technology. In doing so, they directly and indirectly counter some of the arguments that the critics raise.

Increased participation. Boosting the numbers of people that vote is one of the principal arguments offered by those who advocate Internet voting. Pointing to the American case in particular, advocates argue that turnout in advanced industrial democracies is dropping to alarmingly low levels. In 1960, turnout in the U.S. presidential election was 63 percent; by 1996 this had dropped to less than 50 percent. Low turnout among younger voters (18–24 years old) has caused particular anxiety; only around 32 percent of this age group actually bothered to vote in the 1996 race, and just 17 percent voted in the 1998 congressional elections.[27]

Proponents claim that by offering multiple outlets for voting in addition to the traditional polling place, the physical barriers to turnout are reduced. This is

[25] Jacob Weisberg, "Voting Online" (http://www.slate.co/ne...ries/99-10-26_37750.asp), 26 October 1999.

[26] Ted Anthony, "A Vote for Old Fashioned Ballots" (http://www.dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20000311/elone_voter_s_view_1.html), 11 March 2000.

[27] See Martin Wattenberg, "Turnout" in Russell Dalton and Martin Wattenberg, eds., *Unthinkable Democracy: Parties without Partisans* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000) for evidence about declining turnout in OECD countries. See www.census.gov/population/socdemo/voting/history/htab01.txt for U.S. Census Bureau Data on voter turnout by age in elections since 1964, released 19 July 2000.

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seen as particularly significant for those who find it difficult to get to the voting place, because of physical immobility, geographic distance, work schedules, or travelling abroad. Thus, participation rates among the disabled, the elderly, single mothers, remote rural dwellers, expatriates, and busy professionals would increase if RIV were adopted. Beyond these particular groups, however, the reduction of time and effort expended in getting to the polls would significantly cut the costs of voting for most citizens and thus lead to a general increase in participation.

In addition, given the enthusiasm of younger people for the Internet, I-voting is seen as a way to offset their traditionally low rates of turnout. In a recent survey of Internet users, 63 percent said they would vote more if online voting were available and the positive response rose to 74 percent of those in 25–34 age group.[28] Charges about the digital divide are deflected by arguments that the socioeconomic and demographic gaps in access to the Internet are being overcome. Data gathered by Stanford University researchers as part of a wider commercial survey of 2,689 households in December 1999 showed that, while education and age were still significant predictors, race and income were not.[29] If public kiosks were placed in strategic locations such as libraries, schools, supermarkets, and bus stations and an extensive public education program established, then it is arguable that I-voting, far from denying access to poor and ethnic minority, voters would actually increase it.

Increasing administrative efficiency. Applying a more specifically monetary approach to the cost/benefit analysis of voting, arguments about the increase in the efficiency of election administration as a result of moving to I-voting are often made. The move to I-voting would introduce a number of labor-saving options that would reduce the overall costs of elections. A report commissioned by the Canadian Electoral Office in June 1998 on the use of technology in the voting process ended by saying that: ". . . the new technologies—especially the selected three [the telephone, computer kiosks, and the Internet]—offer the pros-

[28] "Survey: Voting Participation Would Increase Through Online Voting," *Government Technology–News* (http://www.govtech.net/news...phtml?docid=2000.10.26-20300000000000059226/10/00), 26 October 2000.

[29] Norman H. Nie and Lutz Erbring, *Internet and Society: A Preliminary Report* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Institute for the Quantitative Study of Society, 2000). See also studies by Bruce Bimber from 1996 and 1998 that show considerable widening of access among socioeconomic and racial groups: "Toward an Empirical Map of Political Participation on the Internet" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science, Boston, MA, 1998) and "Politics on the Net: Is There a Theoretical Foundation for Speculation?" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, 1996). Also see Pew Research Center Report (www.people-press.org/tech98sum.hm) for survey evidence from 1998 of the broadening Internet population. Finally, results from a survey of Internet and non-Internet users released in October 2000 by the Center for Communication Policy, UCLA indicated that financial cost was not a significant factor for those people who did not have Internet access.

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pect of significantly improving both the accessibility and efficiency of the electoral process in Canada."[30]

The report added, however, that it would be at least two to three years before security concerns could be met to allow for legally binding votes to be cast in this way. The specific savings envisaged are clearly greatest if RIV were to be adopted. Costs for staffing polling stations would drop, as would the money needed to pay for voting machines in the polling stations. All forms of I-voting would reduce expenditure on paper ballots and thus their printing and distribution costs and also eliminate the inevitable wastage of over-production, making it an environmentally friendly option as well.

In addition to financial savings, I-voting could reduce errors in the voting process on the part of voters and electoral administrators. Voters could be prevented from making mistakes on their ballot entry, particularly if the ballot is long and complicated. Intelligent software could prevent them from overvoting or skipping a contest. Online help could be made available to aid voters when completing the ballot, and summary information on each of the candidates could be constantly updated. In addition, adoption of uniform standards in the ballot format would be made easier since it could be transmitted via the Internet from a central election agency to all local and regional polling places. Finally, if all votes are cast electronically, errors in the count and the time taken to produce the final tally would be significantly reduced as vote totals would be produced at the click of a button.

To serve this growing interest by election officials in I-voting, a number of Internet-based news services for information on elections and technology have been established. Securepoll, based at Texas A&M University, offers a mailing list for news of online election initiatives around the world. *The Bell*, an electronic newsletter published by Safevote (one of the companies set up to manage Internet elections) was established to disseminate technical papers, protocols, and legal requirements for Internet voting for online election administrators. In its inaugural issue, *The Bell* discussed the benefits of voting, chief among which were the the cost-effective solution offered by I-voting for multilingual, lengthy ballots and fast and accurate vote tallying.[31]

Even adherents, however, acknowledge that efficiency gains need to be weighed against the greater security risks. Regardless of malicious attacks, if the system were to crash because of power outages or user overload, the whole election might have to be voided. Worse still, the software could incorrectly calculate results without officials necessarily realizing, changing the outcome of the election. Thus, efficiency proponents recognize the need to accept and promote strong safety precautions as elections move into a virtual environment.

[30] "Technology and the Voting Process: Final Report," KPMG and Sussex Circle (Montreal: Elections Canada, June 1998), 5.

[31] *The Bell*, 1 (1 June 2000). *The Bell* is an online newsletter published by Safevote, an Internet elections company on Privacy, Security, and Technology in Internet Voting (http://www.thebell.net).

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Logical progression. A final argument presented by the proponents of I-voting is that most, if not all, democratic election systems currently use electronic technology for preparation of voter rolls, voter registration, and ballot counting. Internet voting simply represents the logical integration of the public face of the process into election management. In the United States, this argument carries particular resonance since voting machines have long been a feature of the electoral landscape. In other countries too, however, suggestions for the move to I-voting from paper-based systems are being made very strongly by election officials themselves. A senior elections administrator in Australia, for instance, went on record to argue that ". . . just about every electoral transaction could be conducted over the internet, from enrolment to voting to displaying the results, and everything in between."[32]

In addition, as Election.com and the Arizona Democrats argued, existing methods of voting such as mail-in absentee ballots are far from one hundred percent secure. The threat of fraud hangs over all elections, even paper-based systems. While I-voting is not a watertight method, all changes to established political practice encounter resistance, and often this response results from political inertia rather than any high-minded concerns about democratic integrity. Vote-by-mail, for instance, took ten years to move from the legislative agenda to actual implementation in Oregon. Politicians' self-interest can also lie behind failure to embrace electoral reform. The decision by the Louisiana Republicans to shelve their online primary, ostensibly for security reasons, was alleged to have been the work of the party's right wing who were concerned that I-voting would advantage the moderate candidate.

The Arizona Democratic Primary

Given all the criticisms and plaudits for I-voting, the main question to be answered in the aftermath of the Arizona primary is how far it fulfilled the hopes or fears of either side in the debate. Before assessing the evidence, some basic background information on how the process worked is presented.

The Mechanics of the Process

To administer, transmit, and tally the votes cast over the Internet the party employed the services of Election.com, one of a number of new companies specializing in the running of online elections. Established in February 1999, the company had previously conducted legally binding online elections for other organizations including the environmental group, The Sierra Club, and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. All registered Demo-

[32] Phillip Green, chief electoral commissioner for the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), "Elections and Technology—Implications for the Future" (paper presented at the Conference on Electoral Research: The Core and the Boundaries, Adelaide, Australia, 1999), 6.

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crats were eligible for I-voting. Those voters who wanted to cast an I-vote requested the appropriate form from the party, signed it, and sent it back. Staff at the party headquarters then verified the signature with that on the registration form and emailed a PIN and instructions to the voter. From 7–10 March (Tuesday–Friday) voters could access either the Arizona Democrats web-site or that of Election.com from their PCs to cast their vote. After punching in their PIN plus other personal identifying information such as their birthdate and social security number, the ballot was presented and voters mouse-clicked on the candidate of their choice: Al Gore or Bill Bradley (the latter remained on the ballot although he had withdrawn from the race half-way through the proceedings). The ballot was then transmitted to an undisclosed site operated by Election.com, where it was stored and later tallied. Once the vote was cast the voter's PIN became invalid. IV@PP was also offered at 124 polling stations for the final day of voting on Saturday 11 March, along with the traditional punch card method. Mail-in ballots were also permitted.

Postelection Verdict

What did the Arizona experiment reveal about the respective merits of the arguments for and against I-voting? Although the data are not available to examine all the issues raised above, some preliminary conclusions can be drawn on a number of the key points, and the prospects for adoption of this method in the future can be assessed.

Advocates of I-voting clearly had their participation claims endorsed. One of the most dramatic features of the election was the jump in turnout compared to previous years.[33] A record number of votes for a Democratic primary in Arizona were cast (85,970) and of this total, just under half (39,942) were cast via the Internet.[34] The next most popular method was the mail-in vote (32,159), followed by the polling booth (18,000). Overall turnout increased to 10 percent of registered Democrats in Arizona, a healthy percentage for any primary election but particularly so, given that Al Gore's chief rival, Bill Bradley, dropped out of the race two days after I-voting began. The exit of Bradley evidently did little to dampen people's enthusiasm to register their preference since more than half the I-votes were cast after this point. Press reports were liberally sprinkled with quotes from enthusiastic I-voters such as Marty Harper, who cast his ballot on the third day of I-voting and was reported as saying, "It was really easy, and kind of fun. . . . It took about five minutes . . ." compared to the 40 minutes he drove to vote in the 1996 primary.[35] Jodi Kantor, writing for

[33] Until 1984, Arizona Democrats used nominating conventions for their selection of presidential candidates; after 1984, the primary election method was adopted.

[34] Ben White, "Online Balloting: A Question of Fairness" (http:///www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/politics/A37369-2000Mar18.html), 19 March 2000.

[35] Rebecca Fairley Raney, "From the Keyboard, Arizonans Cast Votes" (http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/03/cyber/articles/10vote.html), 10 March 2000.

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Microsoft's online magazine, *Slate*, commented that not only did the Internet double turnout compared to any other Democratic primary in Arizona since 1984 but it also showed that almost 50 percent of those who voted saw the Internet as a safe and secure method of casting their vote.[36] Of course, such a figure can also be interpreted to indicate that a significant number of voters did not share this confidence.

The data on younger voters provided even greater cause for celebration. Although voting was still considerably lower among 18–24 year olds (they constituted 2.1% of all votes cast), 75 percent of those who said they had voted reported having done so online.[37] These figures do not come as too great a surprise given the results of a survey by Andersen Consulting of 300 Americans in July 2000, which found that 61 percent of respondents would use I-voting if it were available for the presidential election.[38] This represented a rise of over 10 percent from a poll taken the previous year. An ABC News poll in July 1999 had reported that 48 percent of Americans would vote over the Internet if it was secure. The study also reported that 61 percent of 18–24 year olds indicated their support for this method.[39]

In assessing the association between I-voting and participation levels, however, results from previous experiments also need to be considered. The Alaska Republican presidential straw poll, run over the Internet in January 2000, told a very different story. The election was the subject of considerable media and political hype. Alaska was considered a highly suitable venue for an RIV trial given its geographically dispersed population, high levels of PC ownership (62.4 percent) and online population (44 percent).[40] Hopes were dashed, however, when a grand total of 35 I-votes were cast out of 3,500 registered voters. Postpoll rationalizations such as those by Jim Adler, chief executive of Votehere.net—the company that ran the I-voting—referred to high levels of voter apathy as the cause of the low turnout. Such interpretations, of course, only fuel the complaints of the critics that existing orientations to politics need to change for participation to increase, not the mechanics of the voting system. The 1993 National Voter Registration Act passed by Congress is often cited in this regard; although it made registration easier, turnout has continued to decline. Christopher Arterton in reviewing the I-voting experiments draws comparisons

[36] Jodi Kantor, "Arizonans Vote in Their Pajamas" (http://www.slate.msn.com/netelection/entries/00-03-14_77288.asp), 14 March 2000.

[37] "Voting Goes Online, Young People Go Elsewhere" (http://www.mtv.com...chooseorlose/features/feature_0317.html), 20 March 2000; Lydia Lee, "Vote naked in the privacy of your own home!" (http://www.salon.com/tech/view/2000/03/20/election/print.html), 20 March 2000.

[38] Brock N. Meeks, "Message from the people: get online!" (http://www.msnbc.com/news/443012.asp), 22 March 2000.

[39] David Brady, "Netting Voters," comment posted on the SecurePoll.com Internet Voting Updates (http://www.SecurePoll.com), 19 June 2000.

[40] "E-Voting Starts Monday," A report from GoVote.com, the web company running the online Alaska election (http://wwww.govote.com), 20 January 2000.

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to the teledemocracy era, arguing that "media was not a cure-all for the problems of democracy. The real resistance is citizens' attitudes toward politics."[41]

While the Arizona results stand in sharp contrast to the Alaska experience, the former is regarded as the more anomalous outcome by opponents of I-voting. The massive publicity drive undertaken by Election.com and the intense media focus on the event meant that it had a much higher profile than ordinary elections. Such increased attention combined with the novelty factor of voting online arguably made it a unique event. Over time, could we expect those who are not active or interested in politics to become more engaged simply because of the application of technology? Although such a question raises deeper questions about the extent to which social forces and institutions can shape technology, recent evidence from European electorates would appear to endorse those taking a more skeptical view. In 1995, 40.7 percent of the European Union's population reported being interested in debating politicians online from home; however, by 1996 this figure had dropped to 35.8 percent, and by the following year the total had fallen again to less than one fifth (18.2 percent).[42] Thus, while not providing a definitive answer, such a dramatic collapse of interest certainly raises doubts as to how far any long-term changes in people's behavior can be expected to result from putting politics online.[43]

Even if the high turnout rate in the Arizona primary were to be sustained, however, the question that remains from the critics' perspective is whether the outcome was biased in favor of certain groups of voters. The Arizona election is of particular relevance for examining claims about the digital divide and inequality of voter influence given the law suit filed against the Arizona Democrats by the Voting Integrity Project (VIP) on behalf of two Arizona citizens.[44] The suit contended that I-voting—specifically that from remote locations—violated the 1964 Voting Rights Act by discriminating against minority and poorer voters. Citing figures from the Department of Commerce report on the digital divide and statistics from the state itself, which show whites form 68 percent of the population of Arizona and 83 percent of all home adult Internet

[41] Rebecca Fairley Raney, "Voting by the Internet: The Mouse Still Hasn't Roared" (http://www.nytimes.com/library/review/013000internet-voting-review.html), 30 January 2000.

[42] "Flash Study," *Eurobarometers*, 46, September 1995, October–November 1996, and January–February 1997.

[43] For a fuller discussion of the technological determinism and social shaping debate see John Street, *Politics and Technology* (London: Macmillan, 1992); William H. Dutton, ed., *Information and Communication Technologies: Visions and Realities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Jens Hoff, "Technology and Social Change. The Path Between Technological Determinism, Social Constructivism and Institutionalism" in Jens Hoff, Ivan Horrocks, and Pieter Tops, eds., *Democratic Governance and New Technology: Technologically Mediated Innovations in Political Practice in Western Europe* (London: Routledge, 2000).

[44] The VIP was established with the self-expressed goal of protecting the integrity of the election process in the United States and investigating instances of fraud. Although founded by former politicians, it claims to be nonpartisan.

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users,[45] the VIP argued that the Democrats' use of I-voting would inevitably create two classes of voters with greater and lesser influence over the outcome of the election.

While acknowledging the equality of access concerns raised by the VIP, the judge decided to let the party proceed with its proposals for online voting. According to transcripts from the hearing, District Judge Paul Rosenblatt accepted that the election results might have to be set aside and the process repeated if the results showed "disproportionate" participation by white voters with Internet access. But the election should go ahead, he argued, based on the fact that the plaintiffs had failed to show "irreparable harm" would be caused by the divide, since the election could be voided after the fact.[46]

Unfortunately, no comprehensive post-poll survey has been conducted to assess the socioeconomic and demographic composition of the primary electorate. Nevertheless, a provisional assessment of claims of bias can be made using existing data. The anecodotal evidence from the election reveals a mixed picture. Election.com and the Arizona Democrats certainly engaged in strenuous efforts to facilitate turnout across the state in the buildup to voting and during the election itself. Links were forged with Newvoter.com, a voter registration site started by Mark Strama—a tireless campaigner for voter mobilization and former executive of MTV's Rock the Vote outreach program. Volunteers were sent into poor and minority districts armed with laptop computers and modems to help people vote.[47] Election officials even arranged for twenty members of the Navajo Nation to vote online using a laptop from Window Rock in remote northeastern Arizona—an event that was surrounded with much media fanfare.

According to Jim Ledbetter, however, a reporter for *Slate* magazine who travelled around the state on election day, there was little evidence of polling booth computers being used. Two of the polling stations he visited were closed, both of which were in predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods. A report in the online version of *Wired* quoted one of the four people who voted at a reservation polling station that day as saying that Native Americans were "scared" of the Internet and so wouldn't use it.[48] After the event, Mike Cornfield, an academic at George Washington and specialist in the area accused the Democrats of imposing an ". . . equivalent of a literacy test or a poll tax on voters."[49]

Beyond these impressionistic accounts, more systematically gathered data suggests that the voting population was skewed in terms of income, if not race. The results of a postelection telephone poll revealed that approximately 90 per-

[45] White, "Online Balloting."

[46] Rebecca Fairley Raney, "Judge Lets Internet Primary in Arizona Proceed" (http://www.nytimes/library/tech/00/03/cyber/article/02vote.html), 1 March 2000.

[47] James Ledbetter, "Net Out the Vote" (http://www.publish.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,13004-4,00.html), 20 March 2000.

[48] "No Voting Opportunity for All" (http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,34914,00.html), 18 March 2000.

[49] Ledbetter, "Net Out the Vote."

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TABLE 2

Internet Voting by County Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics[i]

County	% Remote I-Voting	Rank	Median HH Dollar Income	Rank	% White	Rank
Apache	27	(14)	20,173	(15)	21.9	(15)
Cochise	42	(2)	26,958	(5)	90.7	(7)
Coconino	50	(1)	32,640	(3)	67.3	(13)
Gila	32	(10)	27,374	(7)	86.2	(9)
Graham	29	(11)	25,848	(11)	83.0	(11)
Greenlee	36	(7)	40,620	(1)	96.8	(3)
La Paz	27	(15)	20,878	(14)	80.1	(12)
Maricopa	43†	(3)	37,583	(2)	91.7	(6)
Mohave	39	(5)	29,208	(5)	96.4	(4)
Navajo	29	(12)	25,499	(12)	46.2	(14)
Pima	44‡	(4)	30,832	(4)	90.5	(8)
Pinal	34	(8)	26,082	(10)	85.5	(10)
Santa Cruz	27	(13)	24,933	(13)	98.5	(1)
Yavapai	37	(6)	29,205	(6)	97.4	(2)
Yuma	33	(9)	27,119	(8)	93.1	(5)
Total	41		31,736		88.9	

† Figure is an average of 18 electoral districts within Maricopa County.

‡ Figure is an average of 6 electoral districts within Pima County.

[i] Internet %-Arizona Democratic Party web-site (http://www.azdem/org/breakdown.html); Household Income–U.S. Census Bureau: Model-Based Income and Poverty Estimates for Counties in 1995 (released February 1999); Race-USA Counties General Profile, 1998 (data from 1996). Online databases at http://www.census.gov/datamap/www/04/html.

cent of I-votes were cast from home or work-based PCs, as opposed to the 124 computers placed in polling booths around the state.[50] In addition, using statistics from the Arizona Democrats' website and the U.S. Census Bureau, it is possible to break down I-voting by county in terms of race and income.

Table 2 reports the percentage of total votes in each of Arizona's fifteen counties that were cast by the Internet from a remote location, and compares this with the median household income of the county and the percentage of the population who are white.

While these data are aggregate and not conclusive, they do suggest that the affluent nonminority population used RIV more than their poorer ethnic counterparts. Apache County, for example, has the lowest median household income and largest nonwhite population, and it also has the lowest levels of RIV. By contrast, most of the counties ranking in the top five of RIV use are also among the top third for income, although the relationship to percentage of white population is more variable. Simple bivariate correlations confirm these relationships, revealing that income and RIV have quite a strong association (0.66, significant at .01 level), while percent white and RIV is weaker (0.30, not significant at the .10 level). Race and income is slightly stronger (0.47, signifi-

[50] Ibid.

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cant at the .10 level). Based on this preliminary analysis, therefore, it would seem that claims for a digital divide in the Arizona primary are substantiated at least with regard to income. The VIP claim that the four extra days permitted for I-voting gave affluent Arizonans a greater chance to influence the outcome of the election may be taken as having more than just face validity.

Initial reports were fairly optimistic that the security fears of the critics had gone unrealized, but this view has been subject to some revision in the months following the election. Early accounts focused on helplines being down and sporadic instances of service denial due to PINs not being received or machines with disabled cookies (electronic security certificates) and outdated browsers. Anecdotal evidence of the potential for fraud circulated with reports of landlords receiving previous tenants' PINs. Criticism of the election's security increased, however, as Election.com, the company administering the online voting, proved unwilling to open its procedures to informed scrutiny. The company argued that such transparency would compromise its ability to run elections in the future. David Jefferson of the California Internet Voting Task Force condemned such protestations, arguing that "This is obfuscation. . . . Security by obscurity is not security at all."[51] Continued failure by Election.com to explain the hour-long denial of service on the first day of voting heightened concerns with Alfie Charles, assistant secretary of State in California and chair of the Internet Voting Task Force, who stated that such breakdowns were unacceptable. Equally unacceptable to some was the fact that Election.com had access to voters' PINs, placing the anonymity of the ballot in question.[52]

The emerging consensus on the security of the Arizona experiment is that it was a step too far, too quickly, and the lack of any obvious security breach was more a matter of luck than design. Richard Kimberling, the deputy director of the U.S. Office of Elections for the Federal Election Commission (FEC), on the heels of the Arizona primary, described Internet voting as "a breeding ground for fraud."[53] Jane Orie, a Republican member of the Pennsylvania state legislature, in introducing a bill to allow online voting in June 2000, stated that a pilot program from polling places was an essential first step. "Guarding against voter fraud is of utmost importance, and it must be proven that the concept of Internet voting is manageable before it is implemented on a larger scale."[54]

Finally, efficiency claims are obviously difficult to assess. Election.com and the Arizona Democrats have refused to disclose exactly how much the election cost or who paid for what. Media speculators, however, have estimated that Elec-

[51] Burke, "The Tangled Web of E-Voting."

[52] Donna Ladd, "Casting Your Vote on the Internet: Yeah or Nay" (http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/stories/news/0,4164,2597347,00html), 3 July 2000.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Timothy D. May, "State Security Concerns Aired on Internet Voting," *The Associated Press*, 20 July 2000. Posted on the SecurePoll.com Internet Voting Updates (http://www.SecurePoll.com), 20 July 2000.

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tion.com absorbed huge losses to run the primary (in excess of $1,000,000).[55] Given that Election.com was flooded with calls from other states, international governments, and companies seeking their services, this would appear to be public relations money well spent.

Conclusions

Overall, a blanket dismissal of I-voting is somewhat premature at this stage. As the Arizona experiment showed, a significant number of voters do trust the new technology, turnout was boosted, and the security of the system was not fatally compromised. Neither politicians, election administrators, nor most of the companies running the online elections are advocating I-voting as a replacement for existing methods but rather as a supplementary device. Despite the growing chorus of criticism and legal challenge to the Arizona election, a sizeable number of states and localities in the United States have expressed interest in using I-voting in upcoming elections, given its dramatic effects on participation.[56] Spurred by the Arizona Democrats, The Reform Party allowed RIV in the nominating election for its 2000 presidential candidate in addition to mail-in ballots.[57] The Democrats had delegates vote on platform issues as well as candidate selection via computer kiosks from the floor during their nominating convention, and in December 1999 President Bill Clinton requested a National Science Foundation year-long study of the issue.[58]

Although the attention of the critics has largely shifted to the issues of security and vote fraud as the main barriers to implementation of I-voting, particularly in its remote form, the broader social implications for election outcomes clearly need more attention. Are wealthy homeowners of PCs advantaged in registering their preferences? And even if the digital divide is overcome in terms of economic haves and have-nots, will there still be an entrenched class of "want-nots" that emerge? Older and less educated people and those from racial minorities, even if they have access to the new technology, may be intimidated or simply uninterested in using it. More attention needs to be paid by policy makers to questions about frequency of use in addition to issues of access in combating electronic exclusion. Mark Fleisher, Democratic party chair in Arizona, recognized the importance of educating political elites into a more

[55] James Ledbetter, "Virtual Voting" Faces the Real World" (http://www.slate.msn.com/netelection/entries/00.03.16_77458.asp), 16 March 2000.

[56] Deborah M. Phillips and David Jefferson, "Is Internet Voting Safe?" Voting Integrity Project Reports (http://www.voting-integrity.org/text/2000/internetsafe.shtml), released 10 July 2000.

[57] Daniel Keegan, "Online Balloting Thwarts Hackers" (http://www.civic.com/civic/articles/2000/0814/web-1reform-08-16-00.asp), 16 August 2000; "Reform Voting Evokes E-Votes" (http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,37964,00.html), 3 August 2000.

[58] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Electronic Government" (http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/12/20/05.text.1), 17 December 1999: 2 Section 6.

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sensitive awareness of the size and profile of those unfamiliar with Internet technology. He commented: "I thought people who voted online would be computer-friendly all the time. . . . We've had an awful lot who called in who didn't even know how to use a mouse. They're calling with questions that were kind of silly."[59]

On the other hand, the good news about the growing levels of public interest in voting online and particularly among young people should not be ignored. As Bill Jones, convenor of the California Task Force commented, the Internet should be hailed for "the potential to bring a record number of low propensity younger voters into the democratic process for the first time."[60] Yet in line with the California study recommendations, perhaps the first utilization of I-voting should be "evolutionary rather than revolutionary," via polling places, so that issues of access are forestalled. People can then become comfortable with the idea of using computers to vote. Even for those comfortable with using email or looking at websites, the need in RIV for downloading the protective software to ensure secrecy and protect the integrity of one's vote may be beyond the capability of many people. The focus of I-democracy advocates now seems to be shifting to less ambitious projects, such as facilitating online voter registration and absentee ballots.

Outside of the United States there are signs of a cautious yet burgeoning interest in online elections. In France, the city of Brest allowed I-voting in the national referendum in October 2000 on whether the presidential mandate should be reduced from seven to five years. The I-voting, however, was conducted on a trial basis after voting via traditional paper ballots.[61] Evidence from Canada also suggests that it will be quite some time before I-voting is adopted in a legally binding manner. Respondents to the Canadian Election Study of 1997 were asked a number of questions about their most and least preferred method of voting. The results revealed strong support for touch screen voting at the polling place, although traditional paper ballots were preferred by most voters. Voting by a PC (i.e., RIV) was the most preferred method for only 18 percent of respondents and the least preferred method for 43 percent. The principal problems perceived with voting from a PC were access and confidentiality—the same issues that have dominated the debate in the United States. On the positive side, however, inconvenience was perceived as a much greater problem for traditional paper balloting, and in line with the U.S. data, those aged 18 to 24 were more likely to cast their vote via PC than any other age group.[62]

[59] Rebecca Fairley Raney, "From the Keyboard, Arizonans Cast Votes" (http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/03/cyber/articles/10vote.html), 10 March 2000.

[60] Brock N. Meeks, "Message from the people: get online!" (http://www.msnbc.com/news/443012.asp), 7 August 2000.

[61] "Election.com Conducts Online Referendum in City of Brest, France" (http://www.businesswire.com/sebbox/bw.100400/202782480.htm), 4 October 2000.

[62] "Technology and the Voting Process," Data from the 1997 Canadian Election Study, 30–32.

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In a broader sense, one also needs to consider the implications of online elections for the campaigning process in general. Internet voting would create far greater opportunities for electioneering by all parties. Given the possibilities for attacks on the system and service denial, voting would have to be offered across a number of days. Furthermore, whereas voters previously enjoyed a degree of insulation once in the voting booth, online voters would be able to access sources of information right up to point of choice. Campaigning, although considered continuous now, might become even more pervasive. While some observers such as David Brady see this marriage of information and convenience as strengthening democracy, others might see it as inspiring impulsive and less rational choices.[63] Thus, even if the digital divide were erased and the use of the Internet boosted turnout rates, the question still remains as to how far this broader electorate would really lead to better and more informed governance.*

[63] David Brady, "Netting Voters," Comment posted on the SecurePoll.com Internet Voting Updates (http://www.SecurePoll.com), 19 June 2000.

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Rethinking Human Security

GARY KING
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In the 1990s, the two dominant strands of foreign policy—economic development and military security—became intertwined. The development and security establishments have also each undergone a period of conceptual turmoil with the end of the cold war, the recognition of highly uneven patterns of change in different components of development, and the technological and political changes often labeled globalization. One consequence has been the emergence of the concept of human security. As fostered by the United Nations Development Program, this term usually means "freedom from fear and want."[1] Human security has rapidly moved to occupy center stage in discussions of foreign policy; for example, the Group of Eight (G8) foreign ministers declared in June of 1999 that they are "determined to fight the underlying causes of multiple threats to human security. . . ."[2] Despite articulated links to both the development and security fields, alternative definitions abound for human security, and the research and policy agenda for human security remains unclear.

In this article, we propose a simple, rigorous, and measurable definition of human security: the number of years of future life spent outside a state of "generalized poverty." Generalized poverty occurs when an individual falls below the threshold of any key domain of human well-being. An agenda for research

[1] Lincoln C. Chen, "Human Security: Concepts and Approaches" in T. Matsumae and L.C. Chen, eds., *Common Security in Asia: New Concepts of Human Security* (Tokyo: Tokai University Press, 1995); United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *New Dimensions of Human Security* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); A. Florini and P. J. Simmons, *The New Security Thinking: A Review of the North American Literature* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998).

[2] Lloyd Axworthy, "An Address On Human Security," Minister Of Foreign Affairs, To The G-8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting, 9 June 1999.

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and action to enhance human security follows logically from this definition in the areas of risk assessment, prevention, protection, and compensation. We propose that the academic and policy communities develop the forecasting methods and databases so that routine measurement of the average level of human security in different communities can be undertaken. We begin with some of the antecedent developments in the areas of development economics and national security that led to the emergence of the concept of human security. We conclude with a discussion of some areas of research and action to enhance human security that have been neglected and the need for closer interaction between different disciplines addressing human security, such as political science and public health.

From National Security to Human Security

The Development of Development Economics

As early as when William Petty and Adam Smith wrote in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the field of development economics has focused on broad, inclusive definitions and goals for human achievement and well-being.[3] However, following World War II, politicians and practitioners in international and bilateral aid agencies, together with the academic community and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), turned their focus to national income as the main object of development. This change was coincident with the widespread application of national income and product accounts to measure economic activity,[4] the creation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and the widespread perception that human well-being was advanced primarily through economic growth.

Gradually, this narrowed focus on per capita income became the subject of criticism as writers pointed out the stark comparison with the earlier, more inclusive approach.[5] Dissatisfaction with improvements in the circumstances of the most impoverished nations and the plight of the poorest in all nations spawned the basic needs movement in the 1970s, which emphasized achievement of a minimum standard for all as the first priority.[6] In the 1980s, nations such as Sri Lanka, Cuba, China, Costa Rica, and the Kerala State in India—with

[3] Sir William Petty, *Political Arithmetick* (London: Robert Clavel and Hen. Mortlock, 1690); Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, 1776, (republished Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1976).

[4] Robert Eisner, *The Total Incomes System of Accounts* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).

[5] Mahbub Ul-Haq, *Reflections on Human Development* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995); Amartya K. Sen, "Development Thinking at the Beginning of the 21st Century" in Louis Emmerij, ed., *Economic and Social Development into the XXI Century*, (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank distributed by Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

[6] Stephen Knowles, "The Evolution of Basic Needs and Human Development," *Revista Internationale di Scienze Economichice e Commerciali* 60 (1993): 513–42.

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long life expectancies at birth and low levels of income per capita[7]—heightened the recognition that income does not always predict other components of well-being. UNICEF's efforts to study the impact of structural adjustment on the health, nutrition, and education of children were particularly influential in this regard.[8] Capturing these concerns, Mahbub ul-Haq launched the United Nations' *Human Development Report* in 1990.[9] In its report, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) argued that development must be focused on people (even though grouped by country) rather than the security of their national boundaries, and on advancing health, education, and political freedom in addition to economic well-being. Development was defined broadly as expanding people's choices in almost any relevant way. To enhance dialogue on human development and garner increased political attention, the UNDP now publishes annually the "Human Development Index," which is a somewhat narrower, but still broad composite measure of income per capita, life expectancy at birth, and educational attainment.[10] The general view, that development is not merely income, is linked in the *Human Development Report* to Amartya Sen's theory of capabilities.[11] Sen's most recent formulation attempts to justify the movement in terms of expanding individuals' freedoms.[12]

The human development perspective has remained controversial,[13] but it has been widely influential in emphasizing nonincome dimensions of human well-being in the development policy debate. In some ways, the increasing focus of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund on poverty alleviation, rather than their previous goal of increasing growth, can be seen as a response to the UNDP emphasis on human development. For another example, the UK Department for Foreign and International Development (DFID) has taken a similar approach and announced that its strategy is to reduce poverty by half in 2015.[14]

The Changing Nature of Security

In parallel to the debate over development, a different set of national and international actors, organizations, and academics has been debating the meaning

[7] Scott B. Halstead, Julia A. Walsh, Kenneth S. Warren, eds., *Good Health at Low Cost* (New York: Rockefeller Foundation, 1985).

[8] Richard Jolly, Andrea Giovanni, Frances Stewart, eds., *Adjustment with a Human Face: Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

[9] UNDP 1990.

[10] Ul-Haq, *Reflections*.

[11] Amartya K. Sen, *Inequality Reexamined* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

[12] Amartya K. Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Knopf, 1999).

[13] Martin Ravaillon, "Good and Bad Growth: The Human Development Reports," *World Development* 25 (1997): 631–8; Harsha Aturupane, Paul Glewwe, and Paul Isenman, "Poverty, Human Development and Growth: An Emerging Consensus?" *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings* 84 (May 1994): 244–9.

[14] Clare Short, secretary of state for International Development, UK Government.

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of security. The traditional view of security has focused on using the military to ensure the territorial integrity of sovereign states. Security studies and the security establishment have long been focused on foreign and defense policy mechanisms to avoid, prevent, and if need be win interstate military disputes.[15]

The funds spent on military security have been as large globally as the combined income from 49 percent of the world's people.[16] A similarly large quantity of consideration, debate, and thought has gone into formulating and executing foreign policy analyses around the world. Unfortunately, although these funds may have increased the relative security of individual nations at times, and the prevalence of military conflict has gradually declined over many years, the number of people who die as a direct or indirect result of military conflict each year has grown, at least until the early 1990s.

Scholars and policy makers then began to recognize that even successful examples of territorial security do not necessarily ensure the security of citizens within a state, a fact to which the examples of North Korea and Rwanda attest. With Robert McNamara,[17] analysts also began to recognize environmental degradation[18] and natural disasters such as epidemics, floods, earthquakes, and droughts as important threats to security as much as human-made military disasters.[19] The collapse of the Soviet Union, the reduced threat of a major-power war, and the supposed peace dividend unleashed a wider debate about whether to broaden the concepts of security further.[20]

These debates led to calls to consider security from a global perspective rather than only from the perspective of individual nations and the idea of common security.[21] More recently, writers have settled on the phrase human security to emphasize the people-centered aspect of these efforts.[22] The argument of human security in the security literature captured the view that the focus of

[15] Stephen J. Del Rosso, "The Insecure State: Reflections on 'the State' and 'Security' in a Changing World," *Daedalus* 124(2): 175–207; David A. Baldwin, "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War," *World Politics* 48(1): 117–41.

[16] UNDP, 1994: Figure 3.1, 48.

[17] Robert S. McNamara, *The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).

[18] Lester Brown, *Redefining National Security*, WorldWatch Institute #14 (Washington, DC: WorldWatch, 1977).

[19] Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Security* 8 (1993): 123–29.

[20] Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs* 68 (Spring 1989): 162–77; Zbigniew Brezinski, "The Cold War and its Aftermath," *Foreign Affairs* 71 (Fall 1992): 31–49; Theodore C. Sorenson, "Rethinking National Security," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1990); Michael T. Klare, ed., *World Security: Challenges for a New Century* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1992).

[21] Palme Commision on Peace and Disarmament: Project on World Security—Series of Papers (http://www.rbf.org/pws/public.html).

[22] T. F. Dixon, "Environmental Change and Human Security," *Behind the Headlines* 48 (Spring 1991): 1–17; Lincoln C. Chen, "Human Security: Concepts and Approaches" in *Common Security in Asia—New Concepts of Human Security*, Tatsuro Matsumae and Lincoln C. Chen, eds., (Tokai University Press, 1995), 137–147.

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security studies should shift from the state to the individual and should encompass military as well as nonmilitary threats.

The Intersection of the Development and Security Literatures

The idea of human security has prompted the development and security communities to intersect. The development community saw an opportunity to capture some of the more substantial political interest and superior financial resources associated with military security and foreign policy by linking human security to human development.[23] Those in the security community were interested in reaching out to conquer new areas as well.[24] The success of the campaign to ban landmines has also reinvigorated interest in international efforts to enhance human, rather than territorial, security by reducing the human toll of war.[25]

A unifying event occurred in 1994, when the UNDP issued its *Human Development Report* focused explicitly on the topic of human security. They argued that "human security is not a concern with weapons—it is a concern with human life and dignity."[26] Human security had four essential characteristics: it is universal, its components are interdependent, it is best ensured through prevention, and it is people-centered. The report also proposed that threats to human security could be grouped in seven categories: economic, food, health, environment, personal, community, and political. Obviously, these categories are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive, and they do not completely represent the fundamental or basic aspects of the idea. However, UNDP's main goal was to use human security as the organizing concept for the 1995 Copenhagen UN Conference on Social Development. While it was not used as the basis for the social summit, human security as proposed by UNDP has continued as an organizing concept in the development economics, public health, and the security communities.

Foreign Policies Based on Human Security

Canada, Norway, and Japan have led the way by incorporating concepts of human security in their official foreign policies. Politicians and other policy makers in many other nations are considering similar moves. These efforts, however, have led to inconsistent definitions and poorly defined, if somewhat

[23] Ul-Haq, *Reflections on Human Development.*

[24] Chen, "Human Security."

[25] "The International Campaign to Ban Landmines calls for: An International ban on the use, production, stockpiling, and sale, transfer, or export of antipersonnel landmines. The signing, ratification, implementation, and monitoring of the mine ban treaty. Increased resources for humanitarian demining and mine awareness programs. Increased resources for landmine victim rehabilitation and assistance" (http://www.icbl.org/frames/main.html), 10 March 2001.

[26] UNDP, 1994.

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related, perspectives. For example, Canada defines human security as "safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats,"[27] a more conservative and narrower focus than the UNDP version. According to Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, human security does not replace national security. Rather, state security and human security are mutually supportive. According to this limited definition, human security is freedom from fear, and human development is freedom from want. They are mutually reinforcing but distinct concepts.

On a practical political level, Canadian foreign policy advocates the strengthening of legal norms and building the capacity to enforce them through efforts such as the Ottawa Convention on Antipersonnel Landmines and the Rome Treaty creating an International Criminal Court. Austria, Canada, Chile, Ireland, Jordan, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand, and Norway have also promoted a more limited human security agenda. These countries focus on antipersonnel landmines, small arms, children in armed conflict, and international humanitarian and human rights law.[28]

Japanese officials have also articulated a foreign policy with human security playing a central role,[29] but their definition of human security is more inclusive than Canada's. It also differs in some ways from the UNDP definition. According to Japanese foreign policy, "human security comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten human survival, daily life and dignity—for example, environmental degradation, violations of human rights, transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, refugees, poverty, anti-personnel landmines and other infectious diseases such as AIDS—and strengthens efforts to confront these threats."[30] Human security has made it onto the G7/G8 summit agendas. The Cologne meeting of foreign ministers in June 1999 issued a communiqué highlighting human security as central to their agendas. The political support and visibility of human security-based foreign policy has also been reflected in the UN Security Council taking on AIDS in Africa, its first discussion of a public health issue.[31]

[27] Axworthy, "Address on Human Security."

[28] Lysøen Declaration: Canada-Norway. At a senior officials meeting in Ottawa (7–8 December 1998), Canada and Norway agreed to undertake a number of human security issues on a collaborative agenda including the issue of children in armed conflict. They are also committed to follow up on the recommendations made by the Graça Machel Study so as to facilitate the improvement of the situation of war-affected children, to intensify efforts for child protection including an end to the recruitment of child soldiers, and to assist with the rehabilitation and reintegration of war-affected children. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/menu-e.asp), 10 March 2001.

[29] Keizo Obuchi, Prime Ministerial Address, "*In Quest of Human Security*," Japan Institute for International Affairs 40th Anniversary Symposium, United Nations University, Tokyo, 11 December 1999.

[30] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Diplomatic Bluebook 1999: Japan's Diplomacy with Leadership Toward a New Century* (Tokyo: Urban Connections Inc., 1999).

[31] http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000110.sc6781.doc.html, 10 March 2001.

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Problems with Existing Definitions

The movement to replace traditional ideas of state security and human development with a new human security paradigm continues. Yet even some of the strongest proponents of human security recognize that it is at best poorly defined and unmeasured, and at worse a vague and logically inconsistent slogan. Human security as formulated by UNDP has been criticized as too broad to be useful as a construct for security or foreign policy. Political scientists and others complain that if all the components of well-being are included, the concept of human security will lose its meaning. The common approach of defining human security by providing lists of past humanitarian crises and threats is a very useful descriptive first step, but does not provide a prospective definition of the concept or a disciplined method of deriving or evaluating the elements of the lists.

For example, UNDP's seven dimensions of human security imply a number of potential interrelated and overlapping dimensions centered on human dignity, but do not provide a coherent framework for integrating them into a single concept.[32] Similarly, Jorge Nef has compiled a number of dimensions of human security and proposed an alternative five-fold classification system based on his analysis of the elements of world system: ecology/environment, economy, society, polity, and culture.[33] According to Nef, these subsystems are linked by a set of bridges: environment and economy are linked by resources; economy and society, by society forces; society and polity, by brokers and alliances; and politics and culture, by ideology.

A final example of the descriptive list approach to defining human security is the wide-ranging classification scheme of George MacLean.[34] In this formulation, human security involves the security of the individual in his or her personal surroundings, community, and environment. This includes personal security for the individual from violence or harm; access to the basic essentials of life; protection from crime and terrorism, pandemic diseases, political corruption, forced migration, and absence of human rights; freedom from violations based on gender; rights of political and cultural communities; political, economic, and democratic development; preventing the misuse and overuse of natural resources; environmental sustainability; and efforts to curtail pollution.

We conducted informal off-the-record interviews with politicians and officials responsible for the foreign policy in several countries that describe their policy as in some way based on human security. Virtually every person we spoke with was concerned that there existed no widely accepted or coherent definition of human security and that there were considerable conceptual prob-

[32] UNDP, 1994.

[33] Jorge Nef, *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability: The Global Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment*, 2nd ed. (Ottawa: International Development Center, 1999).

[34] George MacLean, "The Changing Perception of Human Security: Coordinating National and Multilateral Responses: The United Nations and the New Security Agenda," United Nations Association in Canada, 1998, (http://www.unac.org/canada/security/maclean.html), 10 March 2001.

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lems in relating human security, human development, and the development focus on poverty together in the articulation of foreign policy.

With no consensus or theoretical definition, the goal of measuring and enhancing human security is beyond reach. As a result, we cannot yet hope to use this concept to focus the policies of UN agencies and nations' bilateral aid agencies to improve the plight of human beings worldwide. The present inconsistent state of discussion about human security also means that energy in the academic literature cannot yet be productively or efficiently captured to foster these important developments in policy making.

Defining Human Security

In common usage, the word "security" denotes freedom from various risks. The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines the word as, "The condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger; safety. . . . Freedom from care, anxiety or apprehension; a feeling of safety or freedom from or absence of danger." In a similar vein, Social Security in the United States is an institution meant to guarantee that individuals do not fall below a minimum income threshold during retirement.

The idea of security thus contains two key elements: an orientation to future risks and a focus on risks of falling below some critical threshold of deprivation. Security is not synonymous with the average level of future well-being, but instead focuses on the risks of being severely deprived. My security today is not only a function of my well-being today, but also the prospects of avoiding states of great deprivation in the future.

Our criteria for an optimal definition is one that formalizes what appears to be the emerging international consensus on human security, is rigorous, precise, and logically consistent, and is useful in making public policy. To lay the groundwork for this definition, we briefly review the concept of well-being. Then we propose a generalized concept of poverty based on falling below critical thresholds in any domain of well-being. We define an individual's human security as his or her expectation of years of life without experiencing the state of generalized poverty. Population human security is then an aggregation of individuals' human security.

Domains of Well-Being

The meaning of human well-being has been debated for more 2,500 years and is reflected in an extensive academic literature.[35] Different formulations of the

[35] For example, Thomas Scanlon, *What We Owe Each Other*, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998); James Griffin, *Well-Being* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1986); Amartya K. Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., *Utilitarianism and Beyond* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Sen, *Inequality Reexamined*; Tibor Scitovsky, *The Joyless Economy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 103–28; Thomas Scanlon, "Preference and Urgency," *Journal of Philosophy* 72 (November 1975): 655–69; Jon Elster and John E. Roemer, eds., *Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

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concept include those that can be categorized as subjective mental states (such as pleasure or comfort), or the degree of objective satisfaction of subjective desires and objective states.[36] An important aspect of these theories is the principle invoked to decide which components of subjective or objective states should be included in an overall conception of well-being.[37] For example, some domains would seem to be intrinsically valued, such as health, freedom, or knowledge; whereas others are important means of achieving well-being, such as wealth; or derivative, such as the absence of crime or natural disasters.

Earlier proposed definitions of human security were sometimes criticized for being overbroad: by trying to encompass everything, they wound up not meaning anything. For our definition, we include in human security only those domains of well-being that are essential or extremely important. We do not pretend to have a unique way to put this normative concept into operation. However, we think that one helpful approach may be to include only *those domains of well-being that have been important enough for human beings to fight over or to put their lives or property at great risk*. Other components of well-being may be important, useful, or desirable, and thus should be included in composite measures of well-being such as efforts like the Human Development Index, and UNDP; but they would be excluded from our definition of human security.

Once these essential elements of well-being are identified, our framework gives us considerable latitude in how each is operationalized. We do not even require the domains of well-being to be independent or logically distinct. They can be derivative, intrinsic, or only indirectly measurable. The resulting definition and measure of human security can still be the same. For example, even the extreme case of two fully repetitive domains would pose little conceptual disadvantage as long as both are measurable: given how the categories are combined in constructing a measure of generalized poverty, no numerical change would occur in our index of human security. All that we require is a list of measurable and possibly overlapping components of well-being that, when taken together, constitute what most people mean by well-being.

Although a mutually exclusive and exhaustive definition of well-being based on independent and intrinsic domains that are all essential would be preferable in its own right, and we applaud scholars who continue their long quest toward this goal, our proposed definition of human security is not greatly affected by these issues.

Generalized Poverty

Because security is based on the risk of severe deprivation, it depends heavily on the concept of poverty. However, poverty is most often defined in terms of

[36] Elster and Roemer, *Interpersonal Comparisons.*

[37] Robert E. Goodin, "Laundering Preferences" in Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland, eds., *Foundations of Social Choice Theory* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 75–101.

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only one instrumental factor—income.[38] For our purposes, we take advantage of the literature that defines poverty more broadly to include the deprivation of any basic capabilities.[39] This broader conception has many advantages, in addition to fitting our definition well. For example, if a person were about to enter prison, food and shelter would be guaranteed, but the loss of freedom would clearly makes that person impoverished. To distinguish this from being below a particular level of income, we refer to this broader concept as generalized poverty.

According to our definition, a person is in a state of generalized poverty whenever he or she dips below the pre-defined threshold in any of the component areas of well-being. Our dichotomization of each component of well-being is based on the belief that there is a qualitative difference in life experience above and below the threshold. For example, the difference between not having enough food and nutrition to survive and having enough food is fundamentally different from the difference between having enough food to survive and having food that also tastes especially good.

For some domains of well-being, the thresholds may be set below the minimum observed value so that individuals cannot be in a state of generalized poverty because of their level on that domain. For example, owning more cars would normally improve one's well-being, but owning zero cars would not put one into a state of generalized poverty. For these purposes, even some entire domains of well-being, such as creativity, might be excluded in this way.

A key advantage of our definition of generalized poverty is that it does not require a set of weights to be developed to "equalize" the different domains of well-being. Since a person missing even one of these essential elements for any part of a year would be considered impoverished, the only arbitrary element in the definition is the threshold for each domain of well-being. Moreover, the policy world has much experience with choosing threshold values for income and many other areas (such as to decide whether individuals qualify for certain programs). Although these thresholds are arbitrary and can be improved in theory in some ways (at the cost of simplicity), they are frequently used because they are fairly accurate reflections of people's life experiences and are simple to use. In addition, small changes in these thresholds do not always produce as large changes in population-based indexes as weights would in an aggregate well-being index.

For example, we treat both (1) being tortured and (2) being tortured and starving, as impoverished and unacceptable conditions. Condition 2 may be harder to remedy than 1, but we do not have to decide how much worse 2 is than 1 in order to decide that the person is experiencing a state of generalized poverty. Similarly, few would argue that persons to be tortured four times in the

[38] See, for example, World Bank relative and absolute poverty estimates, 1999.

[39] Sudhir Anand and Amartya K. Sen, "Concepts of Human Development and Poverty: A Multidimensional Perspective," *Human Development Papers* (New York: UNDP, 1997); Sen, *Inequality Reexamined*.

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next year are secure no matter how high their income. Rather, being tortured in the next year will put them in a state of deprivation or generalized poverty. The prospect of this outcome makes them insecure today. Of course, for analytical purposes other than defining human security, definitions of generalized poverty that include trade-offs between the level of achievement in one domain of well-being versus another may be appropriate, particularly when individuals freely choose to balance some domains of well-being against others.

Since we do not need to create and justify weights in combining domains, we can include as many other domains as the international community agrees on. For example, we can include education as a domain of well-being, even though it was once not considered an essential element for having a minimal level of well-being.

In our view, the set of thresholds used to define generalized poverty for the purposes of measuring human security should be general and not context- or region-specific. Human security is a global issue and a global challenge. For example, if income is used as an instrumental proxy for a number of intrinsic domains of well-being, then a single income threshold should be used in all populations. The alternative view that poverty is a relative concept, and hence the poverty threshold should be context specific, is a reasonable and practical approach in a world with hugely varying income levels. However, our goal, and we believe the goal of most others, is to treat all people, regardless of location, as belonging to the same global community; and hence one common threshold applies. The resulting concept would then also be comparable across individuals and populations.

Individual Human Security

Building on the concept of generalized poverty and the forward-looking nature of our conception of security, we define Years of Individual Human Security (YIHS) as the expected number of years of life spent outside the state of generalized poverty. We give details in the appendix. This concept reflects both the individual's prospects of being alive at each point in time and his or her chances of being above the generalized poverty threshold, if alive. For example, if a 40-year-old women has a life expectancy of 35 additional years but only a 50 percent chance in each future year of being above the generalized poverty threshold, her individual human security would be 17.5 years. The unit of measurement for individual human security is thus a life-year, which is familiar and easy to interpret.[40] YIHS is always less than or equal to an individual's life expectancy. If an individual faces no risks of falling below the generalized poverty threshold, YIHS equals life expectancy; nonzero risks of generalized poverty reduce YIHS further.

[40] Christopher Murray, J. A. Salomon, and C. Matthews, "A Critical Examination of Summary Measures of Population Health," *Bulletin of World Health Organization* 78 (No. 8, 2000): 981–994.

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Although YIHS is most useful for developing the population measures of human security described in the next section, we also define a measure that may be more intuitive for some purpose at the individual level of analysis. Thus, Individual Human Security (IHS) is the proportion of the lifespan that a person could reasonably aspire to that he or she can expect to spend outside the state of generalized poverty. This measure, which ranges from zero to one, controls for differences in age. YIHS and IHS are objective measures and so may diverge from an individual's perceived human security. While enhancing perceived human security is an important goal in its own right, the focus of our concern is on objective levels of individual and population human security.

We have formalized these measures of human security as including discount rates so that risks of entering into a state of generalized poverty in the distant future may be weighed as less important than risks in the near future. Discounting future well-being, or in the present case the risks of being impoverished, has long been debated.[41] While it is our general view that future risks should be considered as important or nearly as important as more proximal risks of poverty, the formulation allows for any plausible discount rate. Current practice in a number of fields, such as cost-effectiveness analysis of health interventions, has slowly gravitated to using low positive discount rates of 3 percent or less per year.[42] Obviously, once the hard work is done to collect the necessary measures, alternative discounting schemes could also be computed for comparison.

Population Human Security

For the purposes of informing debates on development and security policy, we also provide a definition of population years of human security based on two ways of aggregating YIHS. The simplest measure is the average of YIHS for everyone in the relevant population. If YIHS is 25 for half the people and 35 for the other half, then population human security would be 30. For many uses, this direct average is the most appropriate measure. However, it is sensitive to differences in the population age distribution. If one population is older on average than another, *ceteris paribus*, it will have a lower population human security. In a strict sense, this is correct. The older population has an expectation of living fewer years above the generalized poverty threshold. But for some comparative purposes, we might like a measure that is unaffected by the age

[41] F. P. Ramsey, "A Mathematical Theory of Saving," *Economic Journal* 38 (December 1928): 543–59; R. C. Lind, ed., *Discounting for the Time and Risk in Energy Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Stephen A. Marglin, "The Social Rate of Discount and the Optimal Rate of Investment," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 77 (February 1963): 95–111; Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984); Amartya K. Sen, "Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 81 (February 1963): 1123–4.

[42] For example, Marthe R. Gold, Joanna E. Siegel, Louise B. Russell, and Milton C. Weinstein, eds., *Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

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distribution of the population. For such comparative use, we propose to compare groups on the basis of population years of human security at birth.[43] The average value of YIHS for newborns today, just like period life expectancy (which is life expectancy at birth), is not affected by the age structure of the population and to a considerable extent reflects a broad range of future risks of survival and generalized poverty in the future.

Both population years of human security and population years of human security at birth are measured on the same intuitive scale as the familiar measures of life expectancy and life expectancy at birth, respectively. They measure the average number of years members of a given population can expect to live (starting from either observed ages or at birth) outside of the state of generalized poverty.

Both concepts exclude future generations in their calculation and thus avoid the standard paradoxes that would otherwise result. For example, without discounting, including future births means that population human security will be the same for almost all populations far enough into the future. Although challenging examples can be found (such as forecast epidemics of infant diseases), we believe that defining population human security as a function of currently living individuals is a reasonable and practical approach. Given the state of the methods of risk assessments, plausible measures of population human security at birth would need to reflect known risks over the succeeding century. This is already a wide window of evaluation, and extending it further into the future is likely to be empirically impractical.

We also exclude from our population measure anything that affects the security of institutions, governments, or other organizations, unless it also affects individuals. This conception of population human security is thus a natural evolution of the literature since Richard Ullman wrote of focusing security on individuals rather than states.[44]

Measuring Human Security

To measure human security in practice, a set of domains of well-being must be selected. For each domain, a practical indicator must be constructed, as well as the threshold value below which an individual will be defined to be in a state of generalized poverty. Two standard approaches to measuring well-being—money-metric utility and the human development index—are instructive examples for this purpose.

[43] Another option for an age distribution-independent definition of population human security is to use a standard age distribution to calculate age-standardized population human security (See O. B. Ahmed et al., "Age Standardization of Rates: A New WHO Standard," GPE discusion paper, no. 31 (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2000). This measure would reflect the complete range of risks of survival and generalized poverty over age and time but has the disadvantage of requiring the selection of a necessarily arbitrary population distribution for age standardization.

[44] Ullman, "Redefining Security."

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Some analysts favor using income per capita as a general, all-purpose measurement of well-being, as is amply illustrated by the international focus in policy debates on income per capita. This approach is founded on the notion that each individual can best use the resources they command to maximize their own well-being and that interpersonal comparisons can legitimately be made on the basis of total income. The problems with this approach are well known,[45] and when measurement is feasible, most analysts try to include other domains as well. For example, three domains were included in the Human Development Index:[46] income per capita, health, and education. Income per capita was not used as an intrinsic domain of well-being but as instrumental for the attainment of many other domains. Health and education were selected because they were considered intrinsic domains of well-being and could be practically measured.

We begin with the Human Development Index domains and so also use income per capita as instrumentally related to several domains of well-being, and also include health and education. Threshold levels of economic well-being and health are clearly important enough to provoke violence. Education per se has not been that important, and so a plausible case might be constructed that it could be omitted; but people have often fought over the cultural values reflected in education. In addition, we wish to capture contributors to generalized poverty related to other basic freedoms. The UNDP recognized the importance of political freedom and democracy, but could not find generally acceptable measures or weights and so could not include it with their other measured domains. Since we only need a threshold, and no weights, it will be somewhat easier for us to include variables like these. Thus, our suggestion for a parsimonious set of domains for measuring human security would be income, health, education, political freedom, and democracy. Many other domains of well-being come in indirectly through these. In addition, any aspect of well-being that directly affects life expectancy, such as the environment or biodiversity, will to an extent be automatically included in our measure of human security without having to establish a separate domain or threshold.

For each domain explicitly included, we must select an indicator or indicators that reflect our current state of information, as well as the threshold value below which an individual would be in a state of generalized poverty. We now suggest measures of each of these domains, but we emphasize that our framework can easily accommodate any number of additional domains.

Domain-Specific Measures

Although the System of National Accounts (SNA) was developed in the 1950s and has been nearly universally adopted, many variants of income per capita

[45] World Bank, *World Development Report, 2000–01* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
[46] UNDP, 1990.

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could be used.[47] Because we emphasize comparing the purchasing power of different individuals across the world, we believe a good measure is GNP per capita converted into international dollars using purchasing power parities.[48] The World Bank has proposed that the global definition of absolute (economic) poverty is less than $365 per capita per year in 1985 international dollars[49] and this definition has now been widely adopted in the international community (for example, World Bank, DFID). According to this definition, 1.3 billion individuals now live in poverty.[50] Like any threshold, this one is arbitrary but has been set at such a low value that no one can credibly argue that individuals with less than $365 per capita are not in generalized poverty. While a good case can be made for raising the poverty threshold, our goal is to codify existing international consensus, and this is the closest we have at present.

Health factors are included in the definition of human security in two distinct ways. First, survival is a critical component of human security. Increasing mortality rates reduce life expectancy and YIHS, ceteris paribus. Fortunately, mortality forecasting is an active area of scholarly research and policy advice.[51] Second, individuals who are alive can fall below a threshold of health status that places them in a state of generalized poverty (for example, being paralyzed from the neck down). Considerable progress has been made in the development of comparable measures of the nonfatal dimensions of population health.[52] A variety of survey instruments have been developed such as SF-36,[53] Euroqol,[54] and WHODAS,[55] which can be used to measure various aspects of

[47] There are two major choices. First, income per capita can be calculated on the basis of goods and services produced within a country (Gross Domestic Product) or it can be corrected for net property income from abroad (Gross National Product). The distinction is important for countries where remittances or income from investments abroad is substantial. The other key choice is the method of converting incomes per capita in national currency units into a common metric for the purposes of cross-national comparisons. Because official exchange rates do not reflect purchasing power parity for nontraded goods and services such as primary education, an alternative method based on measuring prices and computing purchasing power parities has been developed. See Robert Summers and Alan Heston, "The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950–1988," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 106 (2): 327–68. Such PPP based comparisons are expressed in "international dollars," which is U.S. dollars in purchasing power terms.

[48] The two main estimates of purchasing power parity, based on GDP and GNP per capita, are the Penn World Tables (Summers and Heston 1991) and the World Bank (World Development Indicators 1999), respectively. Unfortunately, the correlation of these two measures is not high enough to make the choice ignorable.

[49] World Bank, 1990.

[50] World Bank, 1999.

[51] World Health Report, 1999 and 2000.

[52] Murray, Salomon, and Mathers, "A Critical Examination."

[53] J. Ware, SF-36 Health Survey, Manual and Interpretation Guide—The Health Institute, New England Medical Center, Boston, Massachusetts.

[54] EuroQuol Group, "A New Facility for the Measurement of Health-Related Quality of Life," *Health Policy* 16 (1990): 199–208.

[55] WHO-DAS, "Disability Assessment Schedule Version 3.1a" (WHODAS-II), Geneva, World Health Organization, 1999.

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individuals' health. In parallel, work on how individuals value time spent in different health states provides a basis for an overall assessment of the severity of health states.[56] Health states are valued on a scale from 0 (death) to 1 (full health). Severe states such as quadriplegia score around 0.2 and severe depression is 0.6.[57] We would suggest that any individual in a health state less than 0.25 is in a state of generalized poverty.

Most of the rich academic literature measuring democracy and political freedom considers each separately.[58] One of the most commonly used measures is provided by Freedom House, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization. Freedom House judges democracy by quantifying political rights and political freedom by quantitative measures of civil liberties, which "include the freedoms to develop views, institutions, and personal autonomy apart from the state."[59] Over 800 other measures of political freedom and democracy have been constructed,[60] but almost all focus on evaluations of governments rather than the political security of their citizens. This means that to measure the political component of generalized poverty properly, we need additional work. One reasonable threshold for the generalized poverty level for democracy could be the right of an individual to vote in at least one free and fair election (not necessarily national) that affects some important aspect of that person's life. This is quite a minimal level of democracy that the international community would surely want to improve, but without this right a person should clearly be seen as severely deprived. The analogous country-level measure might be the fraction of adults who can participate in such elections. Interestingly, such a measure would likely be greater than 0 percent and less than 100 percent in all but a few countries.

The two main options for measuring educational attainment include literacy and average years of schooling. The advantage of literacy is that it incorporates a qualitatively meaningful threshold of educational attainment in its definition. Most would agree that being illiterate places an individual in a state of generalized poverty. On the practical front, the problem with literacy is that it is notoriously difficult to compare across countries because self-reported lit-

[56] P. F. M. Krabbe, M. Essink-Bot, G. J. Bonsel, "The Comparability and Reliability of Five Health-State Valuation Methods," *Social Science and Medicine* 45 (December 1997): 1641–52; J. Brazier, T. Usherwood, R. Harper, and K. Thomas, "Deriving a Preference-Based Single Index from the UK SF-36 Health Survey," *Journal of Clinical Epidemiology* 51 (November 1998): 1115–28; E. Nord, "Methods for Quality Adjustment of Life Years," *Social Science and Medicine* 34 (No. 6, 1992): 559–69.

[57] Christopher Murray and Alan Lopez, eds., *The Global Burden of Disease*, Global Burden of Disease and Injury Series: vol. 1. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).

[58] See Kenneth A. Bollen and Pamela Paxton, "Subjective Measures of Liberal Democracy," *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (February 2000): 58–86.

[59] The methods of Freedom House can be found at http://www.freedomhouse.org/survey99/method/.

[60] Kenneth A. Bollen and Pamela Paxton, "I02532: Cross-National Indicators of Liberal Democracy, 1950–1990." Data set at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu., 1999).

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eracy differs substantially across countries. Average years of schooling, on the other hand, is a more robust measure of educational attainment.[61] An appropriate threshold for average years of schooling might be five or six years, which reflects basic primary education. If a comparable measure of literacy becomes available, we would propose to use it also.

Data Needs

Measuring population human security requires as its starting point good information on the current and past levels of income, health, education, democracy, and political freedom for individuals in different populations of the world. To estimate generalized poverty, however, we need information on individuals within populations simultaneously for these key variables. As the definition of generalized poverty is based on falling below the critical threshold in any of these domains, we require information on the levels of each variable for each individual. In other words, information on health that cannot be related at the individual level to the information on income or political freedom cannot be used alone to estimate generalized poverty for a population.

In practice, we could use available detailed data collections such as national accounts or vital registration to measure the variables separately, and a much smaller study to estimate their joint distribution. As a last resort, methods of ecological inference could be used to infer the joint distribution.[62] Scholars have made substantial progress moving from national aggregate data on income to information on the distribution of income.[63] We believe that the natural next step, consistent with trends in data collection and with the movement toward human security, is to broaden the collection scheme to cross-domain measures at the individual level. In some cases, adding information on education and proxies of wealth or income to routinely collected health information may be relatively inexpensive. This would be especially valuable since this health information is already collected in relatively standard forms in almost all countries.

Not withstanding this agenda for the future development of generalized poverty information systems, new methods need to be developed and applied to estimate the joint distribution of health, education, income, and political freedom. Fortunately, much can be done. For example, the World Health Organization has a project to use national income and expenditure surveys, along with satellite mapping of the world's population and several geographic factors, to map the location of the world's economically impoverished. Preliminary re-

[61] Average years of schooling for the population over 15 or over 25 has been called "human capital." See Jong Wha Lee and Robert Barro, "International Comparisons of Educational Attainment," *Journal of Monetary Economics* 32 (December 1993).

[62] For example, Gary King, *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing Individual Behavior from Aggregate Data.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

[63] See the Wider database on income inequality—http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm.

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FIGURE 1

Estimated Distribution of the Poor in Africa and other Regions of the World, 1998. (Preliminary Results Based on The World Health Organization Mapping The Poor Project).



Note: This map demonstrates the feasibility of locating the economic poor in one of the most data-poor regions of the world. Darker areas indicate a higher density of poor people. Lighter areas indicate the relative absence of poor people (the Sahara Desert in Northern Africa, where few people live, is a prominent pattern in the graph).

sults of this project are illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the density of poor individuals per square kilometer for each continent. This mapping of the world's poor amply illustrates the major difference between those in absolute poverty and individuals whether rich or poor who live in the poorest countries. For example, in China, with an income per capita in 1997 International Dollars of 3070 per capita, over 200 million are estimated to be in poverty.[64] Other parts

[64] World Bank, 1999.

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of the world with high densities of poor include Bangladesh, the Ethiopian Highlands, the Ganges Valley, and the Great Lakes region of Africa and Nigeria. Work is underway to use other sources such as demographic and health surveys to estimate the distribution of individuals in different states of health.[65]

Human security is a forward-looking concept: to measure it today we must project generalized poverty and survival tomorrow. Projections require the development of methods of risk assessment with predictive validity. Such models can best be developed if relatively long historical data bases are available so that the relationship between generalized poverty in each domain, and key social, economic, cultural and political factors, can be explored. Risk assessment is thus a two-stage process. Key factors in accounting for large changes in human security, such as wars, global warming, earthquakes, other natural disasters, and economic crises must be identified prior to projecting generalized poverty itself. In some cases, the areas of health, income, education, and political freedom require as a first step models to assess the risks of these events. Below, we use the challenge of risk assessment of military conflict to illustrate directions for progress in measuring human security.

One important purpose of measuring human security is to provide individuals with better information on their own human security. By so doing, we will tend to increase each individual's perceived human security because humans tend to overestimate threats to their own security. However, measuring human security will also be a critical input to public policy debates on how to enhance population human security. Individual risk assessment models naturally lead to actions to prevent or decrease the prospects of generalized poverty. Measuring human security will also focus the international foreign policy debate on the key contributors to human insecurity and thus improve public policy. To facilitate these goals, we propose that necessary data bases and models be developed that allow for the annual calculation of this human security index. As with all efforts at comparative assessment, annual or periodic reporting of population human security will help all countries understand their situation and inform them about where to make improvements.

Enhancing Human Security

Human insecurity can come from any source that increases the risk that people will remain in or enter into a state of generalized poverty. Since generalized poverty is a state that is often difficult to exit, existing in this state is one of the major threats to human security—that is to being in generalized poverty in the future. Others include crime, military conflict (group violence), nonpeaceful transfers of governmental power, diseases and other public health problems,

[65] Emmanuela Gakidor, Christopher Murray, and Julio Frenk, "A Framework for Measuring Health Inequality," World Health Organization: Discussion Paper, 29 July 2000 (http:/www.nt.who.int/whosis/statistics/discussion_papers/papersos.pdf).

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acute environmental disasters (floods, droughts, earthquakes, weather storms, hazards from space, contamination), long-term environmental changes (global warming, ozone hole, water shortage, pollution), and economic crises.

Some components of generalized poverty, such as income, health, and education, have witnessed considerable global progress in the last half-century. For example, the dramatic success of the international community in contributing to the expansion of global life expectancy from 46.5 years in 1950–1955 to 65.4 years in 1995–2000[66] is an example of the progress that can be made.

Categories of Efforts to Enhance Human Security

We categorize efforts to enhance human security, ranging from ex ante to ex post, as risk assessment, prevention, protection, and compensation. Risk assessment involves improving and communicating knowledge of the risks that particular populations will enter into or remain in a state of generalized poverty. Prevention includes efforts to reduce these risks. Protection includes those actions that decrease the harm from the events if they occur. Compensation includes efforts to provide financial or in-kind payments to those in generalized poverty. To arrive at these categories, we began with the scheme originally developed by Lincoln Chen[67] and then slightly expand it to highlight the importance of risk assessment as distinct from prevention.

This categorization can be used to construct more detailed operational strategies for increasing human security, based on new public policies and academic research. For example, military conflict risk assessment should include research on forecasting military conflict, communicating the risks to those for whom it can make a difference, and developing surveillance systems. Prevention involves estimating causal models of war, identifying modifiable causes, using risk assessments to target conflict reduction interventions, UN Security Council efforts, and national and international deterrence efforts. Protection from military conflict includes trying to change the weaponry of war, such as the campaign to ban landmines and cluster bombs, reinvigorating and extending the international laws that protect noncombatants, and protecting social service delivery and public health systems from combat. Compensation includes war insurance schemes (with risk rated on the basis of existing forecasting models) and various types of humanitarian assistance.

Advantages of Improving Risk Assessment

Even a cursory examination of the major threats to and strategies for enhancing human security highlights risk assessment as the major important and underin-

[66] United Nations, *World Population Prospects, Vol. 1, Comprehensive Tables* (New York: United Nations, 1998).

[67] Chen, "Human Security."

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vested area. Risk assessment is critical even for merely measuring population human security, but the advantages of improving risk assessment go far beyond simple measurement.

First, improving methods so that meaningful risk assessment can be undertaken is an important research endeavor in its own right. This type of knowledge in and of itself should be considered a public good. In addition, better knowledge of specific risks might be used by the international community to make more effective public policy. Many efforts at prevention require knowledge of risks; for example, effective response to human security risks is enhanced by early warning systems and hence good risk assessment.

We also know that much psychological and social-psychological research demonstrates that people tend to overestimate risks of the components of generalized poverty.[68] By providing high quality risk assessments and disseminating this information to the public, individual perceived human security in many settings can be enhanced. In those settings where individuals underestimate their human insecurity, better risk assessment will allow them to take action at the individual, household, or government level to mitigate against the impact of these risks if they occur.

Third, even if individuals' assessments of their average future well-being are unbiased (that is, correct on average), psychological research indicates that people tend to evaluate the uncertainty in forecasts incorrectly. As such, better risk assessment that is widely and informatively disseminated can increase individual perceived human security directly by reducing forecast variances. Perhaps most obviously, better risk assessments make new interventions possible. For example, accurate hurricane forecasts eliminate most of the immediate public health risk of these severe weather events.

Our approach to using risk assessment in the definition of human security also has the advantage of encompassing other important problems not affecting current human well-being. For example, biodiversity, which is seen by the scientific community as one of the most important global problems, has little or no effect on current well-being. Approaches that provide an agenda for the international community that are not forward-looking would either ignore biodiversity or append it to the agenda in a logically incoherent fashion. Under our approach, even though biodiversity has no effect on current well-being, it is essential in maintaining future well-being and hence plays a central role in improving human security.

Risk assessment is important for forging policies based on the forward looking concept of human security, which can be far more effective than basing policy on current well-being or generalized poverty. Since fighting the last war is obviously not the goal of the international community, we need to prepare responses to what is likely to occur and not merely because prevention is less

[68] Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, *Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

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costly than post-hoc responses. We hope that by illuminating the central role of risk assessment in human security that we are able to point to areas where the academic community can help. Risk assessment is under-researched in some areas and undervalued in others. Most of the social sciences, for example, have an understandable focus on estimating causal effects. What scholars need to understand, however, is that this focus need not come at the expense of models that forecast well. Forecasts are often observable implications of the same models used to estimate causal effects and can also be used to validate those same models. Put in reverse, many causal models now used can be marshaled to improve our forecasts and hence our measurement of human security.

Concluding Remarks

We designed our version of human security to be logically rigorous and to satisfy what appears to be the outline of an emerging normative consensus in the international community. As we go to press, we can report on a commitment from the World Health Organization to develop and apply new survey tools to measure health and related domains of human security that follow the suggestions in this article. In addition, we note that in a recent speech, Mexican President Vincente Fox has adopted the notion of human security offered here.

Normative Decisions

Our concept is based on the security of human beings, rather than the protection of state boundaries, with each individual contributing equally to population human security. The definition is forward looking: an individual's current security is a function of her or his future prospects. Most distinctively, human security is a function of the risk of being below a threshold of well-being, what we call a state of generalized poverty, rather than average levels of well-being.

Using generalized poverty means that a policy based on human security focuses effort primarily on human beings in the most dire situations. This is a logical extension of what was effectively the perspective of the international community in the domain of health when over the last forty years it generated unprecedented increases in the human life span by first addressing severe childhood illnesses. The alternative view would be to focus on increasing average levels of human well-being (otherwise known as human development). While we do not think human security has any necessary, absolute, or lexicographic priority as a goal of social policy in comparison to human development, most in the international community seems to believe that it should have some priority except in somewhat unusual situations.

Recent academic debates have led to related distinctions. For example, the prioritarian view holds that we should be interested in improving the well-being of everyone with a special concern for the well-being of the worst off.[69] This

[69] Larry S. Temkin, *Inequality* (New York: Oxford Ethics Series, Oxford University Press, 1993).

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view can be distinguished from the classical egalitarian perspective, which is concerned with the entire distribution of well-being across individuals. Thus, an egalitarian might agree with a public policy that sacrifices a degree of well-being among the best off in order to reduce inequality, but in some cases a prioritarian would object.

Any priority for human security over human development should not be considered absolute, and we would not argue against public policy that enhances human development simply because human security had not been maximized first. But we believe that the international development and security communities are primarily focused on enhancing what we call human security. One way of thinking about these normative preferences is to derive them from the deeper goal of maximizing global human utility. From this perspective, the issue is how we make interpersonal utility comparisons. According to our interpretation of the emerging consensus of the international community, a small increase in well-being across the generalized poverty threshold produces a considerably larger change in utility than all but the most extreme changes in human well-being at other levels. If this is true, then the priority of human security over human development is an automatic consequence.

Agenda for Foreign Policy and Scientific Progress

The definition and measure of human security offered in this article are intended to formalize the emerging consensus in the international community over some of its most central goals. Since the idea of human security is to improve the lives of people rather than improve the security of national borders and key issues cross these borders, coordinated action by the international community seems essential. Continued linkages and cooperation among governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and other parts of civil society will also be important.

If this is a reasonable statement of the emerging consensus, future directions for development and security policies will be greatly affected. We now consider examples of policy and research strategies that would be affected within the four strategies for improving human security—risk assessment, prevention, protection, and compensation.

One of the areas with the largest potential gains is improving risk assessment for the key causes of generalized poverty. Building the capacity in data bases and methods to undertake better risk assessment should be a central component of a human security-focused foreign policy. The potential for improved risk assessment seems substantial in developing surveillance systems for new diseases, for example. Similarly, recent progress in risk assessment methods in political science means that for the first time some military conflicts can be accurately predicted, which may mean that risk assessment for some other key causes of human security can also be rapidly improved. Such efforts could be greatly enhanced by forging new interdisciplinary ties. For example, political

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scientists have focused almost exclusively on elite political decisions to go to war, rather than war's ultimate public health consequences, and hence on only one aspect of risk assessment and prevention. Public health professionals have not taken advantage of these developments, but have much to contribute in the areas of protection and compensation that political scientists have not engaged.[70]

Better prevention strategies could be built on improved risk assessment. For example, in the area of military conflict, better causal models and risk assessments might provide the opportunity for more focused foreign policy interventions to reduce the risk of conflict. Information given to the public in countries or communities with elevated risks of conflict may in and of itself decrease the risk of conflict. Other strategies for prevention that have been proposed and seem likely to be productive include improved international and national monetary institutions to reduce the risk of economic crises, carbon-trading agreements to reduce green-house gases and the risk of global climate change, and improved rapid response teams to minimize disease transmission in response to reports from surveillance systems.

While we believe, like others, that risk assessment and prevention may be the most rewarding direction for international efforts to enhance human security, there are also substantial opportunities in the area of protection. The recent success in the campaign to ban landmines has opened up the prospect of other international agreements to make the weapons of war more focused on combatants, thus reducing the insecurity of noncombatants. International efforts to develop agreements on cluster bombs have a similar motivation. Other strategies for protection include efforts to enhance the quality of buildings in earthquake-prone areas, as well as social mechanisms to protect vulnerable groups during economic crises. Humanitarian disaster response is also a form of protection.

Finally, the international community could enhance efforts at compensation by creating organizations to provide insurance against the financial costs associated with major risks to human security. Most nations effectively self-insure against the costs of major catastrophes. The end result is that many find themselves facing long-term impacts of crises, whether Hurricane Mitch or civil war. Traditional concepts of insurance could perhaps be developed to provide nations at high risk of these events with some financial risk protection.

More detailed implications for policy would, we believe, follow from a structured application of this framework to the challenges of human security. At this point, building the evidence base for human security must be a priority if the focus of international action is to move from reacting to the latest humanitarian crisis to effectively enhance human security through risk assessment, prevention, protection, and compensation.*

[70] B. Levy and Victor W. Sidel, *War and Public Health* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

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APPENDIX

We define individual human security to be $YIHS_i = \int_0^\infty [1 - P_i(t|\tau)]S_i(t)\delta^t dt$, where $P(t|\square)$ is the probability of individual i being in a state of generalized poverty at time t given a vector of thresholds $\square$ that define generalized poverty in critical domains of well-being, conditional on being alive, and $S(t)$ is the probability that the individual is alive at time t (the so-called survivorship function). Thus, if an individual has an elevated risk of death in the future, manifested by a decrease in $S(t)$, then their individual human security has decreased. The discount factor is τ, which equals one if the prospect of being in a state of generalized poverty in the distant future contributes as much to years of an individual's human insecurity as the prospect of being in generalized poverty in the near future. When Δ is less than 1 then the prospect of being insecure in the distant future contributes less than in the near future. In addition, $P(t)$ and $S(t)$ are each conditional on the information set available. In the present case, we define the information set as including all data available to at least one person, but not necessarily the person for whom we are calculating YIHS. Individuals who pay a lot of attention, are smart, have sociological imaginations, have access to education and other knowledge, etc. will often be able to do better than a statistical analyst in forecasting, since they condition on more information. Others who are not so fortunate will probably not be able to forecast as well as a statistical analyst. Thus, part of the goal of the international community probably ought to be to equalize the information sets by distributing information about our forecasts.

YIHS is analogous to the familiar period life expectancy measure, a calculation based on mortality rates by age observed for a single period of time, usually a year. Period life expectancy is the average length of life for a hypothetical group of newborns born today who would experience over the course of their life currently observed mortality rates at each age. As such, period life expectancy is a convenient summary measure of current mortality experience, even though it does not pertain to any actual group of individuals. The proposed measure of human security is also based on the concept of a life table with two key modifications. First, human security is by definition about the future and reflects our uncertainty about the future. Individual human security is thus always calculated prospectively. Second, we are applying the concept of life expectancy at the individual level. Period life tables are usually calculated for populations. At the individual level, however, the concept of life expectancy or the area under the individual's survivorship function can be applied prospectively.

To clarify potential differences between YIHS and individual perceived human security (PYIHS), we define the latter formally as, $PYIHS_i = \int_0^\infty [1 - P_i^p(t|\tau_i)]S_i^p(t)\delta_i^t(t)dt$, where τ_i is the vector of thresholds that individual i uses to define for herself a state of generalized poverty. For example, auto workers in Detroit faced with the prospect of unemployment may perceive themselves as insecure because the threshold they use to define deprivation is much higher than the global income poverty threshold. $S_i^p(t)$ is the subjective survivorship function for individual i and $P_i^p(t|\lambda_i)$ is his or her subjective probability of falling below the generalized poverty threshold. Individuals are well known to overestimate small risks and underestimate large risks,[71] so that their subjective assessments underestimate their human security in secure environments and overestimate them in risky environments. They also generally have a different information set available to make forecasts than we use to define YIHS. This formulation of PYIHS also includes individuals' discount rate for the future.

PYIHS is based on an individual's forecasts of the probability of being in a state of generalized poverty, as well as on forecasts of survival. This measure of PYIHS is strictly relative to the expectations and subjective probabilities of the individual. In other words, PYIHS could increase (as we all know from real life experience) not because the actual probabilities of generalized

[71] Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, *Risk and Rationality: Can Normative and Descriptive Analysis Be Reconciled* (College Park, MD: Institute of Philosophy & Public Policy, 1988).

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poverty or survival have changed but because an individual's subjective assessment of these changes or their discount rate changes.

Because we have chosen to define population human security in terms of forecasted generalized poverty and survivorship does not mean that we think that an individual's own assessments of their human security is unimportant. Clearly, if population human security is high but most individuals perceive that their human security is low, this is a concern for public policy and for the community as a whole. Simply providing the public with better risk assessment may serve to enhance perceived human security if people have overestimated risks of generalized poverty or death. Nevertheless, from the vantage point of development and security, we believe that population human security based on estimated probabilities is of the greatest policy relevance.

IPHS may be based on the high discount rates that many individuals, especially the poor, use in their daily life decisions. We also know that discount rates used for policy decisions, such as investments in water or environmental projects, are typically and reasonably much lower than individual discount rates.[72] Based on long-standing arguments against discounting future utility,[73] we believe that a reasonable approach is to evaluate the risks of generalized poverty five years hence as being as important or nearly as important as in ten years.

Finally, we define

$$\mathrm{IHS}_i = \frac{\mathrm{YIHS}_i}{\int_0^\infty S_i^t(t)\delta^t dt}$$

where $S_i^t(t)$ is the standard survivorship function for someone with the sex and age of individual i. The denominator is the discounted expected years of life an individual can reasonably aspire to. In this way, if an individual faces an increased risk of death in the future, IHS will decrease.

[72] R. C. Lind, ed., *Discounting for the Time and Risk in Energy Policy* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982); S. A. Marglin, "The Social Rate of Discount and the Optimal Rate of Investment," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 77 (1963): 95–111; A. K. Sen, "Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 81 (1967): 112–24.

[73] F. P. Ramsey, "A Mathematical Theory of Saving," *Economic Journal* 38 (1928): 543–559; D. Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984).

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Blairism Brazilian Style? Cardoso and the "Third Way" in Brazil

TIMOTHY J. POWER

The year 1994 was a fateful one for social democracy on both sides of the Atlantic. Only seven short years ago, the German SPD, the world's oldest and arguably most influential social democratic party, went down to its third consecutive electoral defeat at the hands of Helmut Kohl, leading many to despair about the fortunes of democratic socialism on the European continent. In 1994, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom all had entrenched conservative governments. This may seem like a century ago in political time, and in some ways it was. But 1994 also brought forth several intriguing developments. In the UK, the tragic death of John Smith sparked a leadership struggle in the Labour party, and when the dust cleared the new leader of the opposition was a previously little known 41-year-old member of Parliament (MP) named Tony Blair. In that same year, the British sociologist Anthony Giddens published an influential book called *Beyond Left and Right*,[1] a volume that would herald a series of publications proposing a major rethinking of social democracy.[2] Meanwhile, in faraway Brazil, the crucial October 1994 presidential election was won by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, self-described social democrat who, quite unusually, exercised the professions of both Giddens and Blair. The stage was set for a critical debate over the renovation of European social democracy and the rapid diffusion of this debate to South America.

Over the past seven years, political change in Western Europe has been quite substantial, both in terms of the partisan composition of key governments

[1] Anthony Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994).

[2] Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1998); and Giddens, *The Third Way and its Critics* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2000).

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as well as in the intraparty transformations of influential social democratic parties. The year 1997 witnessed the triumph of both New Labour and the French Socialists, and in 1998 the SPD returned to power in Germany for the first time since 1982. By 1998, democratic socialists were present in thirteen of the fifteen governments of the European Union. Even more importantly, the substantial ideological and policy changes within New Labour and other major parties gave rise to a debate over so-called Third Way politics. The Third Way is a term used by Giddens (with some misgivings) and by many politicians (more indiscriminately) as shorthand for the modernization of social democracy and its adaptation to a profoundly changed world. The boundaries of the Third Way debate are elastic, ill-defined, and always controversial. For example, no one is really sure if the dialogue includes Bill Clinton, who has dismal social democratic credentials but is enthusiastic about the possibility of a Third Way, or Lionel Jospin, who has excellent social democratic credentials but is decidedly unenthusiastic about appropriating external models or labels. Moreover, as was the case with early revisionist socialism a century ago, the Third Way debate is an evolving, improvisational domain of both intellectuals and practitioners, containing elements of both theory and praxis and occasionally fomenting miscommunication between the two. As an initial starting point, it can be said that the Third Way debate is being conducted by left-of-center parties and intellectuals, predominantly socialist but occasionally left-liberal in their political origins, that have a common interest in public policy experimentation under the broad rubric of "progressive governance" (an alternative term coined to avoid the Third Way moniker and to pitch a deliberately broad tent) in the context of a newly globalized economy.

From the perspective of Latin Americanists, one of the most unusual aspects of this controversy is that, unlike most other transnationalized policy and ideological debates involving advanced industrial democracies, the Third Way debate has encompassed a major Latin American country, party, and leader. Discussion of the Third Way has drawn scholarly and political attention to the reformist experiment led by Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso and his Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB). This results partly from the personal prestige of Cardoso, who has a dual role as a respected, antipopulist statesman (rare in Latin America) and as an eminent academic sociologist whose curriculum vitae and influence rival those of Giddens; partly from the heavily internationalist profile and external linkages of the PSDB, which from its birth has unabashedly identified itself with the Socialist International and the model Western European social democratic parties; partly from a self-interested desire on the part of First World governments to see Cardoso succeed in his restructuring of the Brazilian economy and thereby serve as a model for neighboring countries; and partly because there are real items of overlap between the views propounded by Cardoso, Blair, and Giddens. However, the inclusion of Cardoso and his government in the evolving Third Way debate points up some important ways in which his experiment differs from others,

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above and beyond the obvious fact that Cardoso governs a developing country and the Third Way has mostly been debated in Europe.

More specifically, the Cardoso experiment raises interesting questions about the viability of "late social democracy,"—that is, the attempt to "modernize" social democracy in a country without a strong social democratic tradition. An examination of the PSDB's transformation over the past ten years illustrates the difficulty of "skipping ahead" to a Third Way variant of social democracy without ever having passed through a traditional or classical variant. The problem can be put quite succinctly: the PSDB was founded in 1988, following Western European models, advocating parliamentarism and redistributive politics; but after coming to power with Cardoso in 1994, the party adopted a largely orthodox and market-oriented program. Although Cardoso strenuously resists the term, most observers consistently apply the term "neoliberal" to his policies and programs, and the label has stuck. Why did the PSDB undergo such a rapid and profound transformation in only a decade? And what are the implications of this transformation for the party itself, for social democracy in Latin America, and for the Third Way debate more generally?

This article begins with an attempt to narrow the definition of the Third Way into something usable for comparative, empirical analysis of specific parties and movements. I then proceed to develop a case study of PSDB in the Brazilian context. A review of the PSDB's experience under Cardoso shows that the party has not truly conformed to the essential nucleus of Third Way politics and that its inclusion in the transnationalized debate over the modernization of social democracy must take this fact into account. The experience of the PSDB's transformation sheds light on the viability of social democratic parties in emerging markets in a globalized world economy.

Cutting Through the Thicket: The Third Way as an Empirical Referent

The notion of Third Way politics has crept into the public consciousness by way of osmosis, mostly through the indiscriminate use of the term by the media. Few academics seem to lend it credence, perhaps for ideological reasons, perhaps because of innate distrust of politicians' motives and slogans. However, if one scratches the surface, one of the most striking things about examining the Third Way debate is the sharp contrast between the maddeningly superficial treatment the Third Way is given by the media and the thoughtful, sophisticated form it takes in the hands of its chief academic proponent, Anthony Giddens. Not surprisingly, Giddens consistently reminds us that the label "Third Way" is optional, and its frequent abuse may in fact cloud theoretical discussion: one can just as easily substitute "modernizing social democracy," a "renewed center-left," or any such term that the reader prefers. In order to foment a reasoned debate on Third Way politics, we must clearly embark from the more formalized treatment Giddens has given it and not rely on journalistic treat-

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ments, nor on the sloganeering of political practitioners. Henceforth I will treat Giddens's main works on the topic as embodying the essence of Third Way politics, and I refer the reader to his books.[3]

Giddens has answered his critics much better than I can, and moreover, he has answered them on a much wider range of topics than I propose to treat here.[4] However, from the perspective of a student of the developing world and of Latin America in particular, one tends to hear some of the following criticisms whenever the concept of the Third Way is broached.

- *The Third Way is merely a slogan* lacking any authentic content. This statement may or may not be true, depending on the specific party or movement in question; however, this is a matter for empirical investigation, and cannot be determined a priori by a dismissive shrug.
- *The Third Way represents warmed-over neoliberalism.* It is a rhetorical facade to justify the maintenance of predictable Thatcherite, Reaganite policies, etc. Interestingly, this criticism is sometimes made by some of the same actors who accuse Third Way politics of being empty sloganeering, although logically one cannot assert both things simultaneously. Again, this is an empirical question that can only be answered by comparative, systematic, case-driven research. In some cases, the criticism that self-styled Third Way politics is indistinguishable from neoliberalism may hold water; in others, it may not. We are far from having the data to make such sweeping assertions.
- *The Third Way is too elastic a concept* if it can receive endorsements from politicians as different as Tony Blair, Hugo Chávez, Bill Clinton, and José María Aznar. On the surface, this is a telling criticism. It is bewildering, if not outright ridiculous, to see such a heterogeneous group of politicians associate themselves with Third Way politics. However, one cannot simply take such endorsements at face value and drop the matter there; such an approach is tantamount to allowing the research subjects to dictate the investigator's framework. Rather, one must establish an ideal type or benchmark definition of Third Way politics and then determine, again by case-driven research, how closely certain individuals or parties approximate it. Granted, such an approach is not easy, yet political scientists attempt similar tasks all the time. For example, we have not jettisoned the concept of democracy just because individuals as different as Vaclav Havel and Alberto Fujimori both claim to be democrats.
- *The Third Way is vague.* There is a considerable kernel of truth to this criticism, for three reasons. The first is simply time: the current debate on Third Way politics is only a few years old, and definitions and concepts have not been widely and authoritatively diffused—although the publication of Giddens's important works may help to remedy this. The second

[3] Giddens, *The Third Way*; and Giddens, *The Third Way and its Critics*.

[4] For his own summary of criticisms, see Giddens, *The Third Way and its Critics*, 22–26.

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reason for perceived vagueness lies in the different emphases and styles of leaders associated with the Third Way, as well as in the fact that the specific, pressing needs of public policy—simply put, the proposed reforms—are not necessarily identical from country to country. The final reason that Third Way politics suffers from the perception of vagueness is that the Third Way is by nature experimental. By definition, the Third Way is a departure from scripted politics and a move into uncharted territory; the Third Way is essentially the dismantling of the standard operating procedures of traditional democratic socialism. By moving from predictability to flexibility in addressing the public policy agenda, the Third Way naturally invites criticisms of vagueness.

Those who criticize the Third Way as vague must answer the question: vague in relation to what? Many political movements, approaches, and "isms" are prone to elasticity, and the Third Way is no different. Liberalism, conservatism, socialism, corporatism, welfare statism, social democracy—all of these terms are bandied about in the academic literature, all have ideal-typical forms, and yet all encompass significant variations in actual practice. Think of the social democratic welfare states, and of the respective political parties that defended them in 1970s' Britain and Sweden. They are substantially different, yet no one would deny that we were talking about the same genus of social democracy. The same applies to the concept of neoliberalism, which has been applied to models as different as those of Margaret Thatcher's Britain, Carlos Salinas's Mexico, and Fernando Collor's Brazil. One wonders why so few intellectuals accuse neoliberalism of vagueness, conceptual stretching, or excessive heterogeneity, but frequently apply a higher standard to Third Way politics. The problem of "obscurity" can only be addressed by the creation of ideal types and the simultaneous recognition that real-world examples almost always differ from the ideal. It could well be that once the Third Way has been sufficiently poked and prodded, it too will become part of the academic lexicon and the theoretical toolbox, and will take up a place next to the "isms" mentioned above. Alternatively, the concept and/or its political incarnation[s] could wither and die. In the meantime, the best solution is to address the vagueness issue head on.

The only fair way to treat the Third Way is to examine it in its most serious, formalized, sophisticated incarnation, which is elaborated in the recent work of Anthony Giddens. Giddens's works are far too nuanced and wide-ranging to summarize here, but we can attempt to distill some of the basic elements of what does and does not qualify as Third Way politics in his understanding. Such a distillation is necessary if we are to arrive at some kind of benchmark or empirical referent for comparative analysis.

Essentially, Giddens argues that social democrats must understand that the world has changed substantially from the times in which the traditional left was forged. The classical instruments of social democratic practice—nationalization, a broad welfare state, and a general resort to statist solutions to all manner

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of problems—were exhausted by the late 1970s and were successfully attacked by neoliberals. The bipolar world is gone, leading to a "state with no enemies." The left's electorate has changed: social democrats can no longer rely on the industrial working class as a social base. Postmaterialist values, including an enhanced desire for individualism, self-realization, and sexual emancipation and equality, are forcing parties and governments to enter into new kinds of dialogues with their electorates. In postmodern society, authority of all kinds is suspect; states and bureaucracies are rejected, grassroots participation is prized, "small is beautiful." Changes in the nature and the definition of the family have outpaced traditional mechanisms of social policy. Immense technological innovation has begun to overwhelm the standard operating procedures of economic management. Globalization—especially in communications, financial markets, and trade—has dismantled the traditional economy that social democrats had trained themselves to manage. According to Giddens, unless social democrats update their theory and praxis to take account of these secular changes, they will become irrelevant, and the future will belong to neoliberals by default.

All of these challenges suggest that democratic socialism *defined as a set of predictable economic and social policies* is dead, and Giddens essentially agrees. However, as Tony Blair frequently intones, the essence of Third Way politics is that social democracy *defined as a set of enduring values* is very much alive. The basic idea is fairly simple: policy instruments can and must change, but the intrinsic values of socialism must remain the guiding principles of political action. Such values include egalitarianism, emancipation, citizenship, community, solidarity, transparency, and democracy. The left's emphasis on equality and solidarity is what will continue to distinguish it from all forms of conservatism, including neoliberalism. Third Way politics is a value-driven program of social democratic renewal: the policies may evolve, yet the values remain the same.

The Third Way rejects both the ossification of the traditional left and the social Darwinism of the neoliberal right. But it claims not to be an empty, vapid center equidistant from two warring poles. Because it is based on the enduring values of the political left, the Third Way is, to use Giddens's term, a radical center. The Third Way is an attempt to demonstrate that the enduring values of the left still have some "purchase" in contemporary, postindustrial society. Although this is an admittedly crude summary of his ideas, it describes in general terms how Giddens envisions the terrain of Third Way politics. In the interest of furthering comparative research, we can now use the above to derive a set of initial decision rules about which parties, leaders, and movements can be legitimately discussed in the context of the Third Way.

First, although this is self-evident to Giddens and he does not dwell on the subject, the Third Way is a form of democratic political practice. Therefore, we can begin by excluding putschists and authoritarians (for example, Hugo Chávez) from the universe of analysis. Second, the Third Way encompasses parties and movements that have a bona fide center-left history and legacy: it refers to an updating of social democratic currents. This would exclude, for example, the

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Spanish Partido Popular (PP); although its leader Aznar professes admiration for the Third Way, the PP has an entirely different historical trajectory with roots in Franquism. The inclusion of the Democratic party of the United States (which Giddens himself frequently engages in) is also questionable, because the social democrats therein share space with liberals and conservatives; but it can be justified on the grounds that the United States has a two-party system of catch-all parties, and the Democratic party certainly occupies the center-left ground in this context. Third, parties and movements of the Third Way must display significant policy innovation, departing from the policy prescriptions of the traditional left. Fourth, these changes in policy cannot be mere pragmatism or opportunism: they must be value-driven and display a historical continuity with the values of the political left. (Note that this fourth criterion raises the bar considerably for professional politicians; it embodies Giddens's view that the Third Way is not pragmatic but is an enterprise involving some authentic ideological debate.) Fifth, Third Way parties and movements should be identifiable by a prominent and well-articulated values-based discourse that emphasizes continuity with the historical struggles of the left for emancipation, equality, solidarity, and citizenship. This discourse is necessary to link policy innovation with the legacy of the traditional left. But discourse alone is not enough: if policies are not linked clearly, directly, and comprehensibly to established left values, then the accusation that the Third Way is repackaged neoliberalism may well be justified.

Defined in this way, Third Way politics is not restricted to the advanced industrial democracies. The task of updating policies to conform to traditional left values must be shared by left-of-center parties everywhere, especially since many of the new challenges to policy makers are unambiguously global in nature. Although social democratic parties in the developing world have very different origins, trajectories, and social bases from the prominent Western European parties, they too are grappling with the new challenges detailed by Giddens. In particular, they are struggling with how to proceed directly to a modernized form of social democracy without having passed through the long cycle of welfare statism and left governance that was experienced in Europe.

Of all the social democratic parties in the developing world, the one that has been most frequently connected with the Third Way debate has been the Party of Brazilian Social Democracy. The PSDB was first led to power by Fernando Henrique Cardoso in the presidential election of 1994, and Cardoso was reelected in 1998. The remainder of this article explores the case of the PSDB, first examining its origins and transformation, then judging it against the backdrop of the Third Way as defined above.

The History of the PSDB

The PSDB was born in 1988 as a dissident faction of the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), the opposition party to the Brazilian military

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regime of 1964–1985. It is impossible to understand the emergence of the PSDB without reference to the front-like nature of the PMDB. Although the dominant tendency of the PMDB could be described as center-left, anti-authoritarian, and moderately nationalistic, the party contained a wide range of forces ranging from Moscow-line communists (the Brazilian Communist party was illegal until 1985) to traditional conservatives. The force holding these various groups together was the logic of unified opposition to authoritarian rule. The PMDB's remarkable defeat of the pro-military Partido Democrático Social (PDS) in the indirect presidential election of 1985, marking the end of the authoritarian regime, lent an enormous amount of democratic prestige to the party.

Under the first democratic president, José Sarney (1985–1990), the party benefited spectacularly from the short-lived success of the anti-inflationary Cruzado Plan in 1986. In the elections that year, the party won an absolute majority of the seats in the all-important National Constituent Assembly (ANC) plus twenty-two of twenty-three state governorships. The party had swollen to unprecedented size, but much of the growth came from the influx of opportunistic conservatives seeking a free ride on the popularity of the Cruzado Plan (just in time, as it turned out, for the plan collapsed less than two weeks after the election). As the ANC began in early 1987, the PMDB appeared hegemonic, in a position almost to dictate the terms of the country's first democratic constitution in a generation; however, this was not the same party as the PMDB of only five years earlier.

Given this scenario, certain environmental variables and intraparty fault lines can be considered permissive conditions for the emergence of the PSDB in 1988. The end of the anti-authoritarian struggle, which had encouraged both ideological and regional factions to work together under the broad PMDB umbrella, signified that viable factions could now consider the option of becoming parties. The resumption of political competition exposed the increasing balkanization of the PMDB; and changes in the macropolitical environment—newfound pluralism and the adoption of permissive electoral laws—lowered the costs of defection from the party. Equally important was the increasing dissatisfaction of the progressive sectors of the party, which were alienated by the advent of a large conservative, clientelistic wing in the PMDB after 1986. One in five members elected in 1986 had previously been a member of the official party of the military-authoritarian regime. The Sarney government, which the PMDB found itself backing because of the tragic death of PMDB President-Elect Tancredo Neves, was too conservative for the tastes of the progressives. Another permissive condition for factionalization was the cautious, hands-off neutrality of the party president, Deputy Ulysses Guimarães, who instinctively understood that the party had become too large and unwieldy for him to micromanage. In his capacity as "triple president" (president of the Chamber of Deputies, of the ANC, and of the PMDB), Ulysses elected to remain above the fray. He declined to intervene in intraparty disputes, restricting himself to lofty calls for party unity, which he would need in order to achieve the prime ministership

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or the presidency after the ANC. In this context of a swollen, decentralized, catch-all "party of power," factionalism flourished.

If these were the permissive conditions for a division of the PMDB, what were the proximal causes? These can be reduced to three interrelated sets of factors: certain controversial votes in the Constituent Assembly; the naked practice of patronage politics by the Sarney government; and a regional dispute in the state of São Paulo, where the administration of PMDB Governor Orestes Quércia engaged in practices mirroring those of Sarney at the national level. Many progressives in the PMDB wanted direct presidential elections to be held in 1988, thus limiting President Sarney to a four-year term. This issue, combined with the left wing's desire to break with Sarney altogether, led to the creation in mid-1987 of the first major dissident faction within the PMDB, the *Movimento de Unidade Progressista* (MUP).[5] This faction, which had a left-nationalist profile, did not contain a sufficient number of PMDB heavyweights to be viable as a party, and for a time considered defecting to the miniscule Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB). One such heavyweight, Senator Mário Covas (São Paulo), prevailed on the MUP to remain in the party until the end of the ANC, arguing that the progressives could still make use of the PMDB's party structure to secure important victories.

In early 1988 an overlapping but higher-profile faction threatened a more dramatic exodus from the PMDB. This press called this faction the *históricos* or *autênticos*, although the label is confusing because it is also used more generally (even today) to refer to progressives with an unwavering historic commitment to the PMDB.[6] The "historic" faction of early 1988, known for its vigorous defense of parliamentarism, contained such São Paulo luminaries as Covas, his fellow Senator Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and former Governor André Franco Montoro; other notables included Senator José Richa (Paraná) and Deputies Euclides Scalco (Paraná) and Pimenta da Veiga (Minas Gerais). This faction was viable as a party, boasting a good number of the PMDB's most respected interlocutors and most reliable votegetters over the previous decade. This group's worsening relations with the Sarney government reached the breaking point in March 1988, when Sarney used blatant patronage politics to overturn a parliamentary option in the ANC to secure a full five-year term in office for himself. Although the defeat of parliamentarism was particularly grievous to them, the São Paulo *históricos* were also increasingly victims of an intraparty power play in their home state, where PMDB Governor Orestes Quêrcia put the state party squarely behind Sarney and progressively shut the *autênticos* out of power. The combination of these factors led the heavyweight *autênticos* to organize an exodus from the PMDB in June 1988, just as the Con-

[5] Jales Ramos Marques and David Verge Fleischer, *PSDB: De facção a partido* (Brasília: Instituto Teotônio Vilela, 1999), 60–65.

[6] For an oral history that includes extensive interviews with many of the *autênticos*, see Ana Beatriz Nader, *Autênticos do MDB, semeadores da democracia: história oral da vida política* (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1998.)

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stituent Assembly was winding down. They christened their new party the *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira* (PSDB). Their choice of a colorful avian mascot immediately gave them their nickname, the *tucanos*.

Although the MUP and the proto-PSDB overlapped in membership (especially with regard to backbenchers), there were some important differences between the factions. First, the MUP lacked notables, thus illustrating Giovanni Sartori's hypothesis that factions do not become parties unless they acquire the electoral resources to do so.[7] The founders of the PSDB knew full well that they possessed such resources. Many were planning all along to found a new party after the ANC was concluded and presidential elections were scheduled, but the behavior of the Sarney government in early 1988 convinced them to act earlier than planned. After the defeat of parliamentarism in March, it became increasingly uncomfortable to persist as a faction when it was quite obvious that the group was viable as a party. Second, to the extent that there were ideological differences between the MUP and the proto-PSDB, the MUP was closer to the left-nationalist wing of the old MDB. This tendency had its origins in the import-substituting economic nationalism of the 1950s, a line best expressed in the Vargas-era PTB (Brazilian Labor party), and which resurfaced in the heavily statist orientation of the MDB in the 1970s. This current survives today in such diverse figures as ex-President Itamar Franco, current Senator Pedro Simon (PMDB-Rio Grande do Sul), and publisher and ex-Deputy Fernando Gasparian. In contrast to many MUP backbenchers, who considered themselves socialists "without adjectives," the *tucanos* consciously styled themselves after the modern social democratic parties of Western Europe. Their commitments to parliamentarism and to a progressive welfare state were strong, but they were less monolithically statist than the MUP; and the majority of *tucanos* did not share in the MUP's 1970s-style economic nationalism. For these reasons, Fernando Henrique Cardoso argued that the PSDB was not simply a continuation of the historic/authentic wing of the PMDB, but rather represented an important break with that position as well. The PSDB was opting explicitly for European-style social democracy, with its adjectives and its pragmatism.[8]

The main contrast between the PSDB and the model European parties, however, was quite clear from the beginning—and the difference was less ideological than organizational and structural. The PSDB would be created from the top down via a parliamentary faction, rather than from the bottom up via a mass-based labor movement. With several parties competing for social democratic space in Brazil and with a good part of the labor movement already associated with the Marxist PT (Workers' party), the PSDB was never able to overcome these very basic structural differences from its European models.

If Cardoso is correct, then the so-called historic or authentic wing of the PMDB was never truly an ideological tendency: it simply designated an unwa-

[7] Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Marques and Fleischer, *PSDB*, 53–58.

[8] Marques and Fleischer, *PSDB*, 58.

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vering commitment to democratization. Within the authentic wing of the party, there were underlying cleavages with regard to statism, to economic nationalism, and to the nature of "democratic socialism" versus "socialism without adjectives." After the *tucanos* departed the PMDB, these cleavages became interparty rather than intraparty, and they dominated Brazilian politics for much of the 1990s.

The Ideological Transformation of the PSDB

In 1988, the creation of the PSDB was commonly described as the exodus of the left wing of the PMDB. The PSDB began its life advocating parliamentarism, the deepening of democracy, and redistributive politics. Seeking international legitimation, the party sought and won observer status within the Socialist International. The party's leaders maintained a consistent social democratic discourse, and the party's foundation arm, the Instituto Teotônio Vilela, began an aggressive campaign to raise awareness of European democratic socialism and its relevance to Brazil. The party's ideological identity was marked by its initial position to the left of the parent party, the PMDB, whose aggregate voting profile in Congress shifted markedly to the right after the subtraction of the *tucanos*.[9] Thus, in 1988 the original PSDB viewed itself as a party of the social democratic center-left.

Data from the early years of the PSDB demonstrate that the PSDB's self-image was not inaccurate. The ANC roll-call voting indexes developed by Kinzo showed that the PSDB voted much more often with the left than with the right.[10] Another analysis of ANC voting was provided by DIAP (Inter-Union Department of Legislative Assistance), a labor union lobby in Brasília that tracks legislative voting on issues of interest to workers.[11] On a scale from 0 to 10, where 10 is the position closest to that of the union lobbies, the leftist Workers' Party (PT) obtained a near-perfect 9.87, the conservative Party of the Liberal Front (PFL) 2.45, and the ANC mean was 4.94, close to the middle of the scale. The DIAP score obtained by the original PSDB was an extraordinarily high 8.16.[12] Yet another grading system was created by FIESP, the *Federação de Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo*, which ranked ANC members by their friendliness to the interests of the private sector. The FIESP scale runs from 3.33 (least favorable) to 9.99 (most favorable). From FIESP, the PT received the lowest possible score of 3.33, the PFL a very high 9.46, and the ANC mean was 7.29. The FIESP grade for the PSDB was 4.68, illustrating that the original

[9] Maria D'Alva Gil Kinzo, "O quadro partidário e a Constituinte," *Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política* 1 (no. 1 1989): 91–124.

[10] Ibid.

[11] DIAP (Departamento Intersindical de Assessoria Parlamentar), *Quem foi quem na Constituinte nas questões de interesse dos trabalhadores* (São Paulo: Cortez/Oborê, 1988).

[12] This score was calculated from DIAP, *Quem foi quem*, and from Bolívar Lamounier, *Partidos e utopias: o Brasil no limiar dos anos 90* (São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 1989), 56–84.

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PSDB had a significantly lower-than-average sympathy for the interests of the private sector, and once again placing the PSDB far closer to the Marxist parties than to the right.[13]

In the crucial 1989 presidential election, Brazil's first free presidential contest since 1960, the PSDB nominated Mário Covas. With several candidates splitting the left-of-center vote, Covas finished fourth in the first round with a respectable showing of 11 percent. In the second round, which quickly became a left-versus-right lineup pitting the PT's Lula against conservative populist Fernando Collor, the PSDB endorsed Lula. In so doing, it joined all five of Brazil's leftist parties plus the PMDB in the anti-Collor (and antineoliberal) front. In the following year's elections, the PSDB again opted generally to support left candidates. In the twenty-seven gubernatorial races that year, the PSDB allied with the socialist Democratic Labor Party (PDT) in thirteen states, with the Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B) in ten, with the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) in six, with the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) in four, and with the Workers' Party (PT) in three states. By way of contrast, in 1990 the PSDB made fewer alliances with the main conservative parties; it joined forces with the formerly pro-military Democratic Social Party (PDS) in three states and with the similar PFL (originally a splinter party from the PDS) in only four states.[14]

On several occasions in 1990–1992, President Fernando Collor—a neoliberal populist who badly wanted social democratic credentials—invited the PSDB to join his cabinet. His chief *tucano* interlocutor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, refused the offer on the PSDB's behalf, citing the strong presence in Collor's government of the notoriously clientelistic PFL. Cardoso told Collor: "The PFL is the very incarnation of backwardness. It symbolizes everything that is wrong with this country."[15] Although several *tucanos* independently served the Collor administration (notably Celso Lafer as foreign minister and Hélio Jaguaribe in the Science and Technology portfolio), the PSDB shunned Collor's overtures and never endorsed his government. Thus, from its creation in 1988 through at least 1992, the PSDB was committed to a traditional social democratic policy line and consistently maintained a center-left profile.

The PSDB finally entered government when Collor was impeached and his Vice President Itamar Franco, a founder of the MDB and a longtime member of its *autêntico* wing, assumed the presidency in October 1992. Lacking both the charisma and the ideological convictions of Collor, Itamar at first groped unsuccessfully for a political identity. His fortunes began to change somewhat in May 1993, when he appointed his fourth finance minister, Senator Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB-São Paulo), and effectively withdrew from most day-to-day decision making. Functioning as a de facto prime minister, Cardoso

[13] Cited in Lamounier, *Partidos e utopias*, 83.

[14] *Folha de São Paulo*, 15 October 1990.

[15] Quoted in Gilberto Dimenstein and Josias de Souza, *A história Real: trama de uma sucessão* (São Paulo: Editora Ática, 1994), 66.

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spent the next year laying the groundwork for the *Plano Real*, the historic currency reform implemented in July 1994. With its early success at reducing inflation, the *Plano Real* launched Cardoso as a natural candidate for president in the elections of October 1994.

Cardoso's 1994 candidacy marked a turning point in the history of the PSDB. As a comfortable São Paulo intellectual with little experience in Brazil's hinterland (especially the poor Northeast), Cardoso was painfully aware of his own political limitations. Like Sarney and Collor before him, he knew where he might look to obtain electoral support in the economically backward regions. Sarney and Collor, and to a lesser extent, Itamar, had all relied on veterans of the military regime for political support, particularly on the conservative and clientelistic PFL, the hegemonic machine party of the Northeast. However, unlike Sarney and Collor, Cardoso had strong reasons for resisting an entente with the former pro-military cohort. Like several leading *tucanos*, Cardoso had been exiled by the military in the 1960s and had returned to fight authoritarianism by joining the MDB of the 1970s. He became one of Brazil's most eloquent voices in favor of a transition to civilian rule. As a PMDB senator after 1983, Cardoso fought bitterly against the PDS in the *Diretas Já* (Direct Elections Now) campaign of 1984 and against the *Centrão*, the conservative coalition in the ANC. In the ANC, Cardoso pushed aggressively for the removal of what he called the "authoritarian debris," the institutional vestiges of dictatorship, many of which were defended by the PFL. He had impeccable democratic credentials, and the PFL clearly did not.

In terms of the PSDB's ideological identity and coherence, the risks of a northeastern strategy were palpable. An alliance with the PFL would mark the end of the PSDB's practice of cooperating only with left-of-center parties and would grossly corrode the social democratic image of the *tucanos*. Moreover, on a personal level, Cardoso was known to loathe *fisiologismo*, the clientelistic exchange of favors, and the conservative parties that practiced it. When asked in 1990 to define the Brazilian right, Cardoso cited two prime characteristics: *arbítrio*, which he defined as a "permanent desire to support the government," and *clientelismo*, which he described as "the practice of constantly dealing in favors."[16]

Although Cardoso had been on the opposite side of history from the PFL and disdained their political practices, he shocked the political world in 1994 by announcing an electoral alliance with the PFL. Awarded the vice-presidential slot on the ticket, the PFL nominated Senator Marco Maciel (Pernambuco), a well-placed ally of every president since Ernesto Geisel in 1974. The success of the *Plano Real* and Cardoso's enormous popularity facilitated the replication of the PSDB-PFL alliance in a large number of Brazil's twenty-seven state gubernatorial races. Within three weeks after the 1 July introduction of the plan, Cardoso passed the PT's Lula in the polls and never looked back. He won elec-

[16] Author interview, Brasília, 29 August 1990.

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tion outright on 3 October, his 54 percent of the popular vote obviating a runoff like the one in 1989.

The fact that Cardoso was elected on the success of the *Plano Real* led many to wonder whether the alliance with the conservative PFL had been necessary in the first place. However, Cardoso did not have the luxury of knowing whether the plan would work and made the deal before the new currency was introduced. But Cardoso maintained that the alliance would have been necessary anyway in order to facilitate executive-legislative relations and governability after his inauguration on 1 January 1995. In the end, the PFL obtained only three ministries (Energy and Mines, Social Security, and Environment) in the first Cardoso cabinet, about on par for what it was accustomed to under Franco and Collor, though fewer posts than it had enjoyed under Sarney. But the PFL presence was still very strong in the government, given Maciel as vice president and Senator Antônio Carlos Magalhães (Bahia) as the government's chief interlocutor in the Senate (of which he was president in 1997–2001). ACM's son, Luis Eduardo, was to become the most important architect of Cardoso's first-term legislative successes and was elected president of the Chamber of Deputies in 1995–1996. Widely touted as a potential successor to Cardoso, Luis Eduardo died of a heart attack at the age of 43 in April 1998, leaving a major void in the Cardoso coalition. Although the PSDB rank and file had greatly resented Cardoso's initial decision to ally with the PFL, the two parties generally cooperated peacefully in Congress during Cardoso's first term.

The PSDB-PFL plan of joint action in Congress was a far cry from the policy positions of the PSDB of the late 1980s. Immediately upon taking office, the Cardoso coalition embarked on an ambitious plan of neoliberal reforms. In order to pass his economic reforms, Cardoso had to amend heavily the constitution that had been promulgated only seven years earlier, and his efforts to do so provided much of the day-to-day action in Brazilian politics beginning in 1995. As in neighboring countries, the attempt to redefine the development model was vigorously contested by the political left, by public employees, and by various social forces—especially labor unions—committed to maintaining a protectionist, interventionist state. Although lacking an important labor wing of its own, the PSDB had nonetheless been closely identified with many of these social forces during the 1987–1988 constitutional convention and again in the elections of 1989. However, in its all-out bid to restructure the Brazilian state and market, the *tucano* economic team made a sharp break with these sectors in 1995. Cardoso frequently ridiculed the policy positions of the left as *atrasados* (backward) and referred to his own reformism as "modern."

Although in 1995 Cardoso's governing coalition expanded to include the PMDB as well as two smaller conservative parties—the Liberal Party (PL) and the Brazilian Progressive Party (PPB)—thus ostensibly controlling up to 75 percent of the seats in Congress, opposition forces colluded with the less reliable of Cardoso's nominal allies to slow the process of constitutional reforms. By late 1996, Cardoso had concluded that a single four-year term would be in-

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sufficient to complete his program, and he authorized his supporters to push for a constitutional amendment allowing presidential reelection. The amendment passed in 1997, paving the way for Cardoso to run again. He and Maciel replicated their 1994 ticket and were reelected with 52 percent of the vote in the first round in October 1998, once again besting the PT's Lula. The PSDB-PFL had not only successfully maintained a governing alliance for four years, but had also decided to stick together for four more.

That the PSDB has moved rightward over the past decade, gradually replacing a traditional social democratic line with a more market-oriented approach, is obvious to even the most casual observer of Brazilian politics. The most stunning evidence of this is the party's controversial electoral alliance with the PFL. Nonetheless, at the risk of statistical overkill, it is worth citing some empirical studies in order to document the PSDB's transformation at the levels of ideology and of legislative action.

Over the past decade, the PSDB's ideological profile—as measured by the self-classification of the party's federal legislators—has shifted markedly. I conducted surveys of the Brazilian National Congress in three consecutive legislatures in 1990, 1993, and 1997. In these surveys, respondents were asked to place themselves on a ten-point scale where 1 equals left and 10 equals right. In the survey of the 48th Legislature (1990, $N = 249$), the mean PSDB score was 3.52, while the mean score for Congress was 4.42, placing the PSDB well to the left of center. In the survey of the 49th legislature (1993, $N = 185$), the Congress score was almost identical at 4.49, while the PSDB mean climbed to 3.81, closer to the central tendency. In the 50th legislature (1997 survey, $N = 162$), the mean score for Congress was 4.60 while the mean for the PSDB was 4.77, slightly to the right of the congressional mean. In the space of only seven years, the legislative PSDB moved from a position in which it was a natural coalitional ally of the left to one in which it is a natural coalitional ally of the center-right.

Similar findings emerge when one turns to preferred economic models. In 1987, Leôncio Martins Rodrigues conducted a study of 435 federal deputies in which they were asked to choose among several macroeconomic options for Brazil.[17] Only 31 percent of the proto-PSDB members chose the most liberal option, "a predominantly market economy with the least possible participation by the state." The percentage of self-described liberals in the whole congressional sample was 40 percent. When I replicated this survey question in 1997, I found that 59.4 percent of *tucanos* viewed themselves as economic liberals—nearly double the proportion of ten years earlier. Although in ten years the support for pure economic liberalism among all Brazilian politicians rose from 40 to 55.7 percent, among the *tucanos* the shift toward a promarket orientation was much more spectacular.[18] Similarly, when in 1997 I asked the legislators to

[17] Leôncio Martins Rodrigues, *Quem É Quem na Constituinte: uma análise sócio-política dos partidos e deputados* (São Paulo: OESP-Maltese, 1987).

[18] Rodrigues, *Quem É Quem*; Timothy J. Power, "Brazilian Politicians and Neoliberalism: Mapping Support for the Cardoso Reforms, 1995–1997," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 40 (Winter 1998–1999): 51–72.

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rate "the *desestatização*[19] of the economy in recent years" on the traditional 1-to-10 Brazilian grading scale (representing a kind of "feeling thermometer"), the PSDB gave this process a higher grade than did any other party (7.33 compared to 6.76 for the conservative PFL and an average of only 3.5 for the left parties).[20]

Behavioral evidence tends to corroborate the above survey responses. In a study of ten roll-call votes on key issues of neoliberal reform in Cardoso's first term, I found that the PSDB was strongly supportive of the reform program.[21] On an index ranging from −100 to +100, where −100 equals total opposition, 0 represents a mixed record, and +100 equals blanket support, the PSDB's pro-reform score in 1995–1997 was +87.93. By way of contrast, the PFL's score was nearly identical at +87.53, and the PT-led bloc of leftist parties demonstrated near-total opposition with an aggregate score of −80.39. (The mean for Congress was 49.18). In its legislative backing of the reform package, the PSDB has proved even more reliable than parties such as the PFL, the PPB, and PL, all of which have long paid lip service to the need for state shrinking and market-oriented reform in Brazil.

Explaining the PSDB's Transformation

Why did the PSDB change both its discourse and behavior in the 1990s, moving away from a traditional social democratic line to endorse a sweeping program of neoliberal reform? The complete story of this transformation has yet to be written, and deeper understanding can only be gained with hindsight that we do not yet have. However, in this section I make a preliminary effort to identify some of the key variables that have apparently impacted the PSDB's trajectory.

Many political parties in the contemporary world are influenced by externally defined and relatively well-worn policy agendas: parties tend to identify themselves with options from a fairly limited menu of established "development models." How and why do political parties choose these models? In his influential study of the comparative political economy of development, Stephan Haggard asked the same question about peripheral states. Haggard concluded that states adopt development strategies based on a combination of four sets of variables: constraints emanating from the international system, shifting domestic coalitions, the configuration of domestic political institutions, and ideational factors.[22] Although it was created for a different purpose and although it is highly stylized (viewing states as unitary actors, for example), this theoretical model—if suitably adapted—surely has some relevance to political parties.

[19] In Brazilian parlance, *desestatização* (literally, de-statization) refers to the process of removing economic institutions and functions from state control.

[20] Power, "Brazilian Politicians and Neoliberalism," 60.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Stephan Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), chap. 2.

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Taking Haggard's variables one by one, we note first that, like states, parties are creatures of systems: they exist within domestic party systems, and if they achieve power they find their hands tied by the international system. Parties are often expressions of coalitions that can and do change, both in response to intraparty and extraparty impulses. Parties both possess their own internal institutions as well as respond to the institutions of the wider macropolitical environment. Finally, ideational factors are central to party life: parties both shape ideology and are shaped by it.

The relevance of several of these factors is illustrated by the very creation of the PSDB in 1988, a story I related above. Here, however, I wish to draw on some of these variables to explain the PSDB's transformation over the succeeding decade and its endorsement of a new policy agenda. Again, I stress that this is a preliminary attempt at explanation, and I restrict myself to identifying a few "plausible suspects."

Systemic factors. Environmental or systemic factors impacting the PSDB may be separated into international and domestic groups. At the international level, rapid changes in the global economy in the post-cold war period have led many Brazilian actors—not only the PSDB—to revise their strategies and policy agendas. The phenomenal growth in world trade has greatly increased competitive pressures on Brazil, encouraging policy makers to consider new macroeconomic strategies. At the domestic level, Brazil's protracted economic crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s—a period in which hyperinflation was punctuated by a number of failed stabilization plans, two of which led to a major recession in 1990–1992—accelerated the search for new approaches to economic management. Some of these approaches include trade liberalization, privatization, reductions in state employment, downgrading or elimination of social guarantees, and "flexibilization" of the labor market. The origins of these strategies were evident well before the PSDB's accession to power. In 1990, President Sarney committed Brazil to economic integration with Argentina in the form of the MERCOSUR customs union, and later President Collor initiated a sweeping program of privatizations.

This confluence of international and domestic economic factors was crucial in shaping the PSDB's transformation. A major economic crisis in Brazil coincided with international competitive pressures as well as a narrowing of the "acceptable" range of curative options in the form of the so-called Washington Consensus. The editorial page of the influential *Folha de São Paulo* may have exaggerated when it asserted that "*A globalização deixou a esquerda sem alternativas*" ("Globalization has left the left with no alternatives," editorial, 3 June 1997). Yet there is at least a grain of truth to this generalization. That Brazil would respond to its economic challenges in the way it approached similar crises in the past—via autarky, a reflation of the economy, or by accepting greater indebtedness—had become virtually unimaginable by the mid-1990s. As evinced by the survey data presented earlier, the appeal of economic liberal-

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ism as a "solution" had advanced impressively in the political class. By the late 1990s, the neoliberal consensus extended from the political right all the way to what had previously been understood as the center-left. Only the PT, PDT, and several small left parties actively opposed the Cardoso reform agenda. Cardoso, his economic team, the PSDB, and the allied parties (PFL, PPB, PL, PTB, and most of the PMDB) coalesced around a strategy that was essentially a continuation of the structural adjustment initiated by Collor in 1990. In this sense, systemic and environmental variables—especially the pressures of the global economy and the Brazilian macroeconomy—helped foment the transformation of the PSDB.

Coalitional factors. All parties—even the most homogeneous and disciplined ones—are to a certain extent coalitions of diverse forces. The original PSDB of 1988 was reasonably homogeneous because it was essentially a parliamentary caucus, born of the PMDB's delegation to the Brazilian National Congress. As such it was composed of experienced legislators, mostly from São Paulo and the more developed states of the Southeast, all of whom had worked together in the struggle against military rule, and who agreed on the need to bring social democracy and parliamentary rule to Brazil. Although the party initially contained some notable economists—notably José Serra and Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira of the São Paulo PMDB—the technocratic wing of the party was insignificant, given that the PSDB had not yet exercised executive power anywhere. The PSDB was known for its political articulators, not for its economic managers.

This equation changed radically when Itamar Franco appointed Fernando Henrique Cardoso to the Finance Ministry in 1993. Cardoso brought with him a number of talented economists (many with roots in the Cruzado-era PMDB) such as Pedro Malan, Edmar Bacha, and Gustavo Franco. He delegated considerable policy-making autonomy to this economic team, did not interfere in its work, and focused instead on what he could do best, which was to employ his considerable negotiation skills in a tireless campaign to build wide political support for stabilization. This division of labor between Cardoso and the economic team produced the *Plano Real* in 1994. The smashing success of the *Plano Real* propelled Cardoso into the presidency that year, but as candidate and as president he was clearly a prisoner of the plan's success—and by extension, of his chief economic advisers. The *Plano Real* thus dramatically improved the position of the "technocratic" sectors of the PSDB vis-à-vis the "political" wing of the party by making the latter's success overwhelmingly dependent on the former's. This redistribution of power accelerated throughout Cardoso's first term, which was characterized by the massive expenditure of political capital by the PSDB's "politicians" in pursuit of a wish list (mainly constitutional reforms) drawn up by the "technocrats" in Cardoso's inner circle.

Tucano heavyweights, who had long imagined that coming to power would mean the chance to make the case for parliamentarism and European-style so-

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cial democracy to the Brazilian public, now found themselves working essentially as marketing managers for faceless bureaucrats who propounded controversial and often unpopular macroeconomic reforms. The *tucanos*, like the French and Spanish socialists before them, found themselves unexpectedly acquiring a technocratic image as soon as they entered the government. The unusual circumstances of the PSDB's rise to power had greatly altered the coalitional balance within the party, empowering the unelected "vanguard" around the president, and this new correlation of forces facilitated a neoliberal line. Why did politicians defer to the economists? With the *Real* hanging in the balance, they reasoned that the cost of obeisance to the technocrats was lower than the cost of economic backsliding. It was better to be in a party with a technocratic image than to be in one that squandered the first functional stabilization plan in living memory. The prospect of backsliding was real, as the devaluation crisis of January 1999 made abundantly clear. Rather than weaken the hand of the technocrats, the devaluation arguably strengthened it, bolstering the case for a more aggressive approach to economic reform.

The strength of technocrats within the PSDB can also be explained by referring once again to the major difference between the PSDB and the model European parties—the PSDB's lack of a mass labor constituency. In the absence of strong linkages to the Brazilian labor movement, the PSDB lacks a major brake that is often applied to the strongest and most controversial technocratic impulses within the European parties. Whereas European social democratic parties had labor bases first and added technocratic expertise much later, the PSDB seems to be trying to accomplish the reverse. But this appears to be an untenable strategy, given that the neoliberal line of the party makes it very unlikely that the PSDB will make inroads into organized labor in the foreseeable future.

We should also recognize that like many contemporary parties, the PSDB is not only a coalition itself, but is also part of a coalition. Since mid-1994, its primary coalition partner has been the PFL, a conservative and clientelistic party dominated by veterans of the 1964–1985 military regime. One cannot use the initial alliance with the PFL to explain the PSDB's transformation, since to do so would be tautological: the PSDB-PFL alliance is prima facie evidence that the PSDB's transformation was already under way in 1994. Nonetheless, since the original 1994 alliance, there has been a reciprocal causal effect through which collaboration with the PFL has accelerated the PSDB's move toward the political center. One way it has done so is by forcing frequent parliamentary collaboration with influential conservatives, for example during 1995–1997 when the PSDB-PFL alliance in Congress was largely led by a *pefelista*, the late Luis Eduardo Magalhães. Another way the alliance has facilitated a rightward shift within the PSDB is by driving some progressives leftward and out of the party. For example, former Ceará Governor Ciro Gomes left for the PPS (Popular Socialist Party, successor to the historic Communist party), taking with him a number of *tucanos* from his home state. He promptly staked out

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the political ground formerly occupied by the PSDB—a social democratic space somewhere between the PT-dominated left and the liberal center. Ciro drew a respectable 11 percent of the vote in the presidential election of 1998, exactly the same percentage that the PSDB's Mário Covas had received in 1989 when he ran on a similar social democratic line.

Institutional factors. The PSDB's transformation can also be linked to certain features of the institutional environment in Brazil. Brazil's permissive electoral system—especially the oft-cited tendency toward party switching, in which parties migrate from party to party in search of improved electoral prospects or access to power—is a system that is conducive to rapid party transformations. In the 1986 elections, for example, the PMDB, riding high on the success of the Cruzado Plan, became a swollen party due to the influx of opportunistic conservatives seeking to benefit from the party's improving electoral fortunes. The PMDB acquired a large conservative wing for the first time, thus alienating the authentic wing of the party and encouraging the subsequent exit of the *tucanos* in 1988. A similar phenomenon occurred with the PSDB in the 1990s: the party's accession to power in 1994, coupled with the extraordinary popularity of the *Plano Real*, caused history to repeat itself. Like the PMDB in 1986, the post-1994 PSDB was the object of *adesismo* (opportunistic bandwaggoning by politicians), not only because it captured the presidency and doubled its parliamentary representation, but also because it captured six governorships, thus provoking similar partisan realignments at the subnational level. The PSDB won the statehouses of the three most populous states, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas Gerais. Many of these new *tucanos* were drawn from the North, Northeast, and Center West regions, where politics tends to be more clientelistic and conservative. Some had previously served the PFL and PDS parties and had supported the pre-1985 military regime. Echoing the pattern of the 1980s PMDB, the influx of these new recruits caused the aggregate ideological profile of the PSDB to shift markedly rightward, thus blurring the distinctions between the PSDB and the parties of the center-right. Again repeating the PMDB's experience, the process triggered a leftward out-migration of some progressive sectors in the party.

To a certain extent, these phenomena are likely to repeat themselves with virtually any governing party in Brazil. In the executive-centered political system that is Brazil, politicians want to find a way to support the government. It is true that the PSDB could have adopted internal institutions (like litmus tests for membership or internal party discipline), which could have mitigated the *adesismo desenfreado* (uncontrolled bandwagoning) and resulting partisan edema, but it is also true that such self-restraining measures are not rational in the Brazilian polity. In a context of open-list proportional representation (PR), parties want to maximize their vote-getting machines; in a context of extreme party fragmentation, they want to increase the size of their parliamentary caucus at all costs. The largest party in Brazil usually holds about 20 percent of the

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seats in Congress. In a competitive multiparty system, they know that other parties will do the same, so why unilaterally disarm? Parties in a coalition government like the PSDB sometimes feel even more pressure to adopt an open-admissions policy: in a situation of minority presidentialism, they need to maximize votes for the president's legislative agenda, and in a situation of a crowded multiparty cabinet, they need to maximize seats in order to obtain the best possible results when the ministries are doled out to the various parties in the coalition. Given these imposing cross-pressures, it makes little sense for governing parties in Brazil to restrict *adesismo* in the name of ideology or homogeneity. Like cells, Brazilian governing parties tend to grow and then divide. In their growth phases, both the PMDB and the PSDB moved rightward.

Another institutional feature worth mentioning here is presidentialism—not presidentialism per se, but the heavily insulated, monopolizing, and *decretista* (decree) form it takes in Brazil. The ability of the president to decree provisional measures with the force of law and to reissue them at will reinforces the tendency toward technocracy described earlier. In both the Collor and Cardoso governments, for example, institutional features of the presidency encouraged the chief executives to initiate neoliberal reform via imposition rather than via negotiation. Decree authority insulates the economic team considerably, and in the case of the PSDB this facilitated the adoption of a neoliberal line even when much of the party rank and file was not enthusiastic about such a transformation. Decree authority also changes the nature of the legislative game, given that PSDB leaders are often in the business of persuading legislators not to revoke policies that have already been put in force by decree, rather than persuading legislators to adopt policies that are under consideration as ordinary legislation. Once again, this institutional configuration tends to put *tucano* politicians at the mercy of *tucano* technocrats backed by the presidency; not only does this pattern reinforce the gulf between politicians and economists, but it also increases the distance between the parliamentary party and the dominant presidency. Conjunctural, coalitional, and institutional factors have caused the PSDB rank and file to fall in line behind the economic project of antistatist technocrats insulated by presidential power, thus fundamentally altering the party's image and identity since 1994.

Ideational factors. Political parties both shape ideology and are shaped by it. In the case of the PSDB, the party has been more attuned than most Brazilian parties to international debates and models, perhaps exaggeratedly so. The founders of the PSDB aligned themselves with the major democratic socialist parties of Western Europe, but particularly those of Spain and Portugal, two Latin countries that had recently undergone transitions to democracy. For some PSDB luminaries, the experience of exile and/or of receiving foreign support during the PMDB's democratic struggle in the 1970s had contributed to the establishment of strong personal linkages with leaders in the European parties, many of whom came to power in the early 1980s. Cardoso, for example,

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who had been teaching in France during the events of May 1968, knew many Parti Socialiste (PS) activists whose generation later came to power in 1981.[23] Many *tucanos* knew and respected Mário Soares, prime minister and later president of Portugal, who was generous with advice and support.[24] A similar role was played by Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González, rebuilder of the PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers' party) who, at age 40, led his party to power in 1982 and governed until 1996. More than any other Brazilian party, the PSDB was plugged into international networks, and its leaders were familiar in Socialist International circles.

These international linkages seem to have affected the PSDB in two major ways. First, they appear to have impressed on the *tucanos* that parliamentarism was superior to presidentialism; after all, parliamentary negotiation and prime ministerial office had been used in dynamic and creative ways in the successful Spanish and Portuguese transitions to democracy. More importantly, they exposed the *tucanos* to the reformist, somewhat postindustrial form of social democracy that was emerging in Western Europe in the 1980s, especially in France and Spain. The Marxist variant of social democracy, already greatly reduced in importance, was now in a terminal crisis. Both the French and Spanish parties moved toward a more pro-market and liberal orientation in their second governments, in France after 1983 (and particularly so under Prime Minister Michel Rocard) and in Spain beginning in the late 1980s. In both countries, the parties distanced themselves considerably from their sometime communist allies, expanded their electoral backing in the middle class, and won greater support from business. They did so with some clear costs, notably by stimulating some conflicts with their traditional electoral base in the trade unions and by acquiring a somewhat technocratic image. Nevertheless, the evolution of the Spanish and French Socialists demonstrated to the *tucanos* that reformist, pro-market social democracy was economically pragmatic and electorally viable. Thus, the PSDB began its life advocating a progressive capitalism à la Felipe González or François Mitterrand.

In the 1990s, these reformist trends in European social democracy were greatly accelerated by the advent of New Labour in the United Kingdom. Tony Blair assumed the leadership of the Labour party in 1994, the same year that the PSDB won the Brazilian presidential election. Together with his intellectual mentor, Anthony Giddens, Blair began advocating a Third Way between tradi-

[23] Cardoso's own personal ideological trajectory is discussed in two laudatory biographies: Brigitte Hersant Leoni, *Fernando Henrique Cardoso: o Brasil do possível* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1997); and Ted G. Goertzel, *Fernando Henrique Cardoso: Reinventing Democracy in Brazil* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999). For Cardoso's own account, see Roberto Pompeu de Toledo, *O presidente segundo o sociológo: entrevista de Fernando Henrique Cardoso a Roberto Pompeu de Toledo* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1998).

[24] For a wide-ranging dialogue between these two Lusophone presidents and close friends, see Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Mário Soares, *O mundo em português: um diálogo* (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1998).

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tional socialism and unfettered Thatcherite capitalism. The Third Way emerged precisely at a time of electoral renaissance for European social democracy: between 1996 and 1998, conservative governments fell in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. After Blair's accession to power in 1997, the Third Way approach was endorsed explicitly by other center-left governments in Europe, particularly the German SPD under Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and the Italian Olive Tree Coalition under former Prime Minister (now European Commission president) Romano Prodi.

Just as it did during the political transitions of the 1970s, European social democracy influenced the PSDB during the economic transitions of the 1990s. As a distinguished sociologist with ample experience in politics and public policy, Fernando Henrique Cardoso had independently reached many of the same conclusions about socialism as Giddens and Blair. As the Third Way gained visibility and political influence in the late 1990s, Cardoso became identified with the movement. He was the only leader from the Third World invited to a 1999 conference in Italy on Progressive Governance, in which Cardoso debated Third Way policy innovation with the likes of Tony Blair, Lionel Jospin, Gerhard Schroeder, and even Bill Clinton.

Not only do such international linkages greatly reinforce the ideological changes under way within the PSDB, they also provide a sort of shield of legitimacy to some of Cardoso's policy experimentation. This shield works both internally, legitimizing the reformist elements within the PSDB vis-à-vis the more traditional sectors, and externally, granting the party an international prestige that few other Brazilian parties have achieved. Even many domestic opponents of Cardoso's economic policies praise him for his ability to improve Brazil's image abroad. However, some in the rank-and-file of the PSDB recognize that the new Janus-faced image of the party—an increasingly technocratic image inside Brazil coupled with greater visibility abroad—is problematic, given that foreigners do not vote in Brazilian elections. Nonetheless, it is beyond doubt that from even before its formal creation in 1988 until the present day, the PSDB has been inordinately influenced by ideational factors emanating from abroad.

Considerations on the Case Study of the PSDB

The previous sections presented an exploratory effort to explain the PSDB's remarkable ideological transformation since its creation in 1988. I began by documenting the existence of this transformation, using evidence that I find both revealing and valid. I then proceeded to make a first stab at identifying some of the factors that seem to have impacted the party in its short life: systemic variables, coalitional change, institutional factors, and ideational and ideological innovation.

Before proceeding, it is worth noting here some of the approaches that I did not employ and that represent promising avenues for further research. One

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of these, for which we do not possess adequate data at present, is an examination of the PSDB's social and electoral bases. Born in the late twentieth century, the PSDB never had the traditional social democratic constituency based on trade unions. In Brazil, these sectors generally "belong" to the PT, and the PSDB has made few inroads among organized labor. Rather, the party initially appealed to the urban, cosmopolitan, educated middle class that endorsed aggressive social reformism but not radicalism. Given that the profile of the party has changed in the 1990s, it is high time to undertake an analysis of the party's social base to examine whether it has undergone the catch-all transformation typical of governing parties. Another avenue I did not pursue, again for lack of data, is that of studying party activists and militants. Impressionistic evidence suggests that many rank-and-file *tucanos* remain highly dissatisfied with the alliance with the PFL and are dismayed by the party's rightward turn. A survey of 503 out of the 708 delegates who attended the PSDB's National Convention in May 1999 found that only 11 percent wanted to preserve the alliance with the PFL for the 2002 presidential elections. Some 82 percent believed that the party should launch its own candidate.[25] If the alliance is recreated for the third consecutive election, it is likely that there will be some significant rebellions within the rank and file of the party.

Only by expanding and diversifying our methodological approaches will we be able to gain a more complete view of the PSDB's transformation. I have identified a number of plausible factors here, but am not yet in a position to ascribe relative weights to them. Nevertheless, preliminary analysis suggests that international factors—both economic, emanating from the global economy, and ideological, emanating from the demonstration effect of the European social democratic parties—are among the most important in explaining the PSDB's relatively rapid evolution.

Conclusions: The Third Way, Case Studies, and Theory

This article began with an effort to sharpen the debate over the Third Way, with special reference to the Latin American context. One of the main problems in this debate has been a tendency to overgeneralization and dismissiveness regarding so-called Third Way politics. Theory is underdeveloped because of a lack of case studies and because of a lack of decision rules as to which parties and movements can properly be discussed in the context of the Third Way. The PSDB was presented as a case study because under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso it is the Latin American party mostly closely associated with the transnationalized Third Way debate. At this point it is worth revisiting our working definition of Third Way politics presented at the beginning of this article and seeing how closely the PSDB corresponds to it.

[25] Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos Políticos, *O PSDB e o futuro segundo a Convenção Nacional do partido: relatório de pesquisa* (Brasília: May 1999, mimeo).

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In terms of the criteria specified earlier, there is no doubt that the PSDB is a democratic movement: it was born of the struggle against authoritarian rule. There is also no doubt that it has a strong center-left history and legacy and that it was conceived as part of the international family of social democratic parties. It is also clear that the PSDB has engaged in a substantial amount of policy innovation that separates its agenda from the that of the traditional left; this becomes evident when one compares the PSDB to the parties to its left, particularly the PT. However, the PSDB has only a weak correspondence to two of our other criteria for Third Way politics: that the party's policy innovations not be vulnerable to the charge of mere opportunism or electoral pragmatism, and that these innovations always be accompanied by a clear values-based discourse that connects specific policies to specific values of left origin. Partly because of the constraints posed by the alliance with the PFL, partly because of its own technocratic drift, partly because of its swollen size and less homogeneous character, and perhaps also simply because of omission and lack of vision, the PSDB has failed miserably at framing its reform agenda against the backdrop of progressive values.[26] When policies are adopted that have a distinct neoliberal hue, and these are not justified in terms of values deriving from the historical legacy of left politics, the party is open to the charge that its metamorphosis is simple opportunism. The inclusion of Fernando Henrique Cardoso as a key interlocutor in the Third Way debate is based more on his personal reputation than on his party's actual praxis in Brazil, where the PSDB lacks a well articulated progressive discourse and strategy.

The incomplete fit of the PSDB with the Third Way profile raises some interesting questions about the portability of Third Way politics to the context of Latin America. First, Latin America is a region of multiparty presidential regimes, where partisan alliances are quite common. Politics often requires progressive parties to ally themselves with conservative, clientelistic parties that can deliver votes: the alternative is to remain shut out of power forever. However, interparty alliances require the dilution of ideology. This is no news for European social democratic parties, who have been struggling with alliance policies for more than a century; their early alliances with Liberals (Lib-Lab coalitions) occasioned some important sacrifices. Nothing new or original can be said here about the pros and cons of alliances; they must be judged on a case-by-case basis. But it should be pointed out that alliances in Latin America may prove more unwieldy. Because of the historical swings between democracy and authoritarianism in the region, and because of the spectacularly uneven patterns of development within countries, many of the potential alliance parties for social democrats have political histories and practices that are much less attractive than those of the Liberal, Christian Democratic, and Green parties

[26] Timothy J. Power, "Quais são os valores da social-democracia hoje? Alguma reflexões comparadas sobre a crise de identidade do PSDB," *Política Comparada: Revista Brasiliense de Políticas Comparadas* 2 (January–June 1998): 79–92.

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of Europe. The conservative and formerly pro-military PFL is a case in point: it restricts the PSDB's possibilities for proclaiming a strong social democratic identity. Current Third Way theorizing does not deal well with the problem of alliances.

Second, institutional factors heavily condition the manner in which parties can maintain the ideological coherence that is necessary for a Third Way renewal. In Brazil, more than perhaps any other country in the democratic world, partisan change is often driven by personnel change, due to the unusual electoral arrangements. Party switching and the perceived need to tolerate it dilute the PSDB's identity. Another institutional arrangement that inhibits value-based reform is the powerful presidency, which reinforces historic trends toward technocratic rule. The adaptation of the Third Way to Latin American contexts will be heavily conditioned by the macroinstitutional environment, in particular the weakness of political parties and the more fluid, unpredictable nature of electoral politics.

Finally, although even a restricted definition of the Third Way can still include several Latin American parties and movements, it must be noted that the public policy challenges are quite different from those in Europe. The notion of "crisis" is simply not the same in Europe as in Latin America. The crisis of the welfare state in Europe was and is a slow-motion one, in which national catastrophes are a remote possibility and in which there is ample lead time to reform and revise. In contrast, the Latin American economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s were (and are) life-and-death dramas, in which the policy of total macroeconomic and social collapse was (and is) a real possibility. The political environment is pervaded by *imediatismo político*, or the perceived need for problems to be solved yesterday. Failure to solve them will bring electoral defeat and the appearance of yet another self-anointed savior, as in Guillermo O'Donnell's model of "delegative democracy."[27] In this context we are much more likely to see drastic policy swings, shock treatments, and complete overnight revision of parties and identities without a corresponding revision of ideological devices. As developing countries face globalization, technocratic urges overwhelm values-based politics. It takes time for theory to catch up to praxis, as Giddens himself has pointed out.[28] In the case of the PSDB in Brazil, we may be witnessing this lag.

In this sense, Latin American social democratic parties like the PSDB can be included in the transnationalized debate on the Third Way, but their inclusion must be sensitive to historical factors and national contexts. In the meantime, much can be gained, by both theorists and practitioners, from Giddens's exhortation to reinsert left values into the current debates on Third Way policy reforms, and to do so without delay.*

[27] Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 5 (January 1994): 55–69.

[28] Giddens, *The Third Way*, 2.

* I would like to thank Ted Goertzel, Frances Hagopian, João Paulo Peixoto, David Samuels, William C. Smith, and Bruce Wilson for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. I bear responsibility for any errors or omissions that remain. All translations from the Portuguese are mine.

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Book Reviews

America's Strategic Blunders: Intelligence Analysis and National Security Policy, 1936–1991 *by Willard C. Matthias. University Park, Penn State University Press, 2001. 367 pp. $35.00.*

This book suffers from two related tensions. One is between the topic given in its title and its subtitle, *Intelligence Analysis and National Security Policy, 1936–1991.* The first implies a focus on policy and decision making, the second on how the intelligence community saw the world. Although the two are related, they are not identical and are difficult to cover in one volume. The second tension is between a work of history and a personal memoir. Matthias, having been a life-long intelligence officer who wrote many important estimates, has not been able to make up his mind what kind of book he wanted to write, and as a result his account is often superficial. It's too arcane for the general reader; it says little to the specialist.

As a history, it is marred by insufficient research and uneven coverage. Its basic argument is that throughout the cold war intelligence reports and policy makers were divided into two camps. One saw the Soviet Union as nasty but essentially defensive and prudent, well aware of American strength and its own internal weaknesses, and often acting most aggressively in response to American moves. The other camp saw the USSR as highly ideological, aware that the West did not threaten it and willing to run high risks in order to expand. Matthias is in the first camp and sees Soviet-American conflict largely as a spiral growing out of fears and misperceptions. Although he draws on some documents from Soviet archives, his account will not be new to scholars; nor will it convince those not already in his camp.

The book comes alive when he draws on his personal experiences to explain splits within the intelligence community, to describe the intelligence processes, and to provide telling details. Matthias is an acute observer of how intelligence was put together and sheds light on a number of key estimates, not only on the USSR but also on Vietnam and other countries. It is nice to know, for example, that when the CIA's head of operations visited its top analytical group in the spring of 1960 and got no support for his view that internal opposition to Castro was widespread, he never probed further or repeated his visit. Unfortunately, Matthias apparently was not involved in many of the key controversies, such as the bomber and missile gaps, the underestimates of the Soviet build-up of the late 1960s, and the infamous

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Team B report of 1979. Only the latter is covered, entirely from standard sources. Interestingly enough, Team B's hard-line analysis, which Matthias excoriates, argued that intelligence had gone wrong because it had concentrated on hardware and lost sight of the softer factors of ideology and intentions. Matthias criticizes earlier hawkish estimates for a similar focus on capabilities and a neglect of context and politics.

Matthias usefully excerpts or summarizes many intelligence estimates, especially those that he wrote. His discussion of the pre-Korean War years is particularly interesting, because he can compensate for his lack of first-hand involvement by his knowledge of the changing processes and organizational arrangements, which remain obscure in most histories of the period.

Although he rarely discusses the links between intelligence explicitly, the story he tells is largely one of lack of influence (pp. 51, 56, 73, 79, 92, 138, 195). Even in discussing "the estimate that changed the world," which he wrote in 1964, he can find no instances in which an estimate had a noticeable effect on policy. As his discussion of the increased politicization of intelligence in the 1970s and 1980s makes clear, intelligence seems to have mirrored American policy more than guided it. Perhaps intelligence's most important contribution is one Matthias does not note: it gave policy makers a justified confidence that they would not suddenly face an unexpected Soviet military weapon or military posture, let alone a surprise attack. This was not a minor contribution.

ROBERT JERVIS
Columbia University

Beyond the Security Dilemma: Ending America's Cold War *by Jason G. Ralph. Burlington, VT, Ashgate, 2001. 213 pp. $69.96.*

Security studies has long been dominated by realists who contend the international milieu is one of anarchy and uncertainty, causing states to prioritize protection from military threats through power maximization. This state of affairs creates the security dilemma, a never-ending cycle where states build up their militaries to counter perceived threats, leading other states to respond in like fashion. Jason G. Ralph challenges these assumptions in this post-modern polemic, arguing that the very concept of security is one manufactured by the military and other special interests who "cynically manufacture uncertainty . . . in order to encourage support for their preferred solution" (p. 3).

For Ralph, true security focuses on the individual rather than the state, since any gains in the military security of one state necessarily create a disadvantage for competing states. We must instead think past borders and see "the other as an extension of the self" (p. 108). This can be achieved through a series of confidence-building measures to "reduce suspicion and tension between two

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benign states that [are] victims of misperception" (p. 29). He uses the case of U.S. foreign policy during the cold war to illustrate his thesis.

Ralph argues that the primary impetus for the end of the cold war came from forces in Soviet civil society rather than pressures put on by the United States. A new thinking, supported by transnational coalitions and the global leftist intellectual community, led to "Gorbachev's emphasis on common humanity and cooperative action to solve common problems" (p. 73). While this movement advocated democracy and free markets, it was nonetheless initially resisted in the United States by "powerful intellectual communities who have a vested interest in international conflict" and who "peddle their 'theories' in order to further their narrowly defined interests" (p. 79). The United States only cooperated once the Soviets "decentralized and those institutions that threatened U.S. interests were on the political sideline" (p. 93).

A principal feature of the transnational liberal community was NATO, which, although performing a realist collective defense role, was primarily a Wilsonian democratic community governed by a U.S.–led Gramscian hegemony. "When political units see each other as extensions of themselves," as was generally the case within NATO, "it is irrational for them to prepare for war against each other" (p. 115). For Ralph, however, a true security community requires doing more than simple cooperation among elites that removes the military causes of mutual vulnerability. Common security must respond to the needs of all individuals within the community. Democracy and expansion of global capitalism, while perhaps acceptable to a large majority, disenfranchise many individuals. The main barrier to an extended security community for the post-cold war is American hegemony and, specifically, its dominance by a capitalist elite. Instead, we must encourage "an ideal dialogic community" (p. 152) that emphasizes equitable wealth distribution and gives environmentalists, labor, and the poor an equal voice.

The book is a useful explication of the postmodern argument. Its principal drawback is that it oversimplifies the views of the neorealists, who Ralph chides for believing in a "constant zero-sum competition for security" (p. 1), believing military issues to be "the only factors . . . mediating . . . a state's behaviour" (p. 25), and of "rul[ing] out the possibility of cooperation because of the fear of being duped by another state's defection" (p. 36). Such characterizations reflect either an inadequate understanding of the basic international relations literature or a deliberate straw man; either would be troubling in a scholarly book. Further, Ralph blurs the distinction between objective changes in reality—such as the demonstrable diminution of Soviet hostile will and capability—and mere perception.

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Troy State University

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Another American Century? The United States and the World After 2000 *by Nicholas Guyatt. New York, St. Martin's Press, 2001. 258 pp. Paper, $17.50.*

In 1941, *Life* magazine publisher Henry Luce issued what was to become a famous plea: the United States should act so as to fulfill the possibility of an "American Century." It could do so, Luce argued, only if it wholeheartedly abandoned isolation and used its tremendous potential power to spread its values across the globe. Soon thereafter, Vice President Henry Wallace made an impassioned rebuttal, cautioning against an imposed American world order and arguing that global development should reflect economic and social justice. From Nicholas Guyatt's perspective in *Another American Century*, the six decades since Luce's article have witnessed the triumph of his vision—in Guyatt's view, an imposed, corporate-driven world order. In a sustained populist critique of American foreign policy during the late twentieth century, Guyatt argues that the world has been the loser.

The heart of the book consists of three issue-specific substantive chapters—one each on U.S. foreign economic policy, U.S. policy toward the United Nations, American military policy—and a fourth essay on the opinion leaders and academic experts who explain and critique these policies at the margins, but mostly, according to Guyatt, simply justify their core purposes and the instruments used to achieve them. Guyatt contends that American foreign economic policy has reflected an unyielding neoliberal consensus on market-driven solutions to national and world economic problems, reinforced by corporate self-interest and corporate power within the U.S. political system. As a result, governments that evaluate globalization or some of its effects more critically are marginalized by world financial markets or U.S.–controlled multilateral economic institutions. U.S. officials have similarly viewed the United Nations through a prism of narrow self-interest, ignoring or disparaging any efforts by UN officials to forge a more autonomous role and acting unilaterally, whatever their putative obligations to do otherwise, whenever it suits their purposes. In the chapter on military power and strategy, Guyatt asks why there was no substantial peace dividend for the United States following the cold war. He finds the answer, not surprisingly, in elite politics at home: neither U.S. military organizations nor the defense contractors that depend on them could accept a radical downsizing of the U.S. defense establishment. The result has been an effort to identify new threats that would continue to justify a large, technologically state-of-the-art military establishment, even as the American public remains reluctant to use force in a way that might produce significant casualties. In his fourth substantive chapter, Guyatt argues that opinion leaders both inside and outside academia typically interpret U.S. foreign policy uncritically, either blatantly accepting official values and rationales for major programs and actions or failing to offer significant counter-arguments.

Guyatt concludes that "the U.S. has created and fostered a world in which inequality and injustice are either encouraged or harboured, and in which ef-

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forts to address systemic inequities and looming crises are deterred by American economic or military power" (p. 243). He laments not just these outcomes, but the absence of any serious, sustained critique of contemporary U.S. foreign policy within the United States itself. Victory in the cold war and a tight economic orthodoxy in favor of market-oriented solutions to economic and social problems have produced a virtually unassailable consensus in favor of globalization on the American model. Only the street protests against globalization witnessed at recent World Trade Organization and International Monetary Fund meetings seem to offer him hope of a broad-based populist resistance against official American priorities.

As with similar critiques of U.S. foreign policy in the past, this book can serve a useful gadfly purpose even for those who disagree with its conclusions. Mainstream post-cold war elite debate on foreign policy *has* been constrained. NATO expansion was accomplished with very little public discussion of its long-term costs and risks; decades of American arrears in payments of UN dues have been accepted as essentially normal, or as a legitimate tool to coerce reforms in the organization; foreign governments and other constituencies with serious reservations about U.S. environmental, financial, and military policies are preached to or ignored by official Washington, but rarely consulted or treated as anything other than obstacles. Yet Guyatt paints with too broad a brush. Much of the rest of the world wants to join U.S. alliances and begs for U.S. military intervention to right local wrongs; most have also accepted the ground rules embodied in the major multilateral economic organizations Washington dominates. In a sense, the United States is playing a role of global hegemon because, as collective action theory suggests, no other actor or coalition is able or reliably willing to do so. That such a hegemon would seek to promote its own values—which in America's case are overwhelmingly individualistic rather than collectivist in nature—is no surprise. If readers want an intellectual foil for contemporary U.S. policy, they will find it here. They will have to look elsewhere for a measured critique that might contribute toward the kind of sustained debate the United States could use.

JOSEPH LEPGOLD*
Georgetown University

* Professor Lepgold died tragically in a fire, November 2001.

When America Fights: The Uses of U.S. Military Forces *by Donald M. Snow. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 2000. 221 pp. Paper, $24.95.*

This book has not been completely overtaken by events. Because it attempts to make sense of the foreign policy dilemmas facing U.S. officials between the

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late 1980s and 11 September 2001, it offers some insights into exactly how things might have gone so horribly wrong.

When America Fights is based on an idea originally articulated by Donald Snow in the early 1990s—the interest-threat mismatch. According to Snow, low-level, nagging threats such as ethnic violence, terrorism, or just instability and unrest permeated parts of the world after the cold war. These threats, however, had little effect on U.S. national interests. People who suggested that the United States become involved in places like Rwanda, for instance, were really thinking with their hearts and not their heads. At issue was not whether the United States should work to stop bands of machete-wielding primitives from succeeding in their genocidal plans, but the fact that intervention meant an open-ended American commitment to social engineering that realistically had little prospect of success. Intervention was an option available to Americans, but it was not without costs and significant risks.

Snow's concept of interest-threat mismatch fits well into a broader construct often expressed with the catchy phrase "The West versus the Rest." In the West, democracy, market economies, globalization and the information revolution were making war obsolete, while the Rest continued along the well-worn path of ignorance, religious and ethnic violence, poverty, disease, and war. I often turned the effort to define the "West"—a strip of civilization running from Seoul in the East through New York to (hopefully) Moscow—into a sort of parlor game in front of undergraduates and audiences on cruise ships. It was all very entertaining, because the general message was so positive. We were getting richer, and sooner or later globalization would help the savages too.

Several weaknesses existed within "The West versus the Rest" construct. One problem is that it ignored the issue of contagion. This actually is the issue that led Snow to put pen to paper, although he only deals with the problem in terms of its policy and operational implications. Snow's purpose in writing *When America Fights* is to offer a framework to classify threats to U.S. security and to develop ways to respond to problems (for example, Kosovo) without getting bogged down forever in ethnic conflicts in faraway lands. Contagion is the idea that we in the West end up acting badly if for no other reason than self-defense against the Rest. One might forgive visitors from another planet, for example, if they could not distinguish the good guys from the bad guys as NATO dropped Danube River bridges and Serbs slit the throats of their Muslim neighbors. Americans rarely acknowledged that containment of a savage and aggressive dictatorship in Iraq meant that the United States has been continuously at war for a decade, although this fact again paved the way for some interesting banter with undergraduates. The suppression of Iraq has been easy for Americans to ignore, because it really did not cost much money and virtually no Western blood.

Another problem, which Snow recognizes, is that "The West versus the Rest" idea encourages a creeping isolationism not only in America, but also throughout the rest of Globalization Land. Many people from the industrial-

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ized nations came to the conclusion that if these primitives were at each other's throats, maybe it would be best to step aside and "give war a chance." Eventually, they would tire of violence, although this could take a long time. Remember those televised images of hundreds of Palestinians cheering on a lone gunman taking potshots at Israeli soldiers? When people take to the streets not to celebrate the death of the latest martyr but to demand peace, that might be the time to intervene to provide some financial or technical support. Until that happened, we could depend on our computer-equipped, precision-guided, professional (albeit at times oddly jittery) military to keep the primitives at bay. After all, we have the Maxim gun and they don't.

Who would have thought that the savages would have the audacity to leave the reservation and to bring their box cutters with them? The idea of an interest-threat mismatch has just taken on a whole new meaning.

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The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests and World Order *edited by Victor A. Utgoff. Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 2000. 319 pp. $22.95.*

This is a timely and significant compilation of theoretically informed and empirically grounded essays that collectively address important policy questions. As with all edited books, some chapters are stronger than others, but in *The Coming Crisis* the best are very good indeed. Five of the chapters deserve special mention. Scott Sagan's "Rethinking the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation: Three Models in Search of a Bomb" provides a cogent and well-structured account of alternative theoretical frameworks that explain why states do or do not decide to develop nuclear weapons: the national security, domestic politics, and norms models. In a style that is reminiscent of Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision*, Sagan provides a very useful introduction and well-deployed empirical examples to illustrate the operation of the three different models. Richard K. Betts, in his balanced and carefully argued "Universal Deterrence or Conceptual Collapse? Liberal Pessimism and Utopian Realism," works through competing utopian realist and pessimistic liberal understandings of the consequences of nuclear proliferation. Rather than promoting the virtues of a particular paradigm, Betts provides a thoughtful and nuanced account of how dissimilar theoretical understandings can illuminate a problem.

Stephen Peter Rosen, Barry R. Posen, and Stephen M. Walt provide three different views on how nuclear proliferation is likely to influence alliance relations, and in particular how the United States is likely to respond if a nuclear-armed state impinges upon an important American national security interest.

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Using counterfactual analysis, Rosen and Posen separately ask what difference it would have made to U.S. foreign policy if Iraq had possessed nuclear weapons before invading Kuwait. Rosen argues that the high potential risks in his invented scenario would have provided a considerable disincentive to U.S. intervention and that we might anticipate similar reticence if events akin to his imagined plot were to occur. By contrast, arguing from the same counterfactual story, Posen argues that America would have very strong incentives to provide a forceful response if a nuclear-armed aggressor were to attack a U.S. ally. Stephen Walt's chapter asks whether the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by so-called rogue states will encourage or impede the formation of countervailing coalitions. Employing his well-regarded balance of threat theory, Walt concludes that such alliances are likely to form and to be effective. Students will appreciate Walt's clearly laid out summary of his theory, and aficionados will welcome the extension of the theory to a new empirical domain.

While still good value, the remaining chapters are not quite of the same caliber as those mentioned above. Victor A. Utgoff's introduction and conclusion are very capable, but given the dense and complex arguments presented in the book's intervening chapters, he has some difficulty arriving at a workable synthesis. George H. Quester and Brad Roberts address questions relating to how wars in which weapons of mass destruction were used should end and what should follow. Roberts asks how the introduction of weapons of mass destruction will affect war termination in regional wars. Quester compares and contrasts law enforcement and deterrence models as two ways in which the United States can respond to the renegade use of weapons of mass destruction. Although they offer useful discussions, these chapters are not the seminal treatments to match the stronger contributions in this volume. Caroline F. Ziemke's essay on "The National Myth and Strategic Personality of Iran: A Counterproliferation Perspective" suggests that collectively held ideas can explain Iranian foreign policy. As a case study of a single state, this essay stands out from the other broader and more theoretical chapters in the book.

The Coming Crisis is likely to appeal to a wide and appreciative audience. The book's chapters are sufficiently comprehensible to be assignable to senior undergaduate classes and important enough to be on graduate students' comprehensive exam reading lists, as well as on the bookshelves of well-read international relations theorists, security studies specialists, and policy analysts who work on proliferation issues.

COLIN ELMAN
Arizona State University

New Nukes: India, Pakistan, and Global Nuclear Disarmament *by Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik. Northampton, MA, Olive Branch Press, 2000. 312 pp. $18.95.*

New Nukes is written by two prominent disarmament campaigners who oppose the overt nuclearization of India and Pakistan. They exhort the South Asian

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nations to disarm and call the decisions in 1998 to test nuclear weapons monumental blunders. The book also brings forth the dangers of nuclear weapons globally. It takes a swipe at deterrence theories as well as realism, the international relations approach most associated with military security.

The authors squarely place the causal variable for the 1998 nuclear tests on the arrival to power of the Bharatiya Janata party (BJP) or Sangh-Parivar, as they call it. According to them, the Hindu-nationalist party-led government made a major shift in India's nuclear policy, even when there was no dramatic change in the security environment. This argument is at best simplistic. Although the immediate decision can be attributed to the BJP-led government's arrival, it did not make the decision to assemble the bomb, nor did it keep the test site in Rajastan ready. The authors acknowledge that in 1995, Congress Prime Minister Narasimha Rao was planning to conduct the tests but had to cancel them under U.S. pressure. But neither Rao's nor his successor governments under different parties abandoned the nuclear device or the test site. This means that the fundamental long-term source of the decision to test was systemic: India's increasing concerns about the nuclear powers' attempt to marginalize it as a minor power and perpetuate their monopoly rights as evident in the extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in perpetuity and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's entry into force clause.

Another major problem with the book is the almost clean bill it gives China. Like most Indian leftist scholars, the authors think China is an innocent bystander in South Asia. They also do not examine China's aspirations to become a superpower, China's continuous support to Pakistan (without which Islamabad would not have developed nuclear weapons), China's unwillingness to compromise on borders, and China's belligerence in 1962 and during subsequent India–Pakistan confrontations. Studies on militarized interstate behavior show that China has been one of the most frequent users of military force in the postwar era. One wonders why disarmament advocates such as the authors think it is perfectly legitimate for China to aspire to great power status and behave according to the dictates of realism and why the same logic does not apply to India. After all, India, arguably shares several attributes for major power status; lagging behind China by a decade in economic and social reforms is not a strong reason to relegate one-sixth of humanity to a marginal global role. The authors also ignore the intense humiliation that the 1962 war bestowed on India and the effect this had on India's nuclear choices. Most importantly, China's continuous support for the containment of India through the instrumentality of Pakistan is neglected in the study.

A final criticism pertains to the negligence of the positive results of the tests. One can argue that the major powers, especially the United States, are taking India seriously today partially because of the nuclear tests and the fairly responsible manner in which the Indian leadership conducted the conflict in Kargil. The authors are right in their assertion for more confidence building measures between the two nuclear states.

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Overall, this book is fairly rich in its empirical details and pointed criticisms, and it widens the scope of the debate over nuclear weapons. However, the writing often gives the impression that the authors are picking evidence selectively to suit their preference for nuclear disarmament.

T. V. PAUL
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With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power *by Kenneth R. Mayer. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001. 298 pp. $39.95.*

If one looks at the scientific progression of congressional and presidential studies, it is evident that the two began to pursue separate evolutionary paths in the 1960s. Congressional studies simply ascended to heights that incorporated some of the finest formal and empirical analysis political science offered. Our understanding of legislatures generally, and Congress in particular, improved as a result. On the other hand, presidential studies lay moribund, consisting of analyses of personality, vignettes, and plain old descriptive analysis. There were exceptions, but the general trend of presidential studies had become inferior to studies of Congress.

In recent years that trend has reversed itself and the gap between the two has narrowed. The volume under review should help to narrow this gap further. In his book on presidential executive orders, Kenneth Mayer combines in seven chapters a mix of descriptive, historical, legal, and empirical analysis that improves our understanding of presidential power.

From an analytical perspective, the first three chapters of the book are the most important. Most of this review is devoted to these chapters, which examine the importance (Chapter 1), legal basis (Chapter 2), and patterns of use (Chapter 3) of executive orders. The topic of Chapter 1 on the importance of executive orders should seem obvious. Article II is no match for Article I, which is what the Founders intended. However, presidents do have the authority to issue "directives that require or authorize some action within the executive branch" (p. 4).

Mayer argues that these actions appear in three primary forms. This first type of executive order—self-executing—relies on a president's formal authority, so it is of less interest in terms of an expansion of presidential power. Self-executing executive orders include Dwight Eisenhower's 1957 enforcement of Supreme Court desegregation orders in Little Rock, Arkansas.

The second and third types of executive orders are extensions beyond Article II. One form alters institutional structures and processes, while the other form uses executive orders as a symbolic bargaining tool. An example of the former is Ronald Reagan's executive order calling for all major regulations to

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first meet a cost-benefit analysis. An example of the latter is Bill Clinton's executive order barring government contractors from hiring replacement workers. This was a form of symbolism to assuage unions, given his support of the North American Free Trade Agreement, which unions opposed.

Regardless of the form an executive order takes, orders are also important because they afford a president a firm basis "to control policy, establish and maintain institutions, [and] shape agendas . . ." (p. 28). The reason is that executive orders are rarely overturned by Congress. Since 1973, Mayer documents that only one out of 1,400 executive orders was overturned by Congress. This may be surprising, but as Mayer and others point out, the president has some advantages over Congress. A president's institutional position (a single actor), his ability to act first, and the ambiguity of congressional delegations of authority make an executive order a sturdy instrument of presidential authority.

The legal basis for executive orders is examined in Chapter 2. In a thorough review of the relevant case history (the first executive order was in June 1789), Mayer describes how executive orders have been subject to judicial review since 1804 (*Little v. Barreme*, 2 Cranch 170). It was not until 1891, however, that the Supreme Court held (*Jenkins v. Collard*, 145 U.S. 557) that executive orders are equivalent to laws when they are based on legitimate constitutional or statutory grounds. As Mayer notes, this is not a blank check, since "longstanding judicial doctrine holds that when the executive order conflicts with a statute enacted pursuant to Congress's constitutional authority, the statute takes precedence" (pp. 35–36).

Chapter 2 also includes case studies of various executive orders under implied or delegated powers. Along with these case studies and court decisions is an interesting discussion of the precise legal definition of an executive order and how it differs from a proclamation, administrative directives, and other presidential policy instruments. This attempt for clarity is very useful. In the end, Mayer argues that executive orders differ from the others since they "combine the highest levels of substance, discretion, and direct presidential involvement" (p. 35).

In Chapter 3, Mayer addresses the pattern of usage and what causes the frequency of executive orders. He shows that the best available data set (published in the *Federal Register*) for executive orders goes back only to March 1936. In the period from 1936 to 1999, Mayer uses a set of 1,028 executive orders, randomly drawn.

One difficulty with the analysis is that the importance of an executive order is sometimes unclear. Many results are not quantifiable but have great importance. But an analysis that looks at the causes of executive orders also needs to look at the effects of the orders. To address this concern, Mayer adopts a fairly rigorous and comprehensive criteria for significant executive orders. This results in a sample of 149 out of the set of 1,028. One can quibble with Mayer's standards, but to do nothing would undermine the analysis completely.

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Mayer's empirical analysis considers possible influences on the monthly totals of executive orders for the period from April 1936 to December 1999. Among the independent variables are presidential party; beginning and end-of-term effects; congressional and public support; and campaign effects. Mayer finds that Democratic presidents issue more orders than Republican presidents. In addition, presidents issue more executive orders at the end of their terms, or when they are running for reelection, or when they are down in public opinion polls.

Chapters 4 to 6 contain extensive discussions about how executive orders have been used to enhance the power and effectiveness of the executive branch (Chapter 4), conduct foreign affairs (Chapter 5), and assist or hinder the cause of civil rights (Chapter 6). In these chapters, the reader will find a combination of case law, case study, and some interesting vignettes. Of particular interest is Mayer's discussion of the role executive orders played in the struggle for civil rights. He describes that on many occasions political considerations kept this potent presidential weapon silent in the face of an overwhelming national wrong.

Kenneth Mayer accomplishes a great deal in his book. The one criticism I would level is that the empirical section and tests should have been more extensively discussed and more attention paid to the threats to valid statistical inference. But, that aside, this book—particularly given the variety of approaches it brings to his research question—is suitable for nearly anyone (student, academic, nonacademic) interested in the question and evolution of presidential power.

JIM GRANATO
National Science Foundation

Bad News: Where the Press Goes Wrong in the Making of the President
by Robert Shogan. Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, 2001. 308 pp. $26.00.

There is no end of opinion, published and privately vocalized, on how the press does its job of covering government. Most of it reflects partisan views of the outsider for whom the press presumably works. Here is the view of an insider on how the press has covered one important governmental area—the election of the U.S. president. Robert Shogan's credentials are well established. As a national correspondent he has been covering presidential races since 1968 for *Newsweek* and later the *Los Angeles Times*. He is careful to conceal his personal political preferences, but by the end of the book a reader may well conclude he is part of that group of moderate liberals in which Shogan finds most of his comrades at the keyboard.

Yet personal bias is not a significant flaw that Shogan finds in most of the record he reviews. When the press goes wrong, he argues, more often than not it is a consequence of its desire to be the first to report something at least superficially new and important. The scoop mentality prevails over a more rational and balanced presentation of all the real issues and positions of the candidates.

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The author speaks, of course, from close personal knowledge. After a brief overview of the often cantankerous and venomous nature of press-presidential relations from George Washington into modern times, Shogan takes up each White House contest since Humphrey-Nixon through Gore-Bush. He was a member of the pack for all those races, and he cites instances where the media went off base. In the process he discusses and dissects the way that presidential races are now conducted, with consultants and image makers controlling—or trying to control—the perception of their candidate. And perception has become almost everything at the expense of presentations of issues and the candidate's approaches to them. Reporters on the campaign trail know this, but few make any serious effort to explore and detail the views and differences between the candidates that voters should be considering before they cast their ballots. Instead, the press concentrates on the horse race of the campaign—who is leading, by how much, and what gaffe or misstatement by a candidate cost him votes.

All this, of course, is a consequence of a media revolution that has made television the principal source of news for perhaps a majority of Americans. And TV at the network level has little time for detailed presentation of issues. It, too, is more interested in the horse race and enamored of poll numbers. For both print and television, the latest poll numbers are the basic news of the campaign.

The other major news in recent campaigns, of course, has been personal scandal. Shogan reviews in detail the impact of the sexual shenanigans of Gary Hart and Bill Clinton and George W. Bush's drinking problem. The justification for the intensive coverage was the character issue—whether the candidate was suitably upright enough to be president—but the public's interest was its endless appetite for scandal.

Shogan's presentation of the shortcomings of the media in the presidential races neglects one principal shortcoming that has existed from day one of the First Amendment. That amendment has guaranteed the freedom of the press. It has not guaranteed that the press—or the newer electronic media—will make money exercising their freedom. And the press is a business before it is a high-minded profession, so it must offer what the public will buy, or it will go out of business—as many good newspapers have.

Perhaps the final conclusion to be drawn from Shogan's book could be a paraphrase from Shakespeare: The fault, dear reader, lies not in the press but in ourselves that we don't care enough to demand better.

JOHN J. SMEE
Fordham University

Implementing the Constitution *by Richard H. Fallon, Jr.. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. 186 pp. $35.00.*

Concerns over the legitimacy of judicial review, which include the power of American courts to declare laws unconstitutional, once dominated scholarship

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on the subject. By contrast, contemporary scholars have largely focused on the appropriate standards of constitutional interpretation that courts should utilize when exercising such review. Should justices primarily seek to adhere to the plain words of the text, the intentions of those who wrote and ratified the Constitution, or to precedents? Or should they tailor decisions to constitutional structures, enhance democratic processes, advance human rights, strive for economic efficiency, or promote some form of utilitarian calculus?

In a well-written and carefully crafted book, Harvard Law's Richard H. Fallon, Jr. offers some keen insights that explain why no unidimensional interpretative method is likely to prove perfect. Fallon formulates a framework that accommodates what he believes justices should do with what he believes they have been doing and with what, as lawyers used to exercising practical judgment, they are best equipped to do.

Fallon steers between the model of original intent advocated by Robert Bork and the theory of justices as Herculean philosophers seeking absolute justice advocated by Ronald Dworkin. Bork's approach requires justices to act as historians who ascertain and translate original intent into contemporary policies. Most originalists limit the application of their own principles and agree on the necessity of maintaining at least some precedents such as those outlawing segregation or providing for one-person, one-vote, which they cannot justify by reference to original intent. To the extent that originalists cannot describe what the Supreme Court has done, or even what it should do in regard to such past precedents, Fallon finds their theories inadequate.

If it is unreasonable to expect justices to be historians, Fallon also believes it is impractical and presumptuous to expect them to be philosophers, especially of the omniscient variety that Dworkin advocates. Such a role ignores the distinctly practical responsibility that justices exercise as members of a collective body that is only one of three branches of government.

Fallon emphasizes the attention that justices often devote to the yeoman task of devising and applying practical legal tests and argues that the primary role of the justices is not broad constitutional interpretation but constitutional implementation. Fallon further distinguishes between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" adjudication. Justices exercising the former are warranted by historical practice and unwritten constitutional conventions to aim for second best, being mindful of the costs of judicial decisions to various governmental interests, problems of judicial manageability and enforcement, and problems of democratic acceptability. Even in cases of extraordinary adjudication, Fallon believes that justices can legitimately craft their decisions with problems of implementation in mind.

Fallon believes his theory can at once justify *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) and the reapportionment cases. He admits to being unsure what "the least bad answer" (p. 66) would have been in *Roe v. Wade* (1973). He questions the Court's decision in *Boerne v. Flores* (1997), striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, as being inadequately deferential to congressional

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implementation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Perhaps as important, Fallon dignifies less heralded cases of ordinary adjudication where justices adhere to tests that temper their individual views of ultimate justice by building upon previous agreements.

Since Fallon limits his discussion to Supreme Court justices, it is not always clear how his framework would apply to other judges. Fallon succeeds in sensibly describing and justifying a variety of high court decisions, thus bridging the gap that often exists between judicial theory and practice.

JOHN R. VILE
Middle Tennessee State University

Despite Nationalist Conflicts: Theory and Practice of Maintaining World Peace *by Kristen P. Williams. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2001. 224 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $22.50.*

Europe's Nightmare: The Struggle for Kosovo *by Miron Rezun. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2001. 240 pp. $35.95.*

The first volume under review is an ambitious and theoretically informed effort to advance the important debate over the relationship between territory and ethnicity. Kristen P. Williams wades into that murky academic region where ethnicity, nationalism, sovereignty, and territory converge. She examines the conditions and practices necessary to maintain the peace and stability of the international system in the face of the revisionist territorial demands of nationalist groups or states.

Williams divides territorial revisionists into two camps: imperialist and consolidationist. The former refers to a state or group that places no symbolic value upon, has no historical claims to, and/or has no links to the current population composition of the desired territory. The latter are groups that have legitimate historical claims to the territory, connections with the national identity of the population, and a history of recurrent conflict over that territory. In dealing with these threats to the peace, Williams proposes a "firm-but-flexible" strategy of mediation that seeks to promote "power-sharing (confederation), protection of minority rights, autonomy and federalism, as well as coercive responses that prevent the outright conquest of territory" (pp. 19–20).

An immediate problem with the author's prescription is that discerning the legitimacy of territorial claims is a difficult undertaking, especially in a multilateral context. Certain claims to self-determination will be given more political and moral weight than others, regardless of the objective validity of the revisionist claims. Since no state or group that seeks territorial revisions or redesignations would openly admit to imperialist intentions, determining whose claims are arbitrary and aggressive, and whose are historically and ethnically

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legitimate would be nearly impossible. Williams presents a valuable metric with which to differentiate between the two revisionist camps, but not the mechanisms by which the international community would decide who falls into each category.

In what is the strongest section of the book, the author uses four illustrative case studies to examine how past claims of territorial revision have been dealt with in an international setting. The case studies, three of which will be familiar to students of international relations—Bosnia, Kosovo, and Kashmir—were a joy to read by themselves. The fourth study is of the nineteenth-century unification of Germany. Instead of compelling history to fit within the parameters of her theory, Williams highlights the important decision-forcing events for each case and discusses aspects of both successful and unsuccessful international responses. What these cases tell us is that the international community maintains stability best when it responds reasonably to reasonable revisionist claims, but it acts indecisively when it is forced to interpret the intent of more strident territorial revisionists.

A great deal of international relations theory centers on signaling and interpreting intent between states. With future claims for self-determination a certainty, the author has provided a plausible, if debatable, framework with which to judge the demands and intentions of revisionist actors. Scholars and policy makers would do well to read and study the suggestions outlined in Williams's work.

The second book under review illustrates the usefulness of this sort of theoretical frame. Since the end of the war over Kosovo, interpretive histories of the conflict have begun to accumulate. Written on the quick, many of these works are as critical of NATO's antiseptic bombing campaign and self-righteous mandate as they are of Serbia's effort to ethnically cleanse Kosovo. They eagerly seek to revise the triumphal narrative and public relations gloss with which NATO has framed its involvement in Kosovo. *Europe's Nightmare* is another such effort, and in this regard, it comes off well.

Relying exclusively on an impressive range of secondary sources, Rezun presents a straightforward retelling of the fight for Kosovo. The author begins with an extensive and well-researched background section describing the prelude to the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo war. The sections covering the war and its aftermath are told through a balanced perspective that is critical of all sides in the conflict. The Kosovo Liberation Army is accurately depicted as a terrorist, separatist organization that sought independence from Serbia at the cost of moderate Kosovar Albanians. Conversely, Serbian politicians are faulted for playing on the Serb population's "very fine sense of victimization, pervasive to a fault" (p. 86) in order to mobilize support for the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. The West receives the harshest condemnation for its indecisiveness, its preoccupation with avoiding casualties, as well as the one-sidedness of its fight with Belgrade.

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Despite his criticisms of NATO and its member states, Rezun repeatedly refuses to condemn outright the alliance's second intervention in the Balkans. His point is that "the whole context of intervention, retaliation, and punishment should be looked at more closely" (p. 109). Furthermore, if NATO is willing to reenergize itself (as Rezun claims) by intervening outside of its borders, its member states also have a responsibility to extend the protection that they provided to the Kosovar Albanians to all vulnerable ethnic populations.

More complete works already exist on this subject: see Tim Judah's *Kosovo: War and Revenge* and Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon's *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo.* This work is primarily a critical analysis interspersed with inspired satire about the current international order. While much of his criticism and satire are on target, one wishes that Rezun would have probed deeper at some of the issues raised throughout the book. The author raises rhetorical questions (often three or more in a row) and then quickly moves on to another subject. Rezun would have done well by his readers if he had further explored the prickly topics he raises. Nevertheless, this book is worthwhile to anyone familiar with Western involvement in the Balkans and in need of another perspective.

MICAH ZENKO
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Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power *by A. I. Johnston and R. S. Ross. New York, Routledge, 1999. 309 pp. Paper, $29.99.*

The first reason to recommend this book is a series of excellent chapters on various Asian countries' policies toward China. Victor D. Cha on South Korea, Michael Leifer on Indonesia, Yuen Foong Khong on Singapore, Amitav Acharya on Malaysia, and perhaps especially Michael Jonathan Green on Japan each give an up-to-date, nuanced, analytic account of that country's recent and current policies toward China. Information like this is hard to find and welcome whether one is teaching Chinese foreign policy or simply trying to understand China's environment.

Each of these neighboring countries has established extensive diplomatic and commercial ties with China, and the question set by the editors is whether such policies help moderate Chinese behavior. A common analytical dilemma for the authors is that it is hard to sort out the influence of relatively small individual neighboring nations on the foreign policy of a country as large and as multifariously involved as China. Regardless, the Asia chapters are invaluable in giving us a country-by-country picture of China's relations with some of its most important and most interesting regional interlocutors.

Other chapters are also skillfully done but deal with topics that are not so rarely covered. In this category are Steven M. Goldstein on Taiwan's China

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policy, Robert S. Ross on American China policy, Margaret Pearson on multilateral economic institutions, and Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans on multilateral security institutions.

The latter breaks new ground in its effort to measure China's level of participation in the international security regime and the impact of that participation on China's behavior. The authors ask whether China's increasing compliance with the international arms control regime and involvement in regional security forums is merely tactical or whether it represents a real change in China's conception of its national interests. This question is central not only to the engagement versus containment debate at the policy level, but to the higher realms of international relations theory, where the issues are whether geopolitical interests are given or constructed and whether nations learn new norms or only new tricks. The chapter gives a partial answer, arguing that participation in the security regime has produced new communities of experts within the Chinese bureaucracy, altered China's reputational rewards and costs, and introduced new ideas to policy makers.

The separate enterprises of the various chapters are united by a central issue that Randall L. Schweller lays down in his introductory history and theory chapter and that the editors discuss in their conclusion: Does engagement work in moderating the behavior of rising, dissatisfied powers? The existence of a common question helps unify the book, but does the question fit the subject? First, there is no showing that China is a dissatisfied power, in the sense that it aims to challenge the international distribution of territory and power. If it isn't, then the engagement policies of the rest of the world are not altering China's behavior but simply meeting halfway China's desire for participation. Most of the chapter authors conclude that China did whatever it did for its own reasons. Second, according to several of the chapter authors, their countries' policies were not engagement, in the sense of policies designed to change China's behavior, but self-interested openings based on a realistic calculation of interests.

The engagement framework best fits the chapters that focus on American and U.S.–led multilateral institutions' China policies. With Ross in the forefront, these chapters make a good case that engagement with China has paid dividends for American interests.

ANDREW J. NATHAN
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America's Asian Alliances *edited by Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2000. 143 pp. Paper, $17.95.*

Scholars have written a great deal about how security in Europe and in Asia has evolved along two distinct and very different paths since 1945. The United States sat at the center of both security structures. In the European theater,

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U.S. participation was equal in form (in NATO) but dominant in practice, and in the Asian theater the United States occupied the central hub from which radiated a network of bilateral alliances. They have pointed to a variety of factors to explain the disparate paths security has taken in the two theaters, including geography, relative levels of economic development, decolonization, cultural diversity, diversity of threats, and initial choices made by the United States. However, relatively less attention has been paid to the post-cold war evolution of alliances in the two regions, particularly the Asian theater. What distinguishes the latter is the extent to which security continues to be shaped and informed by the cold war. There is no denying that there have been some changes, but by any measure the end of the Soviet threat has led to transformations in American alliances in Europe that have not been visible in Asia. Continuing threats from North Korea and uncertainties regarding China's intentions have effectively postponed wider analyses of alliance resiliency in the twenty-first century. What happens to these alliances when immediate threats no longer drive their cohesion? How resilient will they be? What future forms will they take? And if these alliances do not survive, will they break up amiably or poorly?

The set of essays contained in *America's Asian Alliances* takes an important first step in answering these questions. The authors frame the volume's rationale around two key questions: "Can it be true that a U.S. alliance system in Asia that was created to deal with the Soviet threat is still optimal when the Soviet Union no longer exists?" (p. 116). Are the alliances (U.S.–Japan, U.S.–Korea, U.S.–Australia) adequately prepared to deal with recent events like the financial crisis, Taiwan Strait crisis, North Korean missile and nuclear threat, South Asian conflict, and potential Indonesian disintegration all of which "underline the basic insecurity of the region" (p. 13)?

The binational (American and Australian) team of experts answers these questions from the perspectives of the three alliances. The rhetorical prescription is to strengthen, revitalize, and boost cooperation in each alliance. But if one takes each chapter's recommendations in aggregate, they offer some sound substantive recommendations. For example, John Baker and Douglas H. Paal's chapter stresses two themes for the U.S.–Australia alliance that resonate for all American alliances in Asia. First, the United States must guard against indifference with regard to an ally's more proximate security concerns (Indonesia in Australia's case). Second, maintaining interoperability becomes a key task of alliance resiliency as the United States presses forward with the RMA (revolution in military affairs).

In a sound and pragmatic assessment of the U.S.–Korea alliance, Ralph P. Cossa and Alan Oxley raise the importance of consolidating the network of American alliances in Asia. In the Korean context, the specific recommendation is for Seoul to be more outwardly supportive of the U.S.–Japan alliance as the former's security depends greatly on the latter. However, the larger mes-

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sage is that the United States and its allies need to build a superstructure on top of the traditional "hub and spokes" network of alliances.

Stuart Harris and Richard N. Cooper's chapter on the U.S.–Japan alliance also makes specific recommendations for this alliance that would be well-taken for all three relationships. They point out the need to take a holistic rather than compartmentalized view of Washington-Tokyo relations. The authors agree on the importance of India as a new potential partner for the United States and share healthy skepticism about the prospects for multilateral security institutions in the region. Disagreement is clear on the role of China. While some (Blackwill chapter) see a revitalization of these alliances as implicitly directed against China, others express concern about American unilateralism vis-à-vis China that might leave allies behind.

Perhaps the most troubling part of the study is the initial context in which it is framed. The basic rationale of the project, as noted in the opening chapter, is the view that Asia is inherently headed in the direction of instability and conflict in the post-cold war era. Therefore, U.S. alliances must be revitalized to deal with these new threats. Two problems arise. First, empirically, Asia has now survived a decade beyond the end of the cold war without a major hot war, despite all the predictions to the contrary. Second, even if one accepts the instability thesis for Asia, the volume lacks adequate discussion of the underlying logic for alliance resiliency in Asia. To simply say that there are strategic challenges in the region and that this is reason for resiliency is really not enough. What is the "new idea" behind alliances in the post-cold war era? Does America's alliance resiliency in Asia remain based on their standing against threats? Or can alliances perpetuate because they stand for something like values and ideals, rather than simply against something?

Hints of such a discussion are implicit in the Australia chapter, where the authors talk about the common ideational bond present in the U.S.–Australia relationship. It is also apparent in the Japan chapter where Harris and Cooper emphasize the broader context of the alliance as a multifaceted institution rather than as a one-dimensional security pact. The counter-arguments are implicit in Philip Zelikow's interesting chapter on the history of U.S. interaction in Asia and Europe, showing how the U.S. interaction was material and imperialist and lacked the larger ideational context of the U.S.–European interaction. Yet the reader wishes someone had addressed this issue head-on. Is there a rationale for America's successful and prosperous alliances in Asia beyond containment?

VICTOR D. CHA
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Lockerbie: The Story and the Lessons *by Rodney Wallis. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2001. 176 pp. $40.00.*

Rodney Wallis's account of the destruction and investigation of Pan Am Flight 103, the *Maid of the Seas*, makes a damning case against Pan Am and, in so

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doing, provides sobering insight into the state of airline security. Wallis highlights both general and specific information that Pan Am ignored. He notes the discovery on 29 December 1983 of a bomb on an Alitalia flight from Istanbul to Rome and intended for a Pan Am flight to the United States. On 23 June 1985, an interline bag with a bomb detonated on Air India, killing all 320 people on board. Following these incidents, the International Civil Aviation Organization established new requirements for all passenger and baggage reconciliation, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) required positive passenger/checked baggage match in which unaccompanied bags were either physically inspected or not carried from designated extraordinary-risk airports—a list that included Frankfurt and London.

The threat from terrorism increased prior to the Lockerbie tragedy. In 1986, the FAA warned U.S. air carriers of possible reprisals as a result of the Sixth Fleet attacks on Libya. Two years later the *USS Vincennes* shot down Iran Air Flight 655; five terrorists who had attacked Pan Am 73 at Karachi in September 1986 were sentenced to death; Abu Jihad, a highly placed official in the Palestinian Liberation Organization, was murdered in his home; and Ali Hammedei, responsible for hijacking of TWA 847 out of Athens in 1985, went on trial. German authorities announced that U.S. carriers bore the same level of threat as the Israeli airline, El Al.

On 26 October 1988, the German government picked up sixteen members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command. In the raid the authorities found counterfeit passports, ammunition, weapons, explosives, and, most significantly, a modified Toshiba radio cassette player with an electrical detonator and 300 grams of Semtex explosive. On 5 December, the U.S. embassy in Helsinki received a phone call that within two weeks an unsuspecting Finnish woman would carry a bomb on board a Pan Am flight from Frankfurt to the United States. In both cases, the FAA notified all U.S. carriers.

Despite these indicators, Pan Am deliberately discarded passenger and bag matching requirements. On 21 December 1988, Semtex placed in a Toshiba cassette radio player detonated; it had been introduced onto a Pan Am flight via unaccompanied interline baggage from Frankfurt.

Wallis briefly considers some of the reasons why the airline ignored the growing threat: lack of resources and Pan Am's precarious financial position figure, as do considerations in regard to customer service and the delays inevitably experienced by tightened security measures. Wallis also mentions the difficulty with information verification in relation to terrorism and the "little boy who cried wolf" syndrome, which developed prior to the Lockerbie disaster. For the most part, he does not consider ways to address these issues. He does, though, offer a persuasive discussion of why the public should not be notified and responsible for discerning the veracity of threats.

As former director of security for the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the author brings immense expertise to the subject, both in regard to Lockerbie, and more generally in relation to aircraft security. Unfortunately,

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this point features largely in the text, with repeated references to "your author," his previous speeches, and admonitions to the airline industry; two sections are dedicated to his testimony during the Lockerbie trials. These read as "I told you so," with petty attacks on the prosecuting attorney misplaced in a work of otherwise strong quality. He writes, for example, "Coddington, the epitome of a show trial lawyer, was a person given to theatrical gestures, none more so than his use of a silver chalice to contain his drinking water when all others in the courtroom used polystyrene cups" (p. 82). And later, "Coddington frequently based his questions on extracts taken from papers written by your author, but he had a tendency to misquote from the published texts" (p. 127). Wallis's vindication of himself extends to the IATA, in a somewhat biased rendering of where fault rests for the disaster.

The final chapter introduces some of the technological achievements of the past decade, such as computerized passenger-bag matching, dual-energy technology, computed tomography, and bomb-proof aircraft. With the exception of the first, these technologies would address situations in which suicide bombers attacked aircraft, overcoming the weakness of Wallis's main argument, which assumes that passenger-bag matching would prevent further tragedies.

The trials of Abdelbaset Ali Mohamad Al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah came after the book was written and published, but Wallis's indictment of Pan Am plays to his strengths. While a future edition may include discussion of these trials, it is not a noticeable gap in the current volume.

LAURA K. DONOHUE
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U.S. Immigration Policy in an Age of Rights *by Debra L. DeLaet. Westport, CT, Praeger-Greenwood Publishing, 2000. 168 pp. $22.95.*

American immigration policy has evolved in phases into its current construction. The open door at the Founding shut for the first time after the Civil War and the end of Reconstruction. Nativism and Chinese exclusion at the end of the nineteenth century culminated in restrictions and quotas based on national origin until the middle twentieth century. Through the 1930s and 1940s, America's door was virtually closed, with low quotas unfilled despite the refugee crisis and Holocaust abroad. As a response to the acceleration of the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s, the Immigration Act of 1965 eliminated national origins quotas. The last two decades of the twentieth century saw a mixture of emerging immigrant rights and revived restrictionism.

An interesting history of legislation here combines with the author's theory that recent U.S. policy has been liberalized at the behest of certain global but mainly domestic norms and political forces. Interest groups and public opinion have helped bring about changes in favor of family unification and nondiscrimination. This relative liberalization contributed generally to authorize higher

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levels of legal immigration but did not provide "effective measures to reduce illegal immigration" (p. 3). DeLaet attempts to locate immigration policy in theories of state society relations, international relations, the role of ideas in shaping foreign policy, and global norms and relations; but she is more successful in employing domestic interest-group analysis.

The book begins with an introduction to the themes of domestic politics, liberal ideas, and U.S. immigration policy, and it quickly overviews the historical movement of policy from nativism to nondiscrimination. The heart of the book discusses the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 and its extensions in the 1990s. IRCA combined amnesty for up to three-million former "illegals" with "employer sanction" to cut down on new arrivals. Penalties for knowingly hiring illegals may have reduced border apprehensions (Figure 3.1). But "pull" attractions to the United States, such as jobs and family reunification pressures, undercut attempts to stem a greatly increased flow of illegals determined to get into the United States.

Moreover, a 1990 Government Administration Office report found that the IRCA created a "widespread pattern" of discrimination against Asians and Hispanics by nearly one employer in every five. This finding of discrimination should have triggered an expedited repeal of sanctions, but Congress left these ineffective and discriminatory rules in place. The Jordan Commission's endorsement of reduced legal immigration has been shelved due partly to strong public support for conservative family unification. However, the sentiment behind it found expression in the Republican "Contract for America" attempt to reduce benefits to legal immigrants.

The book might have developed the irony of how the relative age of rights liberalization and nondiscrimination in the context of restriction policies toward "illegal aliens" has undermined basic rights of American citizens. The IRCA effectively extends Immigration and Naturalization Service jurisdiction to citizens by requiring documenting citizenship or government permission to work. This essentially presumes that everyone is illegal until otherwise proven and might deny jobs in the absence of documentation in a country appropriately eschewing a national ID. The dilemmas of the IRCA may be revisited in the recently suggested amnesty by the new Bush administration seeking justice and partisan advantage among Hispanics.

For those interested in a march through immigration history, this brief book focusing on the last two decades in another era of historically high immigration has revealing evidence and insights, though less so for experts. The appendix on immigration developments since George Washington's open-door policy puts the later legislation detailed there in context. While tables and figures are helpful, they don't show full quota, nonquota, and illegal totals. For a complex subject such as immigration, this book helps in understanding the forces that face citizens, residents, and those who aspire to somehow join them.

RICHARD SOBEL
Harvard University

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Presidential Power in Fifth Republic France *by David S. Bell. New York, Oxford University Press, 2000. 286 pp. Paper, $19.50.*

In all republics, there is always the question of how powerful is the presidency or the president. In the case of Fifth Republic France, this question is a major one for all analysts of French politics because of the hybrid nature of the French political system, which includes elements of both presidential and parliamentary systems. And in times of what the French call "cohabitation"—when the president and the majority of the National Assembly led by the prime minister are of different political persuasion or parties—the question is whether the president's power will be overtaken by the prime minister and the Assembly, returning the French political system to what it was under the Fourth Republic. In the third case of cohabitation, which started in 1997 and will last until the presidential election of 2002, David S. Bell examines the status of the French presidency.

Presidential Power in Fifth Republic France is a very interesting book. It is a detailed account of the political history of the Fifth Republic from its creation by General Charles de Gaulle to the cohabitation of Jacques Chirac, the Gaullist president, and Lionel Jospin, the Socialist prime minister. Much of that history is presented in terms of the relationship between the president and the prime minister and the different political party coalitions they put and tried to keep together to support their policies and their power. However, the author demonstrates throughout his analysis his thesis that presidential authority has been the result not so much of the president's constitutional powers, which are relatively few, but of "making the Presidency the point of reference in French politics" (p. 11).

Bell argues persuasively that Charles de Gaulle was a political rather than an institutional innovator. He was the one who made the prime minister, contrary to the letter of the constitution, responsible to him rather than to parliament, thus enhancing the power and prestige of the presidency. His four successors, even the socialist President François Mitterrand, in times when the National Assembly's majority was supportive of the president, have followed his example. In times of cohabitation, where the power of the president can be directly challenged by the prime minister, who is truly in charge of the government from an institutional point of view, a duel of wills between the two members of the French double executive can take place, as was the case in the first cohabitation of 1986–1988 involving Mitterrand and Chirac. Yet the president has remained, in such situations, the focus of French politics by the use of his reserved domain of powers, mostly in foreign and military affairs.

Bell correctly states that "Fifth Republic politics is the politics of leadership" (p. 241). And cohabitation, with which the French people are now perfectly at ease, has not changed that. The presidency remains the dynamic institution and "presidential skill is the principal lever on the political system" (p. 243). The great prize in French politics remains the presidency, for which it is

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clear the present cohabitation Prime Minister Jospin will run in 2002. Still, Bell suggests that only time will tell if the long third cohabitation will have affected the position of the president of the republic. Had the change in the constitution passed before he published the book, Bell could also have theorized on the possible effects that the reduction of the term of office of the president, from seven to five years, might bring to French politics.

Presidential Power in Fifth Republic France is a highly recommendable book, which reads well, although a knowledge of French does help since the numerous French quotes are not translated. However, it is unfortunate that the author did not choose to have footnotes instead of references in parentheses within the text, which do much harm to his style. And the book is peppered with a lot of typographical errors, practically one in every French quote. Still this is a book that analysts of French politics will find useful and that any general reader can understand and appreciate.

JEAN V. POULARD
Indiana University Northwest

British Elections and Parties Review, Vol. 10 *edited by Philip Cowley, David Denver, Andrew Russell, and Lisa Harrison. London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2001. 298 pp. Cloth, $64.50; paper, $32.50.*

The *Review* has been a remarkably successful venture. Annually it publishes the best papers from the conferences organized by the British study group on elections, parties, and public opinion. This is the tenth volume and maintains the high standard of its predecessors. As a review rather than a coherent edited collection, the twelve chapters cover very different themes. They tackle the electoral system, constituency parties, neighborhood voting, the internet, candidate selection, the behaviour of Liberal Democrat MPs, studies of voting behaviour, as well as examine U.S. public opinion on the attempted impeachment of President Bill Clinton. The pluralistic nature of the study group probably rules out the production of a volume with thematic coherence.

U.S. readers will be interested in Gary Jacobson's study of American attitudes toward Clinton over the Lewinsky scandal. Using a rich array of data, he shows that the electorate divided on partisan lines but that broad public satisfaction with the economy as well as a belief that the affair was a private rather than a public matter helped Clinton to maintain his remarkable levels of popularity. Anthony Heath draws on 1997 British Election Study surveys to explore the reasons for traditional working class Labour voters' lack of enthusiasm for Tony Blair's drive to the political center and middle England. In 1997 (and in 2001) they were more likely than other groups of party supporters to abstain. This trade-off between risking the loss of traditional supporters (who, for the most part, have nowhere else to go) and seeking new support, has so far been

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brilliantly successful. The side consequence has been a large-scale working-class withdrawal from the electoral process.

Among other chapters, Ron Johnson and colleagues demonstrate the existence of a neighborhood influence on voting. Andrew Russell and Ed Fieldhouse study the image effects of the Liberal Democrats' abandonment of its "equidistance" between the Labour and Conservative parties after the 1992 general election. As the two main parties have been seen to converge, Liberal Democrats are seen to be positioned on the left. This helped to gain seats in 1997 and in 2001. Will it do so in the future? Philip Cowley and colleagues show that on whipped votes in the House of Commons since 1997, Liberal MPs reliably voted with Labour for the first two sessions, although the support has declined over time.

The first-past-the-post for Westminster now massively discriminates against the Conservative party. Since proportional representation has been introduced for the European, Scottish, and Welsh elections, Westminster is the odd man out. The foremost authorities on the subject, John Curtice and Michael Steed, used these so-called second-order elections to draw lessons for the debate on reform of the system for the House of Commons.

The 2001 general election confirmed a number of new trends in British electoral behavior: massive popular disengagement from the process, anti-Conservative tactical voting, a large third-force vote, the bias of the electoral system, and the continued decline of the Conservative party. No doubt the future volumes will tackle these emerging problems.

DENNIS KAVANAUGH
University of Liverpool

Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life *by Leon Aron. New York, St. Martin's Press, 2000. 934 pp. $35.00.*

My Six Years with Gorbachev *by Anatoly S. Chernyaev, translated from Russian and edited by Robert D. English and Elizabeth Tucker. University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000. 437 pp. $32.50.*

In the six years 1985–1991, Russia marked a fundamental historical break initiated by Mikhail S. Gorbachev and completed by Boris N. Yeltsin. The rivalry between these two great men has aroused emotions and confused judgments. It is therefore a special pleasure to read these two outstanding books, which debunk many myths about that time. Two-thirds of Aron's book deals with this period, and all of Chernyaev's volume does. Aron is a political scientist at the Washington-based American Enterprise Institute, and this political biography is his greatest academic work. Chernyaev, who was Gorbachev's foreign policy aide and a veteran of the Central Committee apparatus, has written a mixture

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of political diary and commentary. It is surprising that Leonid Brezhnev's Communist party administration could harbor such a liberal, sincere, and intelligent man.

Both books are highly accurate. Aron's biography is beautifully written, and Chernyaev's is also a good read. Aron uses complete academic references, while the editors of Chernyaev's book have done a masterly job of adding helpful notes. To Aron, Boris Yeltsin is one of the great heroes of the twentieth century, whom he compares with Charles de Gaulle and Abraham Lincoln, while Chernyaev's favorite is Gorbachev. Yet, when discussing the same events, both authors display a surprising degree of agreement, as Chernyaev regrets that Gorbachev did not act as Yeltsin.

These books should help to discard many unbased prejudices about recent Russian history, about which virtually anything is being written without shame or any requirement of even the most elementary test of truth. The case in point is the armed uprising by a mixture of nazis and communists in the Russian parliament in September–October 1993. Aron goes through these events in detail with full evidence, showing the violence, anti-Semitism, and antidemocratism of the instigators of the coup. Anybody who has read Aron is left wondering about the democratic caliber of the defenders of the coup.

Looking back at the events in the second half of the 1980s with these two guides, it is pretty obvious how to judge them and the two main political actors. Mikhail Gorbachev's greatest accomplishments were in foreign policy. He personally ended the cold war, and he rightfully gained the love of Western leaders, which is Chernyaev's favorite theme. As a logical consequence, he let Eastern Europe free. Gorbachev also broached public openness and broke the secrecy of the Soviet state.

In three major areas, however, Gorbachev fell short. While he started democratization, he was not prepared to accept a popular election of himself as Soviet president; Yeltsin was a democratically elected Russian president. Gorbachev undermined the Communist party and infuriated its conservative adherents, but he was not prepared to jeopardize its rule or even sack his dogmatic opponents. Chernyaev finds this negligence unacceptable, clarifying that it was Gorbachev's choice rather than any restriction on his actions. Gorbachev hired few people younger than himself for high positions, and he failed to reach outside the circle of old apparatchiks. Yeltsin, by contrast, promoted young and bright people whom he barely knew. In particular, Yeltsin was totally free of anti-Semitism and allowed Jews to thrive as never before in Russian history.

Whereas Gorbachev let Eastern Europe go, he thought that the other Soviet republics, including the Baltic states, really wanted to stay within the Soviet Union. This was his greatest miscomprehension, which made him resist the republics' liberation and allied him with communist hardliners. Yeltsin grasped that Russia could only be free if it abandoned its imperial ambitions, and he had the psychological strength to follow his logic.

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The third major difference between Gorbachev and Yeltsin was over the economic system. Apart from perceiving that the communist economy had reached a dead end, Gorbachev never understood economics. He paid no attention to fiscal balance, and he maintained old communist prejudices against private property. Strangely, Yeltsin grasped that the only viable alternative was a full-fledged market economy with free prices and predominant private ownership, and that the transition ought to be speedy.

However much Chernyaev admires Gorbachev, he is a hard judge on his master. On the one hand, it is impressive to see Gorbachev tolerate such an insightful and independent aide. On the other, Gorbachev comes out as a confused, half-hearted reformer, who entered the road to democracy or a market economy but was never prepared to go all the way, preferring the company of old communists. Chernyaev's conclusion is that domestically Gorbachev should have done what Yeltsin did in the years 1987–1991.

Aron rightly presents Yeltsin as a great liberal revolutionary with a manic-depressive inclination. Ordinary rule was never his strength, which rendered Yeltsin so ineffective in office. He was better at formulating the goals than implementing them. Aron devotes limited space to Yeltsin in power, and he does not really try to analyze the regime. He admits Yeltsin's foibles and condemns the Chechnya war as well as the disturbing corruption. His final judgment on Yeltsin's life is both exalted and fair: "He made irreversible the collapse of Soviet totalitarian communism, dissolved the Russian empire, ended state ownership of the economy—and held together and rebuilt his country while it coped with new reality and losses" (p. 736).

Aron's biography of Yeltsin is a masterpiece for anybody who wants to acquire a proper picture of the demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of Russia. I hope it will moderate the excessively negative current picture of Yeltsin.

ANDERS ÅSLUND
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower *by Sergei N. Khrushchev. University Park, Penn State University Press, 2000. 765 pp. $54.95.*

Any biography of the head of the Communist party of the Soviet Union by his son has to be taken seriously but also with caution. Expectedly, this one offers intimate and mostly admiring observations of Nikita Khrushchev's thinking, policies, and decisions. Less expected and more troubling is the absence of documentation. Depending on memory alone for detailed descriptions of his father's meetings and personal interactions with scientists, generals, top party leaders, and foreign heads of state, the author inspires skepticism about the book's accuracy. If he used diaries other than his father's memoirs, or memoranda of conversations and events, or other more reliable sources, he does not

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mention them. Moreover, given Soviet security practices, it seems doubtful that he could have kept such records at the time, not to mention after his father was deposed.

His memory fails him when he describes military leaders complaining about the two-year term of obligatory military service, arguing that it should be increased to its former three years. In fact, it was three years throughout Khrushchev's rule, reduced to two years during the Brezhnev regime in late 1967. One must also wonder about the author's apparent access to so much classified information about his father's activities. Only a teenager when his father became the top party leader and 28 when was he was ousted in 1964, Sergei Khrushchev writes as if he were remarkably informed on the details of his father's handling of military policy decisions and party leadership struggles in the 1950s, of the Cuban missile crisis, and major military and industrial decisions in the 1960s. Because he became an engineer and worked in Vladimir Chelomei's missile design bureau, his descriptions of the struggles among chiefs of various missile programs are more compelling. That he could attend official meetings of the Defense Council with no official status, however, is surprising.

More cogent are the author's general impressions of his father's views, because they do not require precise recall of hundreds of empirical details. He is especially convincing when he deals with his father's efforts to cut the military, to force the navy to build submarines, to give highest priority to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and to deal with the numerous bureaucratic struggles within the military and the military industries. His explanation of his father's ouster also has a ring of authenticity to it. He believes that his father saw it coming but simply was not ready to fight the way he had done to defeat those who tried to depose him in 1957.

Although not denying his father's complicity in Stalin's blood purges, he plays it down. He plays up the image of his father as a precursor of Mikhail Gorbachev—a man caught between doubts about the official ideology and political dependency on it; a man who could not imagine actually using nuclear weapons, although his generals and fellow party leaders could; a man who wanted the impossible combination of genuine political détente with the West and a victorious Soviet Union in the ideological, political, and economic struggle with the United States. When forced to choose, however, he took the party and international class struggle.

Another image also emerges, probably not intended but certainly convincing. Khrushchev was a man of limited vision, an impulsive, erratic, verbose, and generally incompetent dictator who probably did not realize that his denunciation of Stalin and the blood purges would accelerate the decay and facilitate the eventual collapse of the system.

WILLIAM E. ODOM
Yale University

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Explaining NATO Enlargement *edited by Robert W. Rauchhaus. Portland, OR, Frank Cass Publishing, 2001. 219 pp. Cloth, $59.50; paper, $24.50.*

NATO's admission of three new members in 1999 was a crucial development in European security affairs. It effectively erased any expectation that other bodies, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the European Union (EU), would supplant the alliance as Europe's primary security institution in the post-cold war era. There is now considerable speculation about a second round of expansion, which may bring in new members from both the Baltic region and the Balkans.

Most books on this topic have focused on whether the enlargement of the alliance was a good or bad idea. The essays in *Explaining NATO Enlargement* also deal with that question, but it is not the primary focus of the book. Instead, the contributors examine NATO enlargement from a variety of perspectives and attempt to shed light on the utility of several major international relations theories, including neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, organization theory, constructivism, and foreign policy-based approaches. In applying one or more of those theories, the various essays seek to explain why NATO expansion occurred and why, according to the editor, international relations theory failed to predict that expansion.

The editor stresses the latter point, asserting that "only a few years prior to the decision to enlarge the alliance, no one thought that such a bold initiative was possible" (p. 6). In that respect, the book is built on a fallacy. Several authors, utilizing public-choice economic theory and other approaches, speculated as early as 1994 that expansion was not only possible but probable.

Despite that defect, *Explaining NATO Enlargement* is a useful volume. As with all collections, the essays vary in quality. The chapter by realist scholar Kenneth N. Waltz is especially incisive. He views NATO's expansion as primarily a U.S. initiative designed to maintain and extend Washington's grip on European security policy. NATO's expansion, he argues, shows how institutions are shaped to serve what strong countries believe to be their interests.

Also useful and intriguing are the chapters by Ronald J. Bee and Charles A. Kupchan. In contrast to Waltz, Bee contends that expansion occurred because of a temporary convergence of U.S., West European, and East European interests. Kupchan argues that NATO enlargement proceeded only because proponents in the Clinton administration vigorously pushed the policy forward despite well-founded opposition within the bureaucracy and the broader foreign policy community.

The contributions by Gale A. Mattox and Steven Weber are decidedly less useful. Mattox's chapter is little more than a brief for the wisdom of NATO expansion and the general role of multilateral institutions. Thus, Mattox outlines ambitious roles in Europe's security affairs for the OSCE, EU, UN, and other institutions as well as NATO, without demonstrating any awareness that

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the agendas of those institutions might be in conflict. Mattox also shows insensitivity toward Russia's legitimate apprehensions as a militarily powerful NATO approaches its borders. That same insensitivity is present in Weber's analysis, as he argues that Russia has very little to fear from NATO expansion. Moscow's growing ties with Beijing and other actions taken to counter the dominant position of the U.S.–led West suggest that Russian leaders see matters quite differently.

Rauchhaus's own contributions provide an effective overview of the debate. He also observes correctly that whereas the Clinton administration "turned the PFP [Partnership for Peace] framework into a fire-ladder that facilitated the entry of eastern European countries into NATO, other administrations may have used PFP as a firewall to keep them out" (p. 191). Europe will be dealing with the consequences of that decision for decades.

TED GALEN CARPENTER
Cato Institute

Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919–1950 *by Mark Philip Bradley. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 304 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $19.95.*

This binational history of U.S–Vietnamese relations, based in part on Vietnamese sources, argues that pre-cold war perceptions contributed significantly to the war in Vietnam and continue to influence relations to the present day. "The global discourse and practices of colonialism, race, modernism, and postcolonial state making," says Bradley, "at once preceded, were profoundly implicated in, and ultimately transcended the dynamics of the Cold War" (p. 8).

Beginning in the 1920s, Vietnamese revolutionaries looked to early American history, particularly the heroic phase of the War for Independence, for inspiration in their struggle for liberation from French colonial rule. The combination of America's historical example and the realization that the United States had become a world power helps to explain why Ho Chi Minh mouthed phrases from the Declaration of Independence in August 1945 and actively solicited American aid. Only after the United States rejected their advances did the Viet Minh veer, albeit rather cautiously, into the socialist bloc.

American images of Vietnam, Bradley argues, were governed by a "racialized cultural hierarchy" that characterized the Vietnamese as lazy, untrustworthy, incompetent, dirty, effeminate, unwarlike, submissive, and excessively prone to external influence. At the same time, Americans tended to be critical of French rule in Vietnam, which seemed, in contrast to America's altruistic performance in the Philippines, wholly indifferent to the development of Vietnam. Notwithstanding this disapproval of French administration, Bradley insists that American views were "a variation, rather than a sharp departure, from

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the hierarchical conceptions of racial difference and the exercise of power at the heart of European colonialism" (p. 105). Not surprisingly, Americans relied readily on French opinion in forming their assessments of the Vietnamese. This racial condescension also accounts for why ostensible anticolonialists like FDR insisted on a lengthy period of tutelage in the form of international trusteeship before granting independence to Vietnam.

Bradley dismisses the oft-heard argument that the United States missed a golden opportunity at the end of World War II to make common cause with the Viet Minh. A close look at the documents reveals that American representatives in Southeast Asia, despite being favorably impressed by Ho Chi Minh's leadership skills, consistently belittled the capacity of the Vietnamese for self-rule. American diplomacy was too much in thrall to ingrained prejudices that stood in the way of a healthier relationship between the two peoples.

Not everyone will agree with Bradley's bleak and unchanging view of race as the key to understanding America's misadventure in southeast Asia. American racial condescension applied to many other peoples with whom the United States did not go to war. To some extent, Vietnamese shortcomings were attributed to French misrule. Some of what passed for racial critique might also better be fitted under the heading of civilization and modernity. Thus, though Bradley takes the answer as given, it is still fair to ask to what degree the Vietnamese were capable of democratic self-government. To ask this is no more racist than to question the fitness of contemporary Russians for democracy.

Still, this insightful book explains better than any work thus far why Americans believed they could replace the French without inheriting the stigma of colonialism and, despite France's disastrous experience, succeed militarily against the Viet Cong. It also helps to explain why a deeply rooted revolutionary nationalism that survives today, albeit in an elegiac form, could not be defeated on the battlefield. By the same token, Vietnamese military success failed to vanquish American misgivings about their political capabilities, which continue to flourish in the post-cold war era. Those who believe that culture matters in international relations will find much support for their arguments in this brief but significant work.

FRANK NINKOVICH
St. John's University

Contracting for Development: The Role of For-Profit Contractors in U.S. Foreign Development Assistance *by Ruben Berrios. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2000. 184 pp. $55.00.*

The recent trend of commercializing foreign assistance programs has remained a remarkably undertheorized topic within developmental studies and the study of international political economy. Ruben Berrios has produced a timely mono-

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graph that not only casts a much-needed critical eye on the growth of the contracting process within the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), but also uses theories of optimal contracting to reveal the properties of different types of contracts.

Berrios is at his best in the first five chapters where he illuminates the inner workings of this new procurement process. He places the commercialization of the aid sector within a broader discussion of the reinvention of government that encourages the private sector to perform public services. The discussion of the structure of the "aid market" is particularly strong and shows how close ties between private corporations and government officials have created an oligopoly in which only established and well-connected companies can actually win what is at best only a semicompetitive bidding process. A background chapter on the evolution of the foreign aid sector is also well-crafted and informative.

Theoretically, the book also has something to offer as the author draws upon the optimal contracting literature to assess the characteristics of various types of contracts. He argues that USAID overwhelmingly employs the cost-plus contract, which given the particular characteristics of the aid sector is generally less efficient from the donor's viewpoint than either fixed-price or incentive contracts. A quantitative analysis of 116 USAID contracts finds a significant correlation between cost-plus contracts and substandard project performance.

The book is not without some empirical and theoretical gaps. While the author competently draws upon the contracting literature, some more theoretical mileage might have been gleaned from expanding the scope of the principal-agent analysis to explicitly theorize the dynamics between contractors and project recipients. After all, aid recipients are all too aware of the contracting system's incentives and often use it to further their own interests. For instance, aid recipients may encourage contractors to look the other way in cases of project abuse and/or mismanagement in exchange for encouraging USAID to renew the firm's contract.

Also, despite the book's powerful general argument, the inclusion of a few cases of specific projects could have illustrated how different contractual incentives play out at the microlevel. Empirically, how do contracting firms manipulate their positions and under what circumstances is there a trade-off between a project's nominal goals and the short-term interests of the firm? Do the incentives described in the model remain constant among various types of projects (economic reform, humanitarian relief, democracy promotion, etc.) and do they affect for-profit and not-for-profit nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) equally?

Finally, it is worth noting that competition among the contractors of various donors within a single sector is quite common in most aid-dependent countries and further exacerbates the self-interested behavior of NGOs. While Berrios deals exclusively with USAID, a future comparative analysis of other agencies such as the European Union, Asian Development Bank, and World Bank

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might reveal instructive differences in contract types, the procurement process, and monitoring procedures across donors.

Berrios has set a high standard for a topic that should be of interest to both policy makers and scholars. One wonders, however, whether the concluding recommendations to employ more fixed cost (for goods) and incentive (for services) contracts would dramatically improve project performance, or whether a more fundamental rethinking of the merits of aid privatization is needed. Given the author's description of the current contracting environment, it seems as if "connected" NGOs would continue to influence the procurement process regardless of actual contract type.

ALEXANDER COOLEY
Barnard College,
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The Uncertain Promise of Southern Africa *edited by York Bradshaw and Stephen N. Ndegwa. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2001. 438 pp. Cloth, $54.95; paper, $24.95.*

Are you looking for signs of hope in Africa? There has not been much progress forty years after the end of colonialism, and there has been considerable backsliding in economic indicators in many countries. Nevertheless, we continue to look for some light at the end of the tunnel. This valuable volume, compiling the views of nineteen distinguished scholars, tells us that the southern Africa subregion has a decent chance to succeed. The book is divided into two sections. The first provides detailed snapshots of six countries at approximately the beginning of the year 2000: South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana, Angola, and Mozambique. The second discusses six key functional sectors: popular culture, land tenure issues, gender, education, health, and economic integration of the subregion.

All of the reviews reveal major structural problems inherited from both colonialism and forty years of apartheid in South Africa, compounded by the HIV/AIDS pandemic that continues to ravage southern Africa more heavily than elsewhere on the continent. Nevertheless, I found that on balance there is a strong current of democratic behavior animating many of the governments. Especially in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, and Mozambique, one gets the impression that the people in power are genuinely determined to use state resources to improve the lives of the populations. The opposite is generally prevalent in other African subregions. If you combine this progressive attitude on the part of governments with South Africa's sophisticated infrastructure and productive capacity, you find a formula for subregional economic breakthrough in the foreseeable future.

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Some of the severe obstacles to economic growth include the reactionary posture of South Africa's powerful labor movement, the interminable and hopeless civil war in Angola, the cultural impediments to providing education for girls in several countries, and the persistence of traditional land tenure systems that inhibit meaningful investment in agricultural production.

All of the contributions are excellent. The one I found the most intriguing is by Masipula Sithole on Zimbabwe. His analysis was written before the beginning of President Robert Mugabe's decision in mid-2000 to unleash violent party cadres illegally to seize commercial farms owned by white farmers of European origin, thereby precipitating a major economic crisis. Nevertheless, Sithole's analysis tells us that Zimbabwe is going through a necessary and irreversible political transition to the post-Mugabe era. Mugabe is probably the last remaining Leninist still in power in the world. The big test for Zimbabwe will be the transformation of Mugabe's ruling ZANU-PF party from its total identification with an authoritarian state into a democratic competitor. If the party fails in this transformation, it will be marginalized and replaced. Hopefully, the party will not also destroy the Zimbabwe economy in the process.

In general, southern Africa has abundant natural resources, strong productive capacity, and substantial infrastructure. If any subregion can break out of Africa's general morass, it is this one.

HERMAN J. COHEN
Johns Hopkins University

Then I Was Black: South African Political Identities in Transition *by Courtney Jung. New Haven, Yale University Press, 2000. 294 pp. $35.00.*

Political identities are made, not born. In a study of the politicization of identity in South Africa during apartheid and postapartheid eras, Jung argues against both the dominant primordial identity/divided-society paradigm (which suggests political identity is derived from innate characteristics and elections in ethnically divided states are little more than a racial census) and its principal competitor, the view that states (policies and institutional structures) make race.

Jung observes that even in South Africa, where race and ethnicity were the key if not the most salient factors in political life, racial and ethnic identities were fluid for individuals and groups, while the significance of these identities fluctuated. Jung then poses the questions of how and when identities are politicized, and what the implications of this process are for democracy. Her theory of the development and politicization of identity is nuanced albeit a bit cumbersome—five independent variables and two dependent variables. It could also perhaps use a shorthand designation: call it a mobilization theory of political identity.

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Jung argues that political elites mobilize collective identities more or less successfully. "Politicization involves the mobilization of symbols and the (re)-negotiation of meaning" (p. 24). Resonance, or the extent that individuals internalize the political meanings and boundaries that elites mobilize, depends on proximate and conditioning variables.

Proximate variables are mobilizing discourse and political institutions. Mobilizing discourse is, at least in my reading, the cornerstone of her analysis. Political elites seeking to mobilize ethnicity construct a world view that articulates a "we," which it differentiates from an outgroup that is understood in more or less threatening terms. Political elites reframe the understanding of historical events and assert a compelling analysis of the contemporary situation. Political institutions organize the political space and partially govern practical possibilities. Conditioning (or contextual) variables—available ideology, material conditons, and the organization of elites—are the background out of which mobilizing discourse and political institutions are possible. Organization highlights the role of preexisting organizational networks and the manner and effectiveness of elite mobilization. Ideology, as constructed by political entrepreneurs, is the background of more or less coherent ideas available for use in the mobilizing discourse of elites. Material conditions are the preexisting economic relations among groups that become relevant as they "contribute to a person's understanding of self, place, and potential membership" (p. 30).

Jung traces the development and evolution of political identity among Zulu, Afrikaner, and Coloured South Africans from 1975 to the late 1990s. Assessing resonance through interviews, public opinion polls, and voting patterns, Jung persuasively argues that politicization of ethnic and racial identities in South Africa depended on how well elites were able to make their mobilizing discourse work given their organizational abilities and the other factors she highlights.

This book deserves a wide readership among those interested in democracy, identity, ethnic conflict, and South African politics. But there are weaknesses. Jung should have clarified her dependent variable(s), which seemed to be both resonance and politicization. Second, analysis was occasionally wooden and the writing less than clear. Third, Jung perhaps presumes too limited an audience of experts on South African politics and history. While her discussion was often a skillful blending of relevant historical context and political analysis, at other points she left out crucial information that could have clarified her argument. In addition, the book could have benefited from a political map of South Africa pre- and postapartheid. However, strengths far outweigh these weaknesses.

NETA C. CRAWFORD
Brown University

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Is the Fetus a Person? *by Jean Reith Schroedel. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2000. 223 pp. $29.95.*

This book provides a well-written, thoroughly-researched account of state and federal fetal protection policies. Jean Reith Schroedel offers support for the women's rights argument that the real aim of the anti-abortion movement is "the subjugation of women, not the defense of the fetus" (p. 12). In this respect, the most interesting evidence comes from the general lack of attention by pro-life groups to "fetal assaults and killings." Most states do not criminalize violence against fetuses. In those that do, the penalties vary; but in only four states is the penalty for fetal killing the same as for killing a child or an adult. On the other hand, pregnant women who seek medical assistance and test positive for drugs may well be charged with child abuse and incarcerated as a consequence of policies supported by pro-life advocates. This occurs despite the fact that incarceration is more likely to lead to miscarriage than would medical treatment for drug addiction. Of the states that do criminalize fetal killings, more are likely to be "weak pro-choice states . . . than either the weak or strong pro-life states" (p. 147). This conclusion is based on a close assessment of the correlation of these laws with pro-choice and anti-abortion public sentiment.

Finally, Schroedel offers evidence that pro-life states are the least likely to support broad child welfare policies, a point that is reminiscent of Barney Frank's quip that Republican interest in children "starts at conception and ends at birth." Schroedel admits that some of the inconsistencies may be the result of inadvertence and some the consequence of historical attitudes toward women. Nonetheless, the thrust of her argument is that the women's rights account is generally confirmed. She also agrees with the women's rights claim that the anti-abortion campaign is an attack on broader reproductive rights, including contraception.

Schroedel also makes a good case for the argument that fetal politics is an aspect of abortion politics. Pro-life forces work to expand fetal rights with the hope that such expansion will ultimately undermine the premise of *Roe v Wade* that fetuses are not persons under the Fourteenth Amendment. Schroedel suggests that they have had a good deal of success in this regard.

Several other sections of the book focus on state and federal abortion policies. Some of this material is not new. The growth in restrictions on abortion and consequent limitations on abortion rights have been a well-known consequence of the Supreme Court's increasing willingness to allow the states leeway to protect potential life. This material, however, is important to the fullness of her account of the politics of fetal policy making. Finally, Schroedel provides interesting information regarding the role of prosecutorial discretion and judicial policy making.

The book, however, is not without its shortcomings. While it provides a great deal of evidence that pro-life advocates are inconsistent in their support

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for fetal life, that inconsistency does not necessarily provide support for the women's rights account. Instead, it may simply reflect a prioritization of concerns by pro-life advocates. Schroedel does not really confront, as she promises to do in her introduction, the normative issues raised in this debate. Her study would have benefited by some connection to the judicial implementation literature and by a more nuanced discussion of the courts. For example, Schroedel misreads the Supreme Court's position in two important respects: first, the Court has not recognized fetal rights, but speaks instead of a state interest in the protection of potential life; second, Supreme Court inaction is not equivalent to approval as its ultimate decision to strike down Nebraska's ban on partial birth abortion shows. On balance however, Schroedel's work is a valuable contribution to the study of abortion politics.

CAREN G. DUBNOFF
College of the Holy Cross

Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment *by Emma Rothschild. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2001. 353 pp. $45.00.*

This book rethinks enlightenment political economy, focusing primarily on Adam Smith and Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Condorcet, and secondarily, on David Hume and Anne Robert Jacques Turgot. It reconsiders these thinkers within their own intellectual moment and rescues them from the procrustean bed of modern economics.

Rothschild makes an important contribution to the history of economic thought by providing an example of how to contextualize a theorist within an intellectual milieu and document the journey of a theoretical system after the death of its author. In addition, she successfully carries out the project of forming an understanding of past political economists without using the prism of twentieth-century economics. The strongest feature of *Economic Sentiments* is the treatment of Smith. Rothschild's erudite recreation of Adam Smith's political economy draws on all his writings, letters included. She carefully explains his theoretical system and gives it a slightly different appearance by pointing out the historical specificity of his terminology. By pointing out that Smith used the term "state" to apply not just to the government, but also to the church, guilds, corporations, and monopolies, we now encounter a Smith that is concerned not just with the individual's freedom from government vexation, but also from the institutionalized oppression of the church, trading companies, and monopsony corporations. As such, Smith's reform agenda becomes more radical, challenging unearned privileges and unfair power structures. Rothschild also describes the process whereby Smith's system was later reduced to a few simple principles, to the point where Edmund Burke and Smith were

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viewed as "equivalents, and economic conservatives" (p. 64), and William Pitt was able to use Smith's ideas to bolster his conservative agenda.

One of Rothschild's aims is to "rediscover a different political economy" (p. 2) that allows us to "see the past more clearly" (p. 1). The author is successful in providing a clear and coherent picture by methodically presenting her view of Smith's system. However, the picture is perhaps too crystallized. The book has a tendency to join selectively passages that connect together smoothly and to gloss over complexities and ambiguities. For example, when discussing Smith's perspective on food and labor market imperfections, Smith is described as a swashbuckling champion of the poor. He allegedly favors regulations that ameliorate conditions for the poor, while opposing market manipulations that he thought would worsen their plight. Although the standard of living of the poor was undoubtedly an interest of Smith's, it is an overstatement to suggest that this was his overarching concern. Where Smith does not provide enough material for the author's vision of Smith's system, she calls upon Hume, Turgot, and Condorcet to fill in the blanks. This eclecticism creates an identity problem for the book. While on the one hand *Economic Sentiments* makes a conscious effort to provide a rigorous reinterpretation of each thinker individually, it unconsciously ends up creating one synthesized theoretical framework that draws ideas from all four thinkers. It is unclear as to the utility of this synthesized view.

Rothschild splendidly contextualizes Smith within the intellectual debates of his period, but she tends to ignore the economic and social context. This is surprising considering that her larger project is to rediscover eighteenth-century political economy in a way that puts us "in a better position to understand their importance for the present" (p. 47). By situating the intellectual debates in their historical moment, she might have clarified to what extent Smith's categories and reasoning are still relevant to our economic conditions. For example, it would have been informative to see an evaluation of Smith's thoughts on food and labor market deregulations in light of the analyses of social historians (such as Edward Thompson and Christopher Hill) regarding food riots and secretive protolabor unions. An understanding of the historically specific relationship between theory and society could have led to an interesting discussion of how enlightenment political economy can be applied to modern themes. Despite its problems, *Economic Sentiments* remains a profound contribution to the literature, especially its revision of Smith's thought and legacy.

CARL WENNERLIND
Barnard College

Unwanted Claims: The Politics of Participation in the U.S. Welfare System *by Joe Soss. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2000. 247 pp. $44.50.*

Unwanted Claims restates the argument of academic liberals that welfare should be more generous and respectful of its clients than it is. Joe Soss inter-

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viewed twenty-five Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recipients and twenty-five claimants of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) in a midwestern city in 1994–1995. He observes their encounters with their agencies, and he conducts statistical analyses using the 1992 National Election Study (NES). He asserts that recipients' claims on support constitute a form of politics, albeit it a less visible one than voting or public protests. True, such claims affect government, and in making them applicants draw on their social connections. In these senses, the demands are public. But because they are invisible, making no overt appeal to other citizens about what government should do, I find calling them political to be an abuse of language.

More plausibly, Soss claims that the welfare system teaches claimants about politics and government, inculcating a dual citizenship. Respondents say AFDC intrudes on recipients' private lives and deters their complaints lest they lose benefits, while SSDI is generally respectful and receptive. The one style, Soss thinks, promotes defeatism and passivity, the other self-respect and involvement. The contrast mirrors the respectability of social insurance programs like SSDI, compared to the stigma of means-tested AFDC.

The NES models relate respondents' internal and external efficacy and whether they voted to whether they were on AFDC or SSDI and to several demographic terms—gender, race, education, partisanship. Being on AFDC depresses turnout and external efficacy. Being on SSDI, however, also does; Soss dismisses these coefficients too quickly because they are not quite significant. And AFDC receipt elevates internal efficacy. This result confutes Soss's picture of discouragement on AFDC, although he tries to explain it away.

Commendably, Soss's study is not entirely statistical, as social policy research often is, but involves direct contact with recipients and welfare. Soss also writes clearly, although repetitively. His interview sample, however, was assembled using community contacts and was probably not representative. The respondents voiced far more criticism of AFDC than appears in surveys of recipients, as Soss admits. He also fails to deal well with selection—the tendency of program outcomes (here political images) to reflect the people who enter programs rather than what the program does. Soss compares the few clients on AFDC and SSDI who were demographically similar and shows that their images of the two programs still differed. But overall, the clienteles are too different for this to solve the problem; SSDI people have work histories and are much older and more educated. The same issue arises in the NES models. Feelings of efficacy or inefficacy may cause people to go on welfare, rather than welfare producing these feelings. Soss should have instrumented his program terms to identify them net of influence from the dependent terms or other variables.

Soss's policy views are caught in a time warp. He recommends more generous and unjudging welfare. But that is the policy the nation had in AFDC in most states between the 1970s and the early 1990s. It contributed to the dissolution of the inner city. Since then, government has enforced work and driven over half the recipients off the rolls, mostly into jobs. The effects to date look

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good. As more poor adults work, government is doing more for them, not less. Soss barely mentions these changes. He still believes that going on welfare "enhances [recipients'] power . . . in the market, the polity, civil society, and domestic relations" (p. 14). On the evidence, for most recipients all those ends are better served by leaving welfare and getting a job.

LAWRENCE M. MEAD
New York University

Empire on the Hudson: Entrepreneurial Vision and Political Power at the Port of New York Authority *by Jameson W. Doig. New York, Columbia University Press, 2001. 620 pp. $49.95.*

Anyone who pays tribute to the massive system of bridges, tunnels, trains, and airports controlled by the New York Port Authority will be taken aback by this "Perils of Pauline" narrative, a phrase I use in the theological as well as melodramatic sense. Jameson Doig relates the surprising troubles, even near-death of the Authority, during its uncertain early years. But he also ponders the issue of democracy's control over an agency founded in an enormous release of political energy. Embodying Progressive Era ambitions for scientific public administration, the Port Authority would reshape a region for the people while remaining removed from democratic accountability.

Doig chronicles that awesome responsibility in the careers of three men who embodied the Port Authority's Progressive legacy: Julius Henry Cohen, the visionary chief counsel, whose name rivals Robert Moses, chairman of the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, in the lore of public authorities; Othmar H. Ammann, the audacious bridge-builder, whose spans, completed on time and under budget, gave the Authority its earliest revenue flow; and Austin J. Tobin, the wily, combative chief executive from the 1940s through the 1960s, who tangled with Moses, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and nearly everyone else who threatened the Authority's entrepeneurial freedom, its ability to energize the port and its resources. A staunch believer in the Progressive ideals of public service, Cohen midwived the Authority's birth in the Port Compact of 1921 and directed its first mission, a "Comprehensive Plan" for the harbor's railroad infrastructure. The effort touched off a decade of squabbles with recalcitrant rail executives and nearly cost the Authority its existence. It was saved by Ammann's obsession for engineering standards, which drove the construction of the toll bridges, including the great George Washington, which revived the Authority's prospects, but more importantly, drew it from rail freight to motor vehicles. Tobin renewed the Authority's mission on trucks, cars, and toll crossings and wrested from Robert Moses the 1954 "Joint Program," which added the Narrows Bridge, a second deck on the George Washington, and a vast arterial system.

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This stirring, keenly-written history is filled with insiders' details and jousts with mayors, governors, and even a president. Doig's utterly fascinating account of Tobin's negotiations for the contracts of the Port Authority Bus Terminal and his 1954 agreement with Moses provides important revisions to Robert A. Caro's view of Moses in his book, *The Power Broker*. But the story is weakened by Doig's acceptance of the Authority's claims of business efficiency, which is ballyhooed by its public relations staff but not supported by any objective criteria. Did the Authority make the port efficient? Was the region's rail traffic handled with dispatch in Authority terminals? We have no way of knowing beyond the claims of its flaks. Nor does Doig provide any basis for judging whether the Authority succeeded in the task of regional development. If the last seems an unfair issue to raise, it is precisely the one that Doig begins with: Progressive Era confidence that expert public administration, carefully insulated from politics-as-usual, could shape and even command the environment.

Then there is the issue of the morality of power, framed by the Authority's own claims to nonpartisanship and strenuous work for the public weal. A good deal of the time, Doig seems inclined to believe it. He cannot quite account for the excesses of Austin Tobin's later years, the gigantic World Trade Center towers, or the obsession for a gargantuan jetport in North Jersey's Great Swamp. Reaching for an explanation, Doig quotes Machiavelli about man's inability to change a prosperous course of action. But I prefer the penetrating realism of Romans 7:19—St. Paul's remarks about the infirmities of flesh and the institutions that flesh would create.

JOEL SCHWARTZ
Montclair State University

Rhode Island Politics and Government *by Maureen Moakley and Elmer Cornwell. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 2001. 245 pp. Cloth, $70.00; paper, $29.95.*

Every state in the Union is a little peculiar, but Rhode Island's uniqueness extends beyond its diminutive size. This informative book, one in a series devoted to the politics and government of the fifty American states, demonstrates why "Little Rhody" has long suffered the dubious distinction of being known as a Rogues' Island. Maureen Moakley and Elmer Cornwell are exceptionally well qualified to tell the story behind the state's mixed reputation. They possess an insider's acquaintance with the colorful state leadership as well as a masterful grasp of the history, constitution, and daily workings of the state government.

A major theme of this book is the gradual reform of the state's tradition of machine politics. Rhode Island is said to possess what Daniel Elazar has called an "individualistic" political culture. Unlike New England's moralist or the South's traditionalist political cultures, Rhode Island politics are based upon

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orientations and expectations of government as a marketplace for the pursuit of group interests. This pattern is manifest in the way Yankee business interests and native rural interests controlled RI government until the New Deal. This was accomplished through property qualifications on the suffrage and apportionment inequities in legislative representation that disenfranchised large segments of the immigrant Catholic working class. When the Democrats took over, they adopted the same patronage politics as their predecessors, using public offices as spoils for groups of their own supporters. Thus, the Irish and then the Italians and now, African-Americans, Portuguese, and Latinos look to their own for representation in state and local government. Similarly, localism prevails in this already tiny state. People passionately identify with their small towns. Their elected representatives are easily accessible.

In some key respects, Rhode Island resembles southern states like Louisiana more than it does its New England neighbors. One-party rule—first by Republicans and after the Green Revolution of 1935, by Democrats—enabled Rhode Island's congressional representatives to accrue seniority and "bring home the bacon" of military contracts, income transfers to the elderly, transportation dollars, and other federal pork barrel. But the dominance of party machines also produced corruption and closed-door government throughout most of the state's history. In 1905, Lincoln Steffens called Rhode Island a "State for Sale." Civil service reforms came late and were inadequate to eliminate political favoritism. Mayors and governors have been indicted or convicted of bribery and other offenses. Two Supreme Court justices have resigned in disgrace.

Rhode Island's tarnished image is partly unfair. Since the Depression, social policy in this strong-labor, Democratic party-dominated state has been liberal and generous. Even Rhode Island Republicans are moderate or progressive compared to the rest of their party. Rhode Island has taken the high road to welfare reform, stressing support services and extending health insurance to all children in needy families. Business, labor, and the Democratic legislature have begun cooperating on economic development projects to their common benefit. Providence, the capital, has recently undergone a Renaissance thanks to state, city, and private joint investments. Housing preservation and environmental protection are also popular in the Ocean State. It is home to a half-dozen excellent colleges and universities, although public education, a separate chapter concludes, leaves room for improvement.

The authors trace Rhode Island's bad reputation back to colonial times when some Rhode Islanders were also smugglers and slave-traders. In 1663, King Charles II granted Newport, Providence, and other early towns a remarkably progressive Royal charter. Since that time, Rhode Island has vested most powers in its legislature, not unlike British parliamentary government. The constitutionally dominant General Assembly and the very weak governor make Rhode Island government institutionally unique. Indeed, Moakley and Cornwell hammer home this structural idiosyncrasy of parliamentary suprem-

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acy in chapters devoted to the state constitution, each branch of government, political parties, and interest groups. The strong legislature strengthened the House and Senate leadership and perpetuated one-party rule.

During the last two decades, the toleration of political corruption at last gave way to demands for reform. In 1984, the state created a very strong ethics commission monitoring procedures, appointments, and other opportunities to abuse the public trust. Only time will tell whether the authors' sanguine prognostication that Rhode Island is entering an era of good government is correct.

This book is more factual and descriptive than theoretical or analytical. The authors do not pretend to have used scientific methods of data collection. Aside from a few formal interviews with elites, their findings are often "the result of countless chats with innumerable others about politics" (p. xiv). Yet this may be the best approach to glean information in a cliquish environment where "knowledge and information equal power" (p. 74). Perhaps this is why there are very few social science studies of Rhode Island, which makes this book especially valuable. It is written in an accessible style, with many humorous anecdotes from Rhode Island's special brand of politics. It is likely to become a widely used textbook on how things really work in the state. Although the book is sometimes repetitive because so many topics discussed are interrelated, it is true that recalling certain facts in subsequent discussions allows any given chapter to stand independently as an assignment in political science courses. The book ends with an appendix on primary sources of information on the state. Students and professors, lobbyists and local political junkies will all find something of interest in this comprehensive treatment of Rhode Island's politics and government.

HILARY SILVER
Brown University

Negotiating NAFTA: Explaining the Outcome in Culture, Textiles, Autos, and Pharmaceuticals *by Maryse Robert. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2000. 298 pp. $60.00.*

Created from NAFTA: The Structure, Function, and Significance of the Treaty's Related Institutions *by Joseph A. McKinney. Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 2000. 298 pp. Cloth, $60.95; paper, $24.95.*

These two recent additions to the rapidly expanding shelf of NAFTA-related publications concentrate on different aspects of the agreement—the negotiations and the resulting institutions. Maryse Robert, a Canadian economist with the Organization of American States, wrote her book on the NAFTA negotiations while completing doctoral studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. It focuses "on the objectives of the negotiators and on their resources

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and tactics during the NAFTA negotiations" (p. vii) and analyzes four sectors: culture, textiles and apparel, autos, and pharmaceuticals. The book, which does not contain a bibliography, is based in part on 100 not-for-attribution interviews with NAFTA negotiators and members of their private sector advisory groups. After a survey of political science literature on negotiating outcomes and a chapter discussing briefly the history of NAFTA, Robert presents her sector-specific case studies, involving a variety of detailed technical issues such as rules of origin and intellectual property. Finally, in a summary the author explains how the case studies relate to her theoretical framework involving structures and processes. "The key message conveyed in this book is that it is the right mix of resources and tactics that explains negotiation outcome" (p. 245).

On cultural issues, which include publications, films, sound recordings, and broadcasting, Robert shows that Canada succeeded in preserving the status quo—particularly an exemption protecting its cultural industries in the 1988 bilateral U.S.–Canadian free trade agreement (FTA). However, Congress in passing U.S. implementing legislation warned Canada that the United States had a right to retaliate if Canada invoked the cultural exemption. On textiles, Robert indicates that Canada had limited leverage and sought to keep the terms of the FTA intact in order to protect the Quebec apparel industry. Hoping to obtain some concessions from the Americans, who wanted to conclude the agreement before the Republican Convention, the Canadians sought to deadlock the negotiations and obtain concessions from the United States. In the automotive sector, Robert says the Canadians sought to preserve the benefits of the Auto Pact of 1965, while addressing the special rules of origin problems involving the export of Honda Civics from Canada to the U.S. "The Canadians were happy with the results" (p. 204). In pharmaceuticals, she concludes that the Americans were successful in their objective to persuade Canada and Mexico to adopt patent regimes that balance incentives to develop new drugs with reducing health care costs through production of generics. She says that the negotiators generally agreed to adopt language approved in Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations on trade-related intellectual property.

This book will interest political scientists studying the theory of negotiations and perhaps some lawyers and trade diplomats concerned about the four sectors examined in the case studies. It has limited value to historians. Most disappointing is Robert's handling of interviews. She does not identify the individuals that she has interviewed, indicate their positions, or even discuss how many interviews were conducted with representatives of each of the three governments involved. In writing about the NAFTA negotiations, Robert often does not identify the individual negotiators who handled the sector issues or discuss in a specific way their tactics. She offers few anecdotes that might add spice and character. In her narrative there are no colorful trade negotiators, such as Simon Reisman, the experienced Canadian diplomat who handled the FTA negotiations, or Bob Strauss, the special trade representative who supervised U.S. negotiations in the Tokyo Round. Based on her special attention to

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Canadian concerns throughout, the book will probably interest Canadian scholars more than those in other NAFTA countries.

Joseph McKinney, a professor of international economy at Baylor University, writes about the institutions created in the NAFTA agreement in individual chapters on the Free Trade Commission, the Commission for Labor Cooperation, the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, the North American Development Bank, and the dispute settlement mechanisms. McKinney's book also contains excerpts from the NAFTA agreement and a listing of web pages for NAFTA-related institutions. His research included some interviews with staffs of the institutions and extensive use of the published literature accessible through Lexis-Nexis. McKinney's book offers a cogent summary of scattered information on the public record. He does not reveal secrets or provide in-depth analysis, but he does offer a competent overview.

The Free Trade Commission, the governing body of NAFTA comprised of cabinet-level officials, is assisted by a NAFTA secretariat, composed of mid-level officials in respective national capitals. One of its most important functions is maintaining the agreement's dispute settlement procedures. However, the author notes that the Free Trade Commission maintains no web site, and it does not effectively disseminate information about its activities. About the Commission for Labor Cooperation, McKinney indicates that it has little authority to remedy labor abuses. The Commission for Environmental Cooperation has been more effective in undertaking studies and in keeping citizens informed about its activities through its web site. In discussing the dispute settlement mechanisms, McKinney summarizes existing cases but gives little attention to controversial issues of sovereignty and transparency. He does not identify the NAFTA panelists or address the concerns of nationalists that ad hoc NAFTA panels can override U.S. law.

Generally supportive of NAFTA, McKinney concludes that its "institutions are for the most part rather minimalist institutions at a very early stage of their development" (p. 243). He notes that they were given limited power and limited resources, and concludes that "underfunding" is a "hindrance to their further development" (p. 243). He thinks that "as economic integration deepens within North America, the NAFTA-related institutions will take on increasing significance" (p. 244).

While neither of these books reaches the threshold of must reading, scholars interested in the NAFTA agreement and its implementation will want to spend time with both volumes.

ALFRED E. ECKES
Ohio University

A History of Environmental Politics Since 1945 *by Samuel P. Hays. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000. 250 pp. Paper, $19.95.*

Samuel Hays offers what must be considered his valedictory to a distinguished career as the leading historian of environmentalism in the United States. The

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book's title is a misnomer: Hays does not describe so much as offer a sweeping assessment of the fundamental tensions that have defined American environmental politics since midcentury. Readers seeking an encyclopedic sourcebook on the history of environmental politics must look elsewhere, for Hays has a far different purpose in mind. He seeks to explain the why of what has happened. This is not a balanced assessment; Hays long ago chose sides. What we get instead is a rather remarkable intellectual tour from one of the true pioneers in the study of environmental politics.

Knitting this book together is Hays's theme that the evolution of postwar American environmental politics must be understood through the emerging and, today, continued tension between proponents of environmental values and defenders of the more dominant developmental agenda. He thus connects the urbanization—and suburbanization—of the nation with the emergence of an environmental ethos that in many ways stands as the sole contemporary critique of free market capitalism.

He uses this conceptual organizing device to examine three competing forces in environmental politics: those seeking to protect and improve the environment; those defending the developmental agenda—whom Hays firmly calls "anti-environmentalists"; and, finally, the institutions of policy development and implementation at both state and federal levels. In doing so, Hays brings to bear a vast literature, ranging from environmental ethics to political science studies of congressional voting behavior. None of this literature is footnoted, an intentional omission that Hays compensates for with a superb, annotated bibliography.

Hays's guided tour through fifty years of environmental politics leaves the reader with several conclusions. First, progress has been made, particularly in such areas as the protection of nature through wildlife preserves and the like; but the forces defending developmental values remain dominant, supported by a culture that values individual freedom and a legal system that sanctifies private property rights over common goods.

Second, the institutions that define American constitutional government are both obstacles to and opportunities for those promoting environmental values. If separation of powers and federalism enable anti-environmentalists to stall or undercut broad-spectrum progress on the environmental agenda, these same institutional features offer environmentalists the nooks and crannies to push more focused, more attainable objectives. Environmental policy thus "has been modest, selective, and incremental rather than comprehensive" (p. 234), an apt description of American policy making writ-large.

Finally, Hays ends by observing that this tension between environmental and developmental values will continue until Americans come to terms with what Hays sees as very definite limits to growth. Given the strength and persistence of the forces for development, as well as the dominant American conception of the Good Life, Hays is not optimistic on this point.

There are a few frustrations in the book. Hays's observations come in relatively short thematic chunks, so the flow of the book seems disjointed. There

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is also some repetition from chapter to chapter, acceptable enough because of the thematic discreteness of each chapter but frustrating nonetheless. However, these frustrations are mitigated by the worth of the observations themselves, particularly for anyone who seeks a broad assessment of the nature of contemporary American environmental politics. This book is especially useful for undergraduate and graduate courses on environmental politics and policy making, or as a supplement for courses on public policy making generally.

CHRISTOPHER J. BOSSO
Northeastern University

Inventing Local Democracy: Grassroots Politics in Brazil *by Rebecca Neara Abers. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2000. 267 pp. $59.95.*

Clientelism has a long history in Latin America. Despite the wave of democratization that has swept over the region in the past few decades, the exchange of favors for votes remains a persistent pattern in relations between elected politicians and their constituents. Yet important exceptions have emerged. In *Inventing Local Democracy*, Rebecca Neara Abers examines a fascinating example: the adoption of a participatory budget process in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre. The new budgetary policy not only shifted the bulk of government spending to the poor, but institutionalized the participation of poor people in political decision making. The book explains how Porto Alegre managed to put the ideals of participatory democracy into practice on a large scale.

How was the Porto Alegre government able to achieve this transformation? Two main answers emerge from this study: fiscal decentralization and a political strategy that prioritized mass participation in governance. Brazil's 1988 federal constitution devolved budgetary authority and increased federal transfers to local governments. The same year, the Workers' party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) won control of the mayoralty in Porto Alegre—and thirty-five other cities throughout Brazil. The PT was a new party with strong grassroots support; its victories demonstrated widespread support for alternatives to Brazil's traditional political elites. In Porto Alegre, a united party devoted considerable resources to public outreach and actively mobilized neighborhoods that had not been active before. Chapters Two and Three chart these changes and provide a helpful overview of Brazilian politics.

Chapters Four and Five describe how the process evolved. Drafting the budget starts from the bottom up, as people meet in their neighborhoods to generate lists of demands. Neighborhood organizations present these demands at regional assemblies, where a popularly elected council decides which ones to fund according to an established set of guidelines. Detailed information about the process itself and actual allocations is computerized and readily avail-

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able, facilitating monitoring. The transparency and inclusiveness of the process stand in dramatic contrast to the closed nature of budgetmaking in other Latin American countries.

Abers frames her analysis in terms of the development of participatory democracy and focuses primarily on the people who participated in the budget and the nature of their participation. Chapter Six examines the socioeconomic backgrounds of the participants and shows that most of them were poor and previously disenfranchised. A minority of them had a prior history of political engagement. Chapter Seven illustrates how the outreach services orchestrated by the Workers' party facilitated unprecedented levels of mobilization at the neighborhood level. Chapter Eight argues that the process engendered trust and created a lasting institutional network, and Chapter Nine shows how participation raised people's political consciousness. Abers's findings show how state policy shapes the development of social capital, defying expectations that a reserve of social capital is a prerequisite for the development of equitable policy.

Although this book is about the budget, it provides little evidence to support the claim that the new process shifted the bulk of government spending to the poor. Abers affirms that the government financed basic services and infrastructure for the poorest neighborhoods, but provides little data to support her claims. Budgetary data would have made the argument about the distributional effects of the new process more persuasive.

Inventing Local Democracy is well written and integrates theoretical considerations and empirical detail in a way that keeps the reader's attention focused on the broader significance of the Porto Alegre case. The book is not just for Brazilianists or even just for Latin Americanists. It provides a rich case study of an important phenomenon that speaks to a diverse array of topics, including decentralization, social capital, urban policy, and democratization. Readers with an interest in these topics will find this book compelling.

LISA BALDEZ
Washington University

Theories of International Relations: Transition vs. Persistence *by Michael P. Sullivan. New York, Palgrave, 2001. 317 pp. $59.95.*

Over the past five years, numerous stock-taking assessments of international relations theory have been published by leading IR journals and university presses. Like many of these appraisals, Michael P. Sullivan's *Theories of International Relations* challenges dominant theoretical approaches (read: neorealism and neoliberalism) and offers an alternative framework to account better for contemporary international politics. However, the book goes beyond existing field surveys in a number of significant ways. First, Sullivan wisely takes

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readers back to the important and often forgotten IR research of the 1960s and 1970s. In showing the antecedents of current IR theory, Sullivan demonstrates more than once that some present-day IR theorizing is not as original as some of its proponents might suggest. Second, while critiquing prominent perspectives, Sullivan usefully points out that rather than discard theories or accept them as universally applicable we would do better to consider the empirical conditions and circumstances under which they best apply. In particular, Sullivan reminds us that IR scholars often talk past each other when they ignore or obscure the fact that different theories speak to different dependent variables. Finally, although the book emphasizes international security and questions realism, it also includes chapters on international political economy and the origins and changing fortunes of other theoretical approaches, including liberalism, constructivism, and political psychology. Thus, the book should have broad appeal for graduate students and scholars looking for a good overview of major theoretical trends in the subfield.

Ironically, the greatest strengths of *Theories of International Relations* also point to its strongest weaknesses. By delving so thoroughly into the IR literature of the cold war era, Sullivan shortchanges much of the new wave of realist research. For example, recent seminal studies by Randall Schweller and William Wohlforth, which signal the subfield's return to classical realism, are not given adequate treatment. Wohlforth does not appear in Sullivan's otherwise extensive bibliography, and Schweller's work is mentioned only in passing.

In addition, while Sullivan's broad sweep of the IR literature correctly notes that there are numerous IR research agendas couched at different levels of analysis, each of which has generated multiple and often competing theories, he fails to discuss whether a paradigmatic or a levels approach provides a better organizing device for IR theory, or whether they should be combined. Should we, for instance, be talking about second image realism or third image institutionalism? Although there is no right or wrong answer here, this is a perennial question, and it would have been insightful to learn of Sullivan's take on it.

Even more conspicuously absent is any discussion of the larger metatheoretical issues that the book raises. How should we distinguish a good theory from a bad one? What sorts of theoretical revisions are legitimate, and which are simply attempts to save favorite theories from discrepant empirical evidence? In order to address these questions properly, Sullivan needed to provide readers with his reasons for choosing and then abide by his choice of a recognized metric of theory appraisal. Yet, missing from the book is an extended discussion of theoretical progress illuminated by Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, and other philosophers of science who have tried to establish criteria for assessing the quality of theoretical emendations. Sullivan's sporadic mention of Kuhn does not replace the more thorough treatment of these issues that a book of this sort requires.

These limitations aside, *Theories of International Relations* does an excellent job of presenting IR theorizing over the past five decades. Students and

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scholars interested in the roots of contemporary IR research will find a wealth of information in its pages; however, those wanting answers as to why some IR theories wax while others wane and how theoretical winners and losers are selected may be better off looking elsewhere.

MIRIAM FENDIUS ELMAN
Arizona State University

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Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund, 1979–1989 *by James M. Boughton, Washington, DC, The International Monetary Fund, 2001. 1111 pp. $75.00.*

Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought *edited by Paul Barry Clarke and Joe Foweraker. New York, Routledge, 2001. 748 pp. $200.00.*

Government Leaders, Military Rulers, and Political Activists: An Encyclopedia of People Who Changed the World (Lives & Legacies Series) *edited by David W. Del Testa. Westport, CT, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001. 256 pp. $69.95.*

Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict *edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall. Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001. 936 pp. Cloth, $59.00; paper, $35.00.*

Sources of Holocaust Research: An Analysis *by Raul Hilberg. Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, Publisher, 2001. 218 pp. $26.00.*

South-East Asia: A Political Profile *by Damien Kingsbury. New York, Oxford University Press, 2001. 444 pp. Paper, $24.95.*

Partisan Linkages in Southern Politics: Elites, Voters, and Identifiers *by Michael A. Maggioto and Gary D. Wekkin. Knoxville, The University of Tennessee Press, 2001, $38.00.*

Public Speech and the Culture of Public Life in the Age of Gladstone *by Joseph S. Meisel. New York, Columbia University Press, 2001. 382 pp. $50.00.*

Ethics in U.S. Government: An Encyclopedia of Investigations, Scandals, Reforms, and Legislation *by Robert North Roberts. Westport, CT, Greenwood Publishing Publishing Group, 2001. 392 pp. $65.00.*

The ICSID Convention: A Commentary *by Christoph H. Schreuer and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2001. 1466 pp. $225.00.*

Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environment and Development 2001/2002 (Ninth Volume) *edited by Olav Schram Stokke and Oystein B. Thommessen. London, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2001. 384 pp. Cloth, $75.00; paper, $25.00.*

Learning to Manage Global Environmental Risks, Vol. 1: A Comparative History of Social Responses to Climate Change, Ozone Depletion, and Acid Rain *by The Social Learning Group. Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 2001. 376 pp. $75.00.*

Learning to Manage Global Environmental Risks, Vol. 2: A Functional Analysis of Social Responses to Climate Change, Ozone Depletion, and Acid Rain *by The Social Learning Group. Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 2001. 226 pp. $60.00.*

The State of the World's Refugees 2000: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action *by the United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees (UNHCR). New York, Oxford University Press, 2000. 352 pp. Paper, $19.95.*

A Moral Temper: The Letters of Dwight Macdonald *edited by Michael Wreszin. Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, Publisher, 2001. 481 pp. $35.00.*

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

Demetrios James Caraley is quite right to argue that "Americans deserve the constitutional right to vote for president"—a right they now lack—and that the present system of presidential electors could be dangerous "if, unlike the 2000 election, a future presidential election were to be fought over intensely divisive foreign or domestic proposals." ("Editor's Opinion: Why Americans Deserve a Constitutional Right to Vote for Presidential Electors," *PSQ* 116 [Spring 2001]). But an equal danger arises from the continuation of first-past-the-post elections, now popular here and abroad, which frequently produce winners without clear popular mandates.

Consider the smashing electoral triumphs won by Margaret Thatcher's Tories in 1979, 1983, and 1987. The divided opposition in each case won the vast majority of the votes; the Tories' share was consistently in the low 40s. The opposition felt doubly resentful because Britain's government, almost by definition, is an elected dictatorship. Or consider the tragic consequences that followed two famous presidential elections where the winner gained less than 40 percent of the total vote: Salvador Allende in Chile in 1970 and Abraham Lincoln in the United States in 1860.

Many jurisdictions here and abroad use runoff elections to provide clear winners. But runoffs have serious defects: turnouts are usually low; costs are excessive for taxpayers and campaign supporters; and frequently, as in Los Angeles' recent election, the results can reverse those of the regular election. But all our problems would vanish under the system of instant-runoff voting utilized by the Australians and the Irish. Voters designate not only their top choice but also their secondary choices. If nobody shows an immediate majority, the losing candidates are eliminated one by one, and their supporters' alternative choices redistributed until somebody goes over 50 percent. If such a system had been used in November 2000, the redistributed Nader votes would have given Gore a clear electoral and popular-vote victory.

WILLIAM M. BURKE

To the Editor:

I applaud the significant—even courageous—step taken by *Political Science Quarterly* in publishing the article by Jerome Slater entitled "What Went

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Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process." During the course of a thirty-five-year career in the Foreign Service, I followed Israeli–Arab developments closely. For me and many others, the persistent lack of balance in the public dialogue about these matters has been both palpable and troubling. Slater's arguments are sound, his scholarship and analysis marked by careful research and documentation.

By thinking outside the box and challenging some of the American and Israeli shibboleths surrounding the peace process, Slater's article should stand as a major contribution in a more sober and thoughtful pursuit of peace in the Middle East.

DAVID E. ZWEIFEL
U.S. Ambassador (Retired)

To the Editor:

Jerome Slater's claim that "Israel rather than the Palestinians bears the greater share of the responsibility . . . for the entire course of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict since 1948" [*PSQ* 116 (Summer 2001)] is disingenuous, because a careful reading of his article reveals a simplistic Manichaean interpretation that assigns all the blame for the origin and perpetuation of the conflict to Jews, Zionism, and Israel and absolves the Palestinians and the Arab states from any responsibility for the protracted confrontations and impasse.

In Slater's seriously distorted view of history, all Israeli officials (Ben-Gurion, Meir, Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu, Barak, and Sharon) emerge as thoroughly cunning, malicious, or inept politicians, while all Arab leaders (Anwar Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, Kings Abdullah and Hussein, Hafaz Assad, and Yasser Arafat) appear as prudent statesmen "who reached and maintained compromise agreements with an Israel that was far more reluctant to sign them than were the Arabs." Slater's flawed interpretation is filled with several additional curious dichotomies: for example, Palestinian behavior is rooted in the moral imperative of resistance to occupation, while Israel policies are not only devoid of any ethical considerations but also reflect false consciousness; Palestinians' resort to violence is attributed to "spontaneous eruption" while Israeli actions vis-à-vis the Palestinians are always products of careful plans and plots.

Lastly, in debunking the widely accepted Zionist narrative of the conflict, Slater creates his own myths. That Israel alone is responsible for the origin of the refugee problem is a myth that has been rejected by all of the so-called revisionist Israel historians. The assertion that a Jewish–Palestinian compromise was possible in 1947–1948 is a product of the author's fertile imagination, because it completely ignores King Abdullah's own political designs for the area west of the Jordan River. The statement that since 1988 "Arafat and the Palestinian Authority accepted that Israel . . . would comprise 78 percent of the land of Palestine, as that was defined in the League of Nations Mandate to Britain in 1919" makes no sense whatsoever because Transjordan (the area

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east of the river, present-day Jordan) by itself accounted for 80 percent of the original Mandatory Palestine. The claim that "Clinton quickly abandoned the policy position of every American President since 1967: that Israeli settlements in the West Bank were both illegal and an obstacle to peace" ascribes to the Johnson and Nixon administrations' views that they did not in fact espouse.

MICHAEL RUBNER
Michigan State University

To the Editor:

I served as American Consul in Jerusalem from September 1976 until July 1980. In that capacity, I had the opportunity of viewing at first-hand the struggle over the land of Mandatory Palestine by the Palestinian Arabs and the Israeli Jews. Subsequently, during the ensuing twenty years, I have followed this struggle as closely as I could. I would like to state that Jerome Slater's article in your recent journal is one of the most accurate accounts of the past fifty years of this conflict that I have ever read and I congratulate the *Quarterly* for publishing it.

Taking advantage of the scholarly works of recent Israeli writers based on newly-opened Israeli official sources, Slater has written honestly, if painfully, of the deceptions of the conventional Israeli mythology of its history. As he writes in his second paragraph, "Contrary to the prevailing view, Israel rather than the Palestinians bears the greater share of the responsibility . . . for the entire course of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict 1948." This is a general conclusion which takes a great desire for historical truthfulness and an equal amount of courage to state in the American public arena. This is not what most Americans have assumed as fact and not what they find easy to believe. However, if the United States is ever to play an honest role in trying to bring peace to the Israelis and Palestinian it should read carefully what Slater has written.

DONALD A. KRUSE
Vienna, VA

To the Editor:

Jerome Slater subscribes to the Palestinian view of the Middle-East conflict. This is, of course, his legitimate right. What is not legitimate is trying to cloak this political bias in academic disguise. I focus only on his methods and mistakes.

"Israeli 'new history' has decisively refuted the conventional historiography [which argued that justice is on Israel's side] . . ." (p. 172). The whole article is based on this assumption without even mentioning the response of "conventional" history. It is an acceptable methodological imperative to engage competing explanations in order to show why they hold weaker explanatory power. Not only does Slater not engage the conventionalist response, he does not even acknowledge its existence. He is content merely to repeat a number of times the revisionist claim that conventional historiography has been "refuted" (p. 174). I doubt the conventional historians would agree.

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Furthermore, it is surprising to read in an academic article that historiographies can be "refuted."

To complement this historiographical bias, when dealing with current affairs Slater bases his narrative mainly on analyses published in the Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz* (twenty-three of forty-nine footnotes). Nowhere does the author reveal to his readers that he cites only journalists well known for their identification with the pro-Palestinian line. Again, following his failure to mention this bias, Slater is absolved of the requirement to contrast *Ha'aretz* narratives and analyses with other accounts. On the basis of this flawed methodology and biased sources, one should not be surprised with the results. Given space limits, I cannot list all their deficiencies; the following are only the most glaring ones.

Two examples of Slater's unsubstantiated assertions are the following statements, for which he offers no citations. First, Israel worked after 1948 to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state (p. 174). How could it, given that the Palestinian territories were under Arab rule? Second, the expulsion of the Palestinians began well before the 1948 Arab invasion (p. 174). How could it, when Palestine was still under British control? When Slater does offer citations, he is not beyond distorting them. Slater cites Iyad's *Foreign Policy* article as committing the Palestinians to a state that would be largely demilitarized, would accept the stationing of international peacekeeping forces, and would refrain from alliances with Arab rejectionist states (p. 176). Actually, there is no mention in the article of any constraints on a Palestinian state. On the contrary, it explicitly states that ". . . the Palestinians are open to any kind of . . . security . . . arrangements *that do not encroach upon the sovereignty* of any of the states involved" (p. 96, emphasis added).

Slater's biased sloppiness is most evident in his factual errors. The PLO did NOT begin crossborder guerrilla raids in the 1950s (p. 175), because it was established only in 1964. The Israeli Labor governments of the 1960s and 1970s did NOT place settlements in areas that would separate Palestinian cities and villages (p. 176); only one settlement was created in a populated area (near Hebron) while all the rest were placed in an unpopulated area (along the Jordan River). Peres did NOT head any settlement-oriented government then; he was a mere 'caretaker' for forty days in 1977, during which time no settlement was created. Rabin did NOT begin implementing his plan a year after he announced it in October 1995 (p. 177, fn. 8) because he was dead a month later. Above all, Security Council Resolution 242 did NOT call for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from *the* territories conquered in 1967 (emphasis added, p. 176). It called for the withdrawal "from territories," without the "the." The difference is crucial, which is precisely the reason why the "the" was omitted from preliminary drafts before the final one was adopted. This, most probably, is not a mere factual error. Slater simply prefers the Arabic version, which is incompatible with the formal UN one.

AHARON (Ronnie) BARTH
Georgetown University

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To the Editor:

I wish to congratulate PSQ for the recent publication of Jerome Slater's article on the Israeli–Palestinian situation, "What Went Wrong." I try to follow this subject closely and found Slater's article to be an excellent analysis of this situation, especially of its latest phase and of former Prime Minister Barak's supposed generosity to the Palestinian side last year.

It is unfortunate that most of the American press and politicians so easily accept the positions of the Israeli officialdom or of the right-wing faction in Israeli politics as if there were no other viewpoint worth considering. Homegrown "Israeli patriots" who predictably defend every Israeli government policy, especially those that are most hard-line, will never concede that Israel might be wrong occasionally. Their inflexible opinion that Israel is always in the right is reminiscent of a previous generation of uncritical supporters of the former Soviet Union or Maoist China who adamantly denied any flaw in those countries' official actions or policies.

What I found particularly valuable is Slater's appeal to much of the influential American Jewish community to rethink its position of uncritical support of the present government of Ariel Sharon and end its own "prediliction to turn a blind eye toward the true history and present realities of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict." Not only are the deaths of Palestinians in the present intifada three to four times greater than those of the Israelis, but Israeli soldiers are now acting with greater brutality to Palestinian civilians than one ever imagined they would.

Jews know from their history that they were frequently the victims of religious persecution or worse. This makes it difficult for many of us to acknowledge that in the present conflict between Israelis and Palestinians it is the Jews who are more often the victimizers. Despite all the faults, the chauvinism, and crimes of some of the Palestinians, it is this people who are fighting for freedom against a harshly oppressive and humiliating occupation. Slater's is a needed voice in this controversy.

SID RESNICK
Jewish Currents

The Author Responds:

I am accused by Barth and Rubner of being "pro-Palestinian" and "an apologist" for Palestinian leaders, and of making a number of factual errors, a consequence either of my ideological biases or sloppy scholarship. It is, of course, predictable—but no less distressing—that any serious criticism of Israeli policy will be labeled by many as "anti-Israeli" or "pro-Palestinian."

Barth is particularly revealing when he says that I cite only "journalists well known for their identification with the pro-Palestinian line." I cited six leading journalists and regular columnists of *Ha'aretz*, widely acknowledged to be Israel's leading newspaper. Barth would do well to reflect on the implications of his

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charge: What would it say about Israeli policy if many of the top columnists and journalists of Israel's most serious newspaper were "pro-Palestinian"?

I do not assign "all" the blame to the Israelis and absolve the Palestinians from "any" responsibility for the continuing conflict: what I said was that Israel "bears the greater share of the responsibility." The Palestinians have made plenty of mistakes, and I pointed them out in several places in the article (see page 173, 189, and 191–92). Still, I certainly do believe that the Palestinian version of both past and recent history is more accurate than the Israeli version.

This brings us to the question of factual errors. I regret two careless but minor errors, both of them irrelevant to the point I was making. First, as Barth points out the PLO was not founded until 1964 and therefore could not have been involved, *as such*, in the guerrilla raids of the 1950s. However, the Palestinian organization Fatah played a major role in those raids, and Fatah later became the core group within the PLO. Thus, Barth has seized upon a minor error to make an easy debater's point, devoid of significance.

Second, Rabin of course was assassinated in 1995 rather than in 1996, as I implied. However, the point I was making was that his "peace plan," announced in detail in October 1995, was seriously flawed. I should have stated that Rabin began to implement this plan "in the next month," rather than "in the next year."

All the other allegations about factual errors are demonstrably wrong. Unfortunately space does not permit me to rebut them. But here is one example. Rubner makes another empty debater's point about what constitutes "Palestine." He is correct that the *original* 1919 League Mandate to Britain included Transjordan; however, I am sure he also knows that Britain separated Transjordan from Palestine in 1922 before the Mandate came into effect. Since then, the term "Palestine" has been understood by everyone to comprise Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza—but not Jordan. Thus, the Palestinians are completely right—and Israelis don't challenge them—when they say that they have already accepted that Israel would comprise 78 percent (that is, Israel within the 1967 boundaries) of the land of Palestine.

JEROME SLATER

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

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

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

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
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

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

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

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

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